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The objective of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate is:
‘To ensure that the resources available to the Garda 
Síochána are used so as to achieve and maintain the highest 
levels of efficiency and effectiveness in its operation and 
administration, as measured by reference to the best 
standards of comparable police services.’
(s. 117 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005)
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This inspection examined the effectiveness of 
the Garda Síochána at preventing, detecting 
and mitigating against internal corruption. 
This report marks a significant milestone for 
the Garda Inspectorate as it is the outcome of 
the first self-initiated inspection.
Due to the unique nature of policing, 
corruption will always pose a threat to the 
integrity of the Garda Síochána. This threat 
comes from those within the garda workforce, 
as well as from groups and individuals 
outside the organisation, such as organised 
crime groups seeking to corrupt susceptible 
individuals. It is clear that the majority of 
the garda workforce are decent and honest, 
but as various tribunals of inquiry and other 
investigations have found, a small minority 
abuse their privileged position by engaging 
in dishonest, inappropriate or unethical 
behaviour. Corruption is deeply damaging 
and when revealed it impacts negatively on 
public confidence in the Garda Síochána.
This inspection found that across the 
criminal justice sector there is no common 
understanding of the threat posed by 
corruption, and that cooperation between 
the criminal justice agencies is often 
uncoordinated, with no formal process 
in place to share information. To address 
this lack of coordination, the Department 
of Justice should develop an overarching 
counter-corruption strategy and the relevant 
organisations must adopt a multi-agency 
approach. In addition, the Garda Síochána 
must develop intelligence and information-
sharing protocols around corruption with the 
Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission 
and other relevant agencies.
While this inspection identified several 
areas of good practice, and the intention 
to establish an Anti-Corruption Unit is a 
positive development, the Garda Síochána 
must also do more than simply react to 
instances of corruption as they occur. 
Instead, it must take a proactive and holistic 
approach to identifying and tackling 
corruption. This includes the assignment of 
sufficient resources to the Anti-Corruption 
Unit to create dedicated intelligence and 
investigation teams.
There are a number of important tools 
which would assist the Garda Síochána 
in assessing the risk of corruption. Of 
particular importance is the development of 
a strategic assessment of corruption threats, 
with the absence of such an assessment 
being a significant organisational risk. The 
lack of important prevention and detection 
policies, such as in relation to professional 
boundaries, in-service vetting and substance 
misuse testing, is also a gap that needs to be 
addressed.
It was concerning to find that many members 
of the garda workforce continue to have 
significant reservations about speaking up 
and reporting wrongdoing. The intention 
of the Garda Síochána to create confidential 
lines and systems for anonymous reporting 
is welcome, and while these are not yet in 
place, they should help to encourage people 
to report unethical and corrupt behaviour.
This report contains a number of 
recommendations designed to deliver a 
more effective approach to countering the 
threat of corruption. I am convinced that the 
implementation of these recommendations 
will ensure that the Garda Síochána and 
the wider criminal justice sector are better 
prepared to prevent and detect corruption.
I would like to thank the members of the 
garda workforce as well as representatives 
from other organisations and agencies for 








While the Garda Síochána has a long and 
distinguished history of integrity and service 
to the community, from time to time, just 
as in any modern police service, scandals 
regarding individual and systemic failures, 
including instances of corruption, have 
punctuated this history.  Corruption has a 
detrimental effect on the integrity and morale 
of the police workforce and undermines 
human rights and public confidence in 
policing.
In June 2019 the Inspectorate commenced its 
first ever self-initiated inspection Countering 
the Threat of Internal Corruption in the 
Garda Síochána.















The purpose of the inspection was not to 
identify specific incidents of corruption 
within the Garda Síochána but rather to 
examine the effectiveness of the Garda 
Síochána at preventing, detecting and 
mitigating against the threat of internal 
corruption.  The inspection also assessed the 
structures, strategies and processes in the 
Garda Síochána, benchmarking them against 
a range of commonly accepted counter-
corruption functions which are considered 
necessary for any modern police service to 
operate effectively.  
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The inspection was divided into five pillars 
as follows: 
 > Strategy and Governance: Examines 
how the Criminal Justice Sector develops 
understanding of the threats posed by 
internal corruption and the effectiveness 
of the Garda Síochána’s counter-
corruption governance structures.  
 > Professional integrity: Examines 
how professional integrity, corporate 
responsibi l i ty and professional 
boundaries can strengthen the garda 
workforce against the pernicious effects 
of corruption.
 > Organisational Resilience: Examines 
the Garda Síochána’s defences against 
corruption. It also examines what 
practices are in place to protect against 
the misuse of police discretion for corrupt 
purposes.
 > Intelligence and Investigation:  Examines 
the identification and investigation of 
corruption. It also examines a number of 
important counter-corruption strategies, 
including identifying the Abuse of Power 
for Sexual Gain, reporting wrongdoing 
and the monitoring of ethical declarations 
by the garda workforce.
 > Communication and Engagement: 
Examines the support processes that need 
to be in place for the garda workforce. 
It also considers how organisational 
learning can build greater resilience in 
the Garda Síochána. 
            
How Does the Garda Síochána 
Identify and Respond to the 
Threat of Corruption Within the 
Organisation?
In order for any police service to effectively 
respond to the threats posed by corruption 
it must have a clear strategic understanding 
of emerging risks and their effect on the 
workforce and the wider environment. 
There also needs to be a structured process 
for prioritising the organisation’s response to 
these threats and assessing the effectiveness 
of its actions. 
 > This inspection found that across the 
criminal justice sector there is no common 
understanding of the threat posed by 
corruption, and that cooperation between 
the criminal justice agencies is often 
uncoordinated, with no formal process 
in place to share information.   The 
Inspectorate recommends greater cross 
sectoral cooperation and the development 
of a multi-agency counter-corruption 
strategy.
 > The inspection found that strategic 
governance of counter corruption within 
the Garda Síochána is underdeveloped, 
with no strategic analysis of corruption 
threats  and counter-corruption 
leadership responsibilities spread across 
a number of functional areas. This has 
the effect of  limiting the ability of the 
organisation to respond holistically and 
effectively to corruption threats. 
 > To address the gaps in strategic 
g o ve r n a n c e ,  t h e  I n s p e c t o r a t e 
recommends  the appointment of 
a senior police leader with overall 
responsibility for counter corruption, the 
development of a strategic assessment of 
corruption threats, and the setting out of 
a counter-corruption control strategy that 
establishes priorities for action. 
... strategic governance of counter 
corruption within the Garda 
Síochána is underdeveloped ... 
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What Steps Does the Garda 
Síochána Need to Take to Enhance 
Professional  Integrity Across the 
Garda Workforce? 
This strand of the inspection which focused 
on Enhancing Professional Integrity in the 
Garda Síochána examined both personal 
integrity and corporate responsibility in the 
organisation.  In particular, the Inspectorate 
explored the Principles of Democratic 
Policing which underpin the development 
and maintenance of professional boundaries 
in the police workforce and the corporate 
governance practices necessary to fulfil the 
fiduciary duties of garda leadership and the 
garda workforce, more generally.
Managing Relationships and 
Associations
International experience has demonstrated 
that clear professional standards help to 
clarify the boundary between relationships 
that are acceptable and those that are not 
within policing organisations.  Developing a 
culture that supports the workforce to build 
appropriate relationships and that sets clear 
professional boundaries is essential.
 > While certain standards of conduct are 
set out in the Garda Code of Ethics, 
including a set of general principles in 
relation to the standards of behaviour 
expected of the garda workforce, these 
principles need to be reinforced by 
clear policies and detailed guidelines on 
maintaining appropriate relationships in 
all aspects of the workforce’s professional 
lives.  
 > There are also significant gaps in the 
guidance related to several key priority 
areas including: maintaining professional 
boundaries, abuse of power for sexual 
gain, relationships and associations which 
should be notified to supervisors (e.g. 
with journalists, private investigators or 
former colleagues), special relationships 
such as with covert human intelligence 










Figure B - Counter-corruption framework to enhance professional integrity
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Abuse of Power for Sexual Gain
Abuse of Power for Sexual Gain (APSG) can 
be extremely harmful to the persons affected 
and represents a significant breach of trust 
with profound implications for the victims, 
the organisation itself and the wider criminal 
justice sector. Abuse of power by police 
officers for sexual or emotional purposes is 
a major  emerging issue in policing across 
the common law world and beyond, and 
required specific comment in the report.  
 > There is no shared understanding 
of the concept between the Garda 
Síochána, oversight bodies and groups 
representing and supporting vulnerable 
victims.  In particular, there was no clear 
understanding of common behavioural 
characteristics or indicators nor was 
there any awareness-raising of the issue 
among leaders, supervisors or the wider 
workforce.
 > The risk to the Garda Síochána was 
poorly grasped and cases were dealt with 
in isolation.  This is an issue which has 
profound human rights implications for 
victims, the organisation and the criminal 
justice sector.
 > The Garda Síochána can draw valuable 
lessons from cases identified by oversight 
bodies and voluntary and support groups 
and enhance the safety of vulnerable 
individuals at risk of such abuse. 
 > To address this, it is recommended that 
the Garda Síochána should develop 
and implement a policy and detailed 
guidelines and raise awareness of the 
issue within and outside the organisation, 
including understanding of common 
behavioural characteristics of those 
engaged in this type of abuse.    
Corporate Responsibility
As well as the obvious duty to exercise 
their policing powers fairly and impartially 
the police workforce have a clear fiduciary 
duty to safeguard public resources.  This 
duty is most obvious in the case of garda 
leaders, managers and supervisors in terms 
of promoting good corporate governance 
practices within the organisation.
 > While the Garda Code of Ethics sets out 
a clear duty on the garda workforce to 
declare and manage conflicts of interest, 
there is no formal process to facilitate the 
exercise of this duty.  In addition, there 
are limited guidelines on identifying 
potential conflicts and limited awareness 
among the garda workforce of common 
situations which can lead to such 
conflicts.
 > Two specific areas, relating to business 
and other interests and post-employment 
activities, are not as well regulated in the 
Garda Síochána as in comparable police 
services. These areas are also subject to 
different rules depending on a person’s 
position within the organisation.
 > The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Garda Síochána develop and implement 
policies and guidelines in relation to the 
management of conflicts of interest and in 
particular the two special cases of conflict 
of interest concerning outside business 
and other interests and post-employment 
activities by garda members.
Abuse of Power for Sexual Gain can be 
extremely harmful to the persons affected 
and represents a significant breach of 






 > The Garda Síochána needs to go 
beyond developing and circulating 
policies and HQ Directives to embed 
integrity-building measures across the 
organisation.  The garda policy on gifts, 
hospitality and sponsorship in particular 
highlights the importance of such an 
approach. While such a policy was 
introduced in 2018, the policy is poorly 
understood and key provisions, such as 
the publication of a register, had failed 
to be implemented at the time of the 
inspection.  This was in contrast to the 
situation in other police services where 
the recording and publicising of gifts 
and hospitality received by or offered to 
members of the police workforce were 
completely transparent.   
 > The Inspectorate has also recommended 
that members of the garda workforce 
undertake periodic integrity health 
checks with their  supervisors, 
particularly at important career points 
such as on promotion or selection for 
specialist or designated roles.
What Systems and Processes in 
the Garda Síochána Need to be 
Strengthened to Build Resilience 
Against Corruption? 
A wide range of garda systems and 
processes which contribute to building 
resilience to corruption in the organisation, 
including procurement, vetting, audit and 
risk management, were examined during 
the course of the inspection. While many of 
these systems contribute greatly to counter-
corruption in the Garda Síochána some 
weaknesses were identified in several of 
the systems or processes.  These have been 
highlighted in the inspection report. 
Figure C - Comparison of police services with similar environments and functions to the 
Garda Síochána that are required to publish gifts, hospitality and sponsorship online
Source: Examination of police service websites
The Garda Síochána needs to go beyond 
developing and circulating policies 
and HQ Directives to embed integrity-




Ineffective vetting of recruits will expose 
the public and criminal justice agencies and 
institutions to increased risks associated with 
national security, public safety, cyber-attack 
and fraud.
 > Some of the weaknesses identified by the 
Inspectorate included; the absence of a 
comprehensive, principles-based vetting 
code of practice; limited in-service re-
vetting; criminal record checks limited 
to garda prosecutions and convictions 
on the PULSE system; and limited 
international vetting checks.
 > The Inspectorate recommends that 
the Garda Síochána undertake the 
following:  develop a comprehensive 
vetting approach which can facilitate 
vetting tailored to role and access to 
police systems by initiating in-service re-
vetting; comprehensive criminal record 
checks including foreign convictions; 
and financial, social media and prior 
employment checks.  
Property Management
Property and evidence management is a 
critical function in any police service.  It is 
vital for the efficient management of criminal 
investigations and prosecutions.  Several 
weaknesses identified by the Inspectorate in 
Garda Property and Evidence Management 
System (PEMS) are highlighted in the report.
PEMS 
Training




 > The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Garda Síochána improve the recording of 
evidence seized during search operations 
and the security of PEMS stores and 
personnel.
Information Security
Garda information systems are a vast 
repository of sensitive information and 
a valuable commodity for persons with 
bad intentions seeking to exploit such 
information, including; terrorists, organised 
crime groups, and those intending to exploit 
vulnerable persons or to benefit commercially 
from such information.
 > While the PULSE system appears 
to have an effective audit function 
which identifies members of the garda 
workforce who access or change a record, 
unlike other police services it does not 
have the capacity for proactive real-time 
monitoring of information systems to 
detect suspicious persons and activities. 
 > The Inspectorate found that investigations 
into serious criminality such as 
suspected child sexual exploitation 
or sexual violence by members of the 
garda workforce outside of their work 
environment did not automatically result 
in an audit of their police system user 
history to identify other possible victims 
or instances of police computer systems 
misuse. 
 > The report recommends that the 
Garda Síochána enhance its capability 
for proactive surveillance of police 
information systems and always review 
an individual’s use of garda ICT systems 
following identified or suspected 
unethical behaviour. This should be a 
responsibility of the Anti-Corruption 
Unit once it has been established.
What Discretionary Garda 
Powers Did the Inspectorate 
Identify that Require Greater 
Scrutiny and Supervision?
Police discretion is a well-established feature 
of modern policing but it harbours the danger 
of misuse.  The Inspectorate examined a 
range of areas within the Garda Síochána 
where a wide degree of discretion exists and 
where strong leadership and supervision are 
critically important for the fair and consistent 
delivery of policing services free from the 
risk of coercion or corruption.
Discontinued Cases
Unlike any of the other police services 
benchmarked for this report, garda members 
have a wide discretion under statute to 
institute criminal proceedings in the State.
 > An examination of a sample of 
District Court prosecution files by the 
Inspectorate identified significant gaps 
in the supervision and management of 
garda members and a high volume of 
prosecution cases that were discontinued 
at court. 
 > The types of discontinued cases included 
serious threats to public safety, such as; 
driving while intoxicated, and public 
order offences. The risk of corrupt 
... investigations into serious criminality 
such as suspected  child sexual exploitation 
or sexual violence by members of the 
garda workforce outside of their work 
environment does not automatically 




exploitation in the absence of strong 
supervision is clear and it constitutes a 
significant threat to the reputation of the 
Garda Síochána.
 > There were a number of reasons for the 
discontinuation of the cases sampled, 
with one of the more prominent being 
the non-attendance of the garda member 
responsible for the case.
&S
&S
Figure E - Top five reasons for discontinuation of garda prosecuted court cases
 > The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Garda Síochána introduce comprehensive 
guidelines for and strengthen the 
supervision of garda-led  prosecutions.
Fixed Charge Penalty System
The legislation underpinning the fixed charge 
penalty system provides for a statutory 
exemption for members of emergency 
services, including garda members, from 
the imposition of penalty points as a result 
of breaches of the road traffic laws.  There are 
two statutory conditions for the exemption 
to apply.  The garda member concerned 
must be driving or directing a vehicle in the 
performance of their duties and the use of 
the vehicle must not endanger the safety of 
other road users.  Garda policy imposes a 
third condition to the effect that the statutory 




 > The Inspectorate examined specific 
aspects of the system related to the 
statutory exemption from penalty points 
for emergency services personnel. 
Applications for statutory exemptions 
lacked detail and supporting verification 
by applicants and were not always 




Figure F - Fixed Charge Penalty Notices issued to garda members using official vehicles 
or private vehicles between August 2018 and August 2019
Source: Data supplied by the Fixed Charge Penalty Office; Analysis by the Garda Inspectorate
 > The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Garda Síochána process for cancelling  a 
Fixed Charge Penalty Notice  for a garda 
member considers all relevant factors and 
that the exceptional circumstances test be 
more rigorously applied in the decision-
making process.
Non-Public Duty
The Garda Síochána Act 2005 provides for 
the recovery of cost for policing certain 
events or activities, such as sporting fixtures, 
concerts and festivals, conferences and 
film productions, and for the protection of 
property at risk of harm.
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 > The Inspectorate recommends that 
the Garda Síochána introduce clearer 
guidance and more consistency in the 
charging and recovery of NPD costs 
including an approval role for Regional 
Assistant Commissioners.
How Can the Garda Síochána 
Best Organise its Approach to 
Identifying and Investigating 
Corruption in the Workforce?
This strand of the inspection focused on 
how the Garda Síochána can best organise 
its efforts to identify and investigate internal 
corruption as well as the optimal structure 
for the proposed Anti-Corruption Unit.  This 
included an examination of two important 
sources of information on the ethical health 
of an organisation: reporting wrongdoing 
and ethical monitoring. 
Operational Structure
Any response to corruption requires more 
than simply reacting to cases as they arise. 
The approach adopted in similar jurisdictions 
commonly follows four of the broad strands 
identified in the report, including plan, in 
terms of strategic assessment and governance; 
protect, in terms of building integrity within 
the police workforce; prevent, in terms of 
strengthening systems and supervision; 
and pursue, in terms of identifying and 
investigating instances of corruption.  The 
renewed counter-corruption approach 
announced by the Garda Commissioner in 
2019 must embrace all of these elements.
 > The Garda Síochána is in the process 
of establishing a standalone Anti-
Corruption Unit. The Inspectorate 
has recommended that for cases not 
























Figure G - Total amount charged by the Garda Síochána for non-public duty in 2018 and 
2019, by category of event
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána; analysis by the Garda Inspectorate
 > Several concerns regarding charging 
for non-public duty (NPD) events were 
highlighted during the inspection, in 
particular, lack of policy and guidance, 
inconsistent charging practices, charging 
of NPD for activities not originally 
foreseen in the legislative framework, 




Ombudsman Commission (GSOC) this 
unit should have primary organisational 
responsibility for the prevention, 
detection and investigation of internal 
corruption.
 > This should include a strong intelligence 
function allowing it to collate and 
develop intelligence from a range of 
internal and external sources and a 
dedicated investigative capability.  The 
unit should have an overview of all 
disciplinary and crime-related enquiries. 
Reporting Wrongdoing
Several international organisations, including 
the OECD and Transparency International, 
promote whistle-blowing as one of the 
most effective ways of tackling corruption 
in any organisation.  The Inspectorate has 
identified several barriers to the reporting of 

































Figure H - Barriers to the reporting of wrongdoing identified by the Garda Inspectorate 
 > This inspection found that while there is 
a comprehensive statutory framework 
for protected disclosures in the State 
and a recently strengthened policy in 
the Garda Síochána, there was poor 
understanding and lack of confidence in 
the protected disclosure process among 
the garda workforce.
 > In 2017 the Garda Síochána signed up to 
the Integrity at Work Pledge, a scheme 
which provides an independent advice 
service for persons considering making 
a protected disclosure, including 
a confidential reporting line. The 
Inspectorate found that there was very 
limited awareness of the programme at 
all levels of the organisation. 
 > In this regard the report recommends 
that the Garda Síochána implement 
a strategy to encourage reporting of 
wrongdoing and build understanding 




It is an important responsibility of any police 
service to proactively monitor ethical and 
professional standards.  This inspection 
found a significant deficit in corruption and 
integrity related policies and guidelines for 
the garda workforce as well as the lack of a 
broad range of ethical declarations common 
in other police services.  Having a single 
body responsible for monitoring all  ethical 
declarations by collating, analysing and 




















Figure I - Monitoring of ethical declarations by the Anti-Corruption Unit 
 > The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Anti-Corruption Unit be responsible 
for monitoring compliance with all 
counter-corruption policies and registers 
including those with ethical declarations.
Having a single body responsible for 
monitoring all  ethical declarations by 
collating, analysing and challenging 




What Supports and Resources 
for Intervention Are in Place to 
Reduce the Impact of Corruption 
on the Garda Workforce?
The welfare of the workforce should be a 
primary objective of the Garda Síochána. 
This duty is no less significant when it comes 
to those who might be vulnerable to being 
corrupted by external influences.  
 > While the Garda Síochána have a range 
of welfare supports in place, these are 
not part of a specific counter-corruption 
strategy aimed at preventing corruption 
in the garda workforce. 
 > The Inspectorate identified several 
factors which can affect individual 
behaviour in the garda workforce and 

























































Figure J - Organisational integrity risk factors
 > The Inspectorate recommends that the 
Garda Síochána introduce a structured 
early intervention and support 
programme to prevent members of the 
garda workforce who may be in need of 
support from developing unethical traits 
unacceptable to the organisation.   
How can the Garda Síochána 
Adapt and Learn from Corruption 
Cases and the Experiences of 
Oversight Bodies and Other 
Organisations?
The inspection examined how organisational 
learning could be better captured by the 
Garda Síochána and how these lessons could 
be communicated to the garda workforce 




 > In particular, the inspection identified 
that corruption and fraud cases are not 
routinely profiled to identify patterns and 
common underlying causes as happens in 
the other police services benchmarked for 
the purposes of the inspection.  This was 
a weakness identified by GRECO1 in its 
first evaluation of Ireland in 2001.
 > Insights and recommendations from 
external organisations are not consistently 
drawn on by the Garda Síochána for 
learning purposes.  The example of 
systematic recommendations made by 
GSOC were highlighted in the report to 
illustrate this point.  This is in contrast 
to the situation in England and Wales 
where there is a partnership approach 
to organisational learning between the 
police complaints body (the IOPC), 
police services and other criminal justice 
agencies and institutions.
 > The comparative research carried out for 
the inspection highlighted how  effective 
communication of the outcomes of police 
discipline and misconduct procedures, 
criminal investigations and substance 
tests can provide valuable opportunities 







1 The Groups of States against Corruption was established by the Council of Europe to monitor states’ compliance with 
Council of Europe anti-corruption standards.
mistakes. This is a particularly common 
practice in UK police services, which 
publish the outcomes of such cases on 
their websites.
What Examples of Good Practice 
Did the Inspectorate Identify?
Despite the fact that until recently counter 
corruption within the Garda Síochána 
was not considered in a formal, systemic 
or strategic manner, the Inspectorate did 
encounter examples of individuals and 
specific departments developing policies and 
practices that could enhance organisational 
integrity. These examples are important 
as they show how on their own initiative, 
sections of the garda workforce are 
identifying processes to improve leadership 
and supervision, strengthen professional 
integrity, enhance organisational resilience, 
and cascade organisational learning. This 
shows the value placed on integrity by the 
organisation. 
Insights and recommendations from 
external organisations are not consistently 



















Due to the unique nature of policing, internal 
corruption will always pose a threat to the 
integrity of policing organisations.  As a 
consequence a police service should always 
acknowledge the existence of the threat, 
recognise that it cannot eliminate corruption 
permanently, and through leadership strive 
to find ways of reducing the likelihood 
and impact of corruption.  This can only be 
achieved through a framework of integrity 
and respect for the rule of law.  In order to 
understand which interventions might make 
a difference to counter corruption in any 
organisation it will need to analyse what are 
the most damaging and disruptive aspects of 
corruption and how these impact on public 
trust and confidence and the human rights 
and dignity of persons.
There are opportunities in every organisation 
for corrupt insiders to operate or to exploit 
weaknesses in the human resources, 
the procedures or the systems of that 
organisation.  In the policing context corrupt 
insiders make society more vulnerable to 
terrorism, organised crime and other threats. 
As a result, this inspection is focused on 
the threat of internal corruption within the 
Garda Síochána.  
For the purposes of this inspection, the 
Inspectorate has relied on a commonly 
accepted definition of corruption used 
by a number of government agencies, 
departments and commercial entities within 
Ireland.  This definition describes corruption 
as an abuse of a position of trust in order to 
gain an undue advantage.
Background to the Inspection
The Garda Inspectorate is an independent 
statutory body established under the Garda 
Síochána Act 2005 with the objective of 
ensuring that:
“the resources available to the Garda 
Síochána are used to achieve and 
maintain the highest levels of efficiency 
and effectiveness in its operation and 
administration, as measured by reference 
to the best standards of comparable police 
services”.
All inspections are conducted in accordance 
with the Act and may enquire into any 
aspects of the operation or administration of 
the Garda Síochána.  The Act stipulates that 
an inspection can commence under any of 
the following circumstances:
 > If the Inspectorate considers it 
appropriate to do so;
 > At the request of the Policing Authority 
in respect of a matter relating to policing 
services; or
 > If requested by the Minister for Justice 
and Equality.
In considering which aspects of policing 
should be examined in its Work Plan for 
2019-2021, the Inspectorate consulted widely 
with a number of key stakeholders including 
the Garda Síochána, the Policing Authority, 
and the Department of Justice.  The final 
Work Plan outlines several distinct areas of 
operation and administration, prioritised 
for examination taking into account the 
level of risk to human rights, public safety, 
public confidence, reputation and financial 
management in the Garda Síochána.  One 
such area is countering the risk of corruption 
within policing.  
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On 14 June 2019 the Inspectorate commenced 
its first self-initiated inspection, examining 
counter-corruption practices within the 
Garda Síochána.
Terms of Reference
This inspection examined the effectiveness of 
the Garda Síochána at preventing, detecting 
and mitigating against internal corruption 
and assessed the systems and processes in 
place in the following areas: 
 > Strategy and Governance in terms of the 
identification and management of risk, 
internal and external oversight, and the 
current anti-corruption architecture 
and strategy.   
 > Enhancing Professional Integrity 
in terms of ethics and integrity 
training, organisational registers 
and disclosures, substance testing, 
transparent and ethical decision-
making, professional standards, and 
maintaining professional boundaries.
 > Building Organisational Resilience 
against corruption in terms of selection, 
vetting, leadership and supervision, 
physical and systems security, and 
procurement. 
 > Identifying and Investigating 
Corruption in terms of protected and 
confidential disclosures, intelligence, 
investigation,  regulation and 
information sharing.  
 > Reducing the Impact of Corruption in 
terms of demonstrating an effective 
response to reports of corruption and 
organisational learning.  
Specifically, the inspection assessed the 
effectiveness of the Garda Síochána in relation 
to international standards and practice.
Perceptions of Corruption in 
Ireland
Corruption is a notoriously difficult 
phenomenon to measure directly.  Official 
statistics will reveal only part of the picture 
because corruption is a crime which certain 
actors will go to extraordinary lengths to 
keep hidden from the authorities.  As a 
result, public and business opinion surveys 
are increasingly relied upon to provide 
international comparisons and some measure 
of corruption trends.
Ireland’s ranking in several well-established 
indices of public perceptions of corruption 
(i.e. the Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index and the 
World Bank Public Integrity Indicator) has 
fluctuated considerably over time, falling 
significantly over the period 1995 to 2002 
and rising again between 2012 and 2017. 
What this means for corruption trends in 
Ireland is difficult to judge because of certain 
measurement problems.  These include 
refinements of the collection methodologies 
and a significant expansion of the 
measurement base over the period, making 
direct comparisons problematic.  However, 
while Ireland’s position may have changed 
in these rankings it has consistently remained 
in the top quarter of the least corrupt of the 
countries surveyed. 
What is clear however is that over the same 
time frame, Ireland went through a period 
when public concerns about corruption 
were heightened and public confidence 
in state institutions shaken as a result of a 
series of tribunals of inquiry.  Despite this 
uncertainty about the extent of corruption 
in wider Irish society there are no grounds 
for complacency.  In a recent result from 
the Eurobarometer survey, which measures 
public awareness and attitudes towards a 
range of issues including corruption, more 
than half of Irish respondents believed 
Ireland’s public institutions were corrupt to 
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some extent.  While this was slightly lower 
than the European average it was noticeably 
higher than most of its Northern European 
counterparts.
Concerns about misconduct and corruption 
in policing have emerged in a number 
of highly publicised controversies, four 
of which were examined in tribunals of 
enquiry2 over the period 2000 to 2017.  While 
some of the tribunals related to specific 
incidents, others involved institutional 
practices and procedures.  The range and 
scale of the issues exposed were significant 
and included the “finding of the Smithwick 
Tribunal Report that there was collusion with the 
IRA from within An Garda Síochána”,3 findings 
from the Morris Tribunal of involvement 
of garda members in planting explosives 
and firearms and tampering with evidence 
and witnesses (Department of Justice, 
undated), the O’Higgins Commission in 
which serious issues of “poor supervision and 
related management responsibility were raised” 
(Policing Authority, 2006), as well as reports 
on inappropriate cancellation of penalty 
points (Garda Inspectorate, 2014) and 
falsified breath test records (Crowe Horwath, 
2017).
2  The Smithwick Tribunal, the Morris Tribunal, the O’Higgins Commission of Investigation and the Disclosures Tribunal.
3  Comment by then Tánaiste Eamonn Gilmore in response to the publication of the report of the Smithwick Tribunal of 
Inquiry, Merrionstreet.ie (2013).
Understanding the Risk of 
Corruption
While the likelihood of corruption cannot 
be eliminated, it can be better understood 
and managed and any consequential harm 
mitigated against.  In order to understand 
which interventions might make a real 
difference to the Garda Síochána it is 
important to understand what the most 
damaging and disruptive threats to the 
organisation are and how these could impact 
on public trust and confidence.
By understanding the risks better it is easier to 
identify and address the persons, institutional 
structures, systems and processes which 
make an organisation vulnerable to 
corruption.  In its Speak Up report for 2017 
Transparency International Ireland produced 
a simple model for understanding the risk of 
corruption in an organisation.  This model, 
which is described in Figure i, is organised 
around pairs of factors: Incentive and 
Accountability, Inclination and Transparency 
and Opportunity and Integrity.
Figure i Transparency International Corruption Risk Model
Source: Transparency International Ireland, Speak Up Report 2017
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The International Legal 
Framework
Since the mid-1990s, the issue of corruption 
has gained increasing prominence on the 
global agenda as it has become the subject 
of widespread international concern. 
The past decade, in particular, has seen 
an expanding framework of ‘hard law’ 
(treaties and conventions) and ‘soft law’ 
(resolutions, guidelines and declarations). 
The purpose of these developments was 
to set common standards, develop and 
disseminate good practice, and provide 
for increased international cooperation.  A 
range of international bodies, including the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), the World Bank 
and the United Nations, as well as business 
groups and non-governmental organisations 
such as Transparency International have 
addressed the issue and it has been 
established as an important transnational 
legal speciality.  A major achievement has 
been the adoption of a series of international 
agreements designed to harmonise national 
counter-corruption measures.
For Ireland, the Council of Europe Criminal 
Law Convention on Corruption, is of most 
significance.  The Convention came into 
effect in November 1998 and incorporates all 
the Member States of the Council of Europe 
together with eight additional observer 
states.  The Convention covers a broad range 
of criminal corruption offences, as well as 
cooperation and asset-recovery measures. 
The evaluation programme associated with 
the Convention,  which is carried out on a 
peer-to-peer basis by the Group of States 
against Corruption (GRECO), helps to 
identify deficiencies in national counter-
corruption structures and promotes the 
necessary legislative, institutional and 
practical reforms needed to bring Member 
States into line with the standards laid out in 
the Convention.  The programme is now on 
its fifth round of evaluations and is themed 
around preventing corruption and promoting 
integrity in central governments (top 
executive functions) and law enforcement 
agencies.
Significant findings from the Fifth Evaluation 
Round of 18 countries so far include the 
following:
 > The importance of strategic risk 
assessment and broad strategic 
approaches to understanding the threat 
of corruption in police organisations;
 > The importance of integrity supports 
and training, including confidential 
advice and reporting mechanisms;
 > Strengthened recruitment and vetting 
processes, including greater co-
ordination between police services and 
regular in-service re-vetting;
 > Better regulation of secondary 
employment and post-employment 
activities in order to minimise the 
impact of reach back into police 
organisations;
 > Comprehensive declarations of 
financial and other interests, including 
declaration of financial liabilities and 
disclosure of the interests of close 
associates; and
 > E n h a n c e d  w h i s t l e - b l o w e r 
protections, including anonymity and 
confidentiality.
Given the significance of the Council of 
Europe Convention and GRECO to Irelands 
counter-corruption framework, any 
assessment of the Garda Síochána’s approach 
to tackling corruption in its ranks would be 
incomplete without considering the impact 






As a state signatory to a series of international 
counter-corruption agreements, Ireland has 
participated in the evaluation and review 
programmes associated with a number of 
these agreements, as well as being evaluated 
by well-respected international cooperation 
organisations, such as the OECD and 
Transparency International.  
GRECO
Ireland has been evaluated by GRECO on 
four separate occasions.4  The fifth round 
of evaluations, which is examining law 
enforcement agencies for the first time since 
the 2000/1 round, is ongoing and Ireland is 
due for evaluation in late 2020 or in early 
2021.
The first evaluation of Ireland by GRECO was 
reported in December 2001.  The evaluation 
team concluded that Ireland was relatively 
unaffected by corruption but that there were 
indications public confidence was weakening 
in the face of high-profile political corruption 
allegations.  The evaluation noted that 
important legislative measures were a strong 
deterrent against corruption and made the 
following critical findings with regards to the 
Garda Síochána (GRECO, 2001):
 > The evaluation team was unconvinced 
by the explanation as to why there 
was no link between corruption and 
organised crime in Ireland;
 > In the absence of a full intelligence 
picture there was no accurate 
4  GRECO’s evaluation rounds operate in cycles, with each round taking a different theme.  The first round (2000–2002) 
evaluated the independence, specialisation and means of national bodies engaged in the prevention and fight against 
corruption, including the extent and scope of immunities of public officials from arrest and prosecution. The second 
round (2003–2006) looked at the identification, seizure and confiscation of corruption proceeds, the prevention and 
detection of corruption in public administration; and preventing legal persons being used as shields for corruption. The 
third round (launched in January 2007) considered (a) the incriminations provided for in the Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption and (b) the transparency of party funding.  The fourth round (launched in January 2012) focuses on preven-
tion of corruption in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors.
assessment of corruption of public 
officials including garda members;
 > The absence of a multi-agency anti-
corruption strategy or plan was a 
considerable weakness;
 > While there were documented audit 
and review processes, organisational 
learning from these processes was 
weak; and
 > The organisation consistently failed to 
properly act on points of vulnerability 
identified from previous instances of 
corruption.  
Crucially, the Inspectorate found that these 
findings remained valid at the time of this 
inspection and important aspects of counter-
corruption strategy in Ireland have not been 
developed since they were first identified as 
being weak in 2001.  It is important to note 
that the Garda Síochána has never been 
specifically re-examined by GRECO in the 
intervening period because of the evaluation 
approach, which focuses on a small number 
of themes for each round of evaluation.
Transparency International
In 2009, Transparency International carried 
out its first review of Ireland’s National 
Integrity System, looking at the institutional 
and legal response to corruption in Ireland. 
The review concluded that, while Ireland’s 
integrity system was relatively strong by 
global standards, significant weaknesses 
existed.  The review also noted that while 
public trust in the Garda Síochána had 
traditionally been strong, its reputation 
was tarnished by the findings of the Morris 
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Tribunal.  It also found that  a proposed 
Corrupt Assets Bureau, which was  to be 
modelled on the Criminal Assets Bureau, 
and that increased transparency around 
the investigation and detection of cases 
involving corruption, including a promised 
Corruption Index, had not been introduced 
(Transparency International Ireland, 2009). 
While a follow-up review of Irelands 
integrity system in 2012 noted some positive 
developments, including strengthening of 
the legislative base and new white-collar 
crime powers, there was still concern about 
the risk of political interference and influence 
over the Garda Síochána (Transparency 
International Ireland, 2012).  However, it is 
important to bear in mind that there have 
been significant changes to the oversight of 
policing in the intervening period, including, 
the establishment of the Policing Authority, 
which now has responsibility for all senior- 
level appointments in the Garda Síochána.
Transparency International Ireland operates 
a Speak Up Helpline service which offers 
support and advice to members of the public 
wishing to report suspected wrongdoing 
across a wide range of sectors.  Between 
May 2011 and January 2015 complaints about 
policing were the third-highest category and 
amounted to 8% of all calls received.  By the 
time of the 2017 Speak Up Report, policing 
accounted for the highest category of 
complaints with calls about policing raising 
from 8% to 17% of all calls.  This report 
covered the period January 2015 to December 
2016, during which the helpline received a 
total of 327 complaints of wrongdoing, with 
54 related to policing.  Figure ii shows the 
complaints for this period broken down by 
sectors.
Figure ii Reports of wrongdoing to the Speak Up helpline - January 2015 to December 
2016
Source: Transparency International Ireland, Speak Up Report 2017
The 2017 Report provided a more detailed 
breakdown of information regarding the 
nature of the concerns raised about policing 
by callers to the helpline.  Figure iii contains 
a detailed breakdown of complaints 
concerning policing and shows that while 
failure to investigate received the highest 
number of complaints, there were also 
high levels of concern about misconduct 
and misuse of public position.  Within this 
analysis, callers reported specific concerns 
about orchestrated neglect in the handling 
of evidence and shortcomings in statement-
taking and note-taking by gardaí.
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Figure iii Types of concerns about policing reported to Speak Up helpline - January 2015 
to December 2016
Source: Transparency International Ireland, Speak Up Report 2017
The report, along with many other sources 
such as media and official reports from 
Tribunals and other public inquiries, adds 
to the collective understanding of the 
issue and suggests that, while the scale of 
corruption within policing in Ireland may be 
unknown, corruption does exist and presents 
a significant threat to the integrity and 
reputation of the Garda Síochána.  As such, 
the Garda Síochána needs to have robust 
governance mechanisms in place to prevent 
and identify internal corruption as well as to 
allow the identification of those seeking to 
corrupt members of the garda workforce.
Links with Organised Crime
Corruption is not a static threat and criminal 
corruptors will adapt their methods in line 
with the States response and changes to their 
own business and operating models.  This 
will include emerging markets for illicit 
drugs and other criminal commodities and 
services, or changing social, environmental 
and technological factors such as COVID-19, 
large scale migration or the development of 
digital currencies.  Changes in the Garda 
Síochána can also provide opportunities for 
criminals.  New Garda Síochána technologies 
and systems can create organisational 
weaknesses, while external factors, such as 
diminishing workforce morale or financial 
crisis, can create new personal vulnerabilities 
in the workforce.  The Garda Síochána 
needs to be alert to the changing corruption 
threat and adroit in its response to ensure 
the integrity of the organisation is not 
compromised.
Police Ethics
There is no commonly accepted definition 
of either integrity or corruption in policing. 
However, they are fundamentally a matter 
of ethics and depend on the particular 
circumstances of the conduct itself.  Popular 
conceptions of corrupt behaviour encompass 
such activities as obtaining personal financial 
gain in return for a favourable decision or 
abuse of power and position in a policing 
context. However, it is now well accepted that 
corrupt behaviour extends to a much wider 
range of behaviours, such as perverting the 
course of justice or excessive use of force. 
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Ethical behaviour is influenced by a range of 
factors and it is important to bear in mind 
that unethical decisions will not always be 
based on unethical intentions.  Police ethics 
is about its workforces doing the right thing 
for the right reason.  There have been four 
broad approaches which have set the context 
for modern ethical policing (Newburn, 2008):
 > An increased drive towards the 
professionalisation of policing by 
setting standards and accrediting 
learning;
 > Performance ethics with an increased 
focus on managerial approaches and 
target setting, requiring the right 
balance of holding individuals to 
account without creating perverse 
incentives leading to unethical choices;
 > Participatory policing, which is about 
ensuring that police officers and the 
police service are responsive to the 
communities they serve; and
 > Approaches which focus on policing in 
action and respond to crises in policing 
as they arise, such as abuses of covert 
policing or the use of force.
No single approach dominates and aspects of 
all four will be visible in any modern police 
service.
Integrity in policing is essential to maintaining 
public order and the rule of law.  It supports 
the legitimacy of the State and is crucial for 
public trust in the democratic process.  The 
nature of the policing environment, the 
ethical climate and the introduction of codes 
of conduct for police services have all been 
identified as critical organisational factors 
impacting on the ethical choices of police 
officers.  Situational factors also influence 
ethical decision-making by officers.  These 
include the extent of consensus among police 
peer groups, familiarity with the person 
being affected by a policing decision and 
perceptions of any negative consequences 
for the police officer.  In addition, individual 
factors can also influence ethical choices 
by police officers.  These might include 
an officer’s moral philosophy, certain 
personality traits, demographic factors and 
job satisfaction.
Like any police service, achieving high levels 
of integrity and professionalism in the Garda 
Síochána would require an organisational 
culture that relies more on positive peer 
pressure than punitive approaches.  Other 
important elements would include the setting 
of clear policing standards and the clear 
implementation and enforcement of codes 
of conduct.  Effective organisational change 
would also require extensive awareness 
raising, training and capacity building.
Due to the nature of policing and the 
provision of extensive powers, a police 
workforce should always adhere to high 
standards of honesty and conduct.  Any 
misuse of authority by a police officer or 
other member of staff is an intolerable 
breach of the trust placed in them by the 
public. Garda members are frequently 
confronted with difficult ethical issues and 
are more likely to make the right decisions 
if senior leaders engage with them in a 
dialogue which acknowledges the complex 
moral world in which they operate.  Strong 
leadership and governance play a significant 
role in promoting an ethical culture in any 
organisation.
A code of conduct or code of ethics is an 
important way of supporting and embedding 
ethical values within an organisation. 
In the Garda Síochána context there is 
a large variety of relevant international 
ethical standards, including the European 
Convention on Human Rights, UN Code of 
Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and 
OSCE Principles of Democratic Policing. 
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These include broadly similar high-level 
ethical principles and values which can be 
translated into practical guidance for police 
officers in service-level codes of conduct or 
ethics.
A code of ethics can greatly contribute to 
improving the image of policing and can 
help to engender mutual respect between 
the police and the public.  In addition, it 
provides guidance as to how the law should 
be enforced.  However, a code by itself is 
insufficient to change an organisation’s 
ethical climate and other factors, such as 
ethical training programmes and visible 
ethical leadership, are necessary to promote 
a healthy ethical culture.
Garda Ethical Framework
The Ethics Acts, which include the Ethics 
in Public Office Act 1995 and the Standards 
in Public Office Act 2001, impose certain 
obligations on public office holders and 
other senior members of the public service 
to report and surrender gifts and payments 
above the value of €650.  In addition, the 
Ethics Acts also aim to combat corruption 
by requiring public declarations of financial 
interests, as well as regulating the receipt of 
gifts whether or not they are given with the 
intention of securing an advantage.
The Ethics Acts, by their nature, apply only 
in respect of public officials.  They contain no 
single definition of ‘public official’, but rather 
they divide public officials into categories to 
which different rules apply.  For example, an 
‘office-holder’ faces more stringent oversight 
than a ‘public servant’.  An ‘office-holder’ 
under the Ethics Acts generally means a 
minister in the Irish government or certain 
other members of the parliament.  The term 
‘public servant’ encompasses a wide number 
of persons, and essentially covers all civil 
servants, or their equivalent, above the grade 
of principal officer in the civil service.
Section 10 of the Standards in Public Office 
Act mandates the Commission, a public body 
established under the Ethics Acts, to promote 
and oversee transparency and accountability 
in Irish public life, and to draw up codes of 
standards and behaviour for public officials. 
Up to this point, five such codes have been 
drawn up, including a code of conduct for 
civil servants and guidelines for a wider 
group of public servants on their obligations 
under the Ethics Acts and the Code of 
Practice for the Governance of State Bodies. 
Both of these simultaneously apply to some 
members of the garda workforce.
The Standards in Public Office Commission 
in Ireland has also published a guide 
(undated) to best practices for supporting 
ethics compliance in public bodies.  Several 
of these are relevant to the Garda Síochána as 
a public body, including: 
 > Nomination of a specific individual to 
assist designated persons to comply 
with their obligations, including 
tax compliance, and to act as a 
point of contact with the Standards 
Commission; 
 > Maintenance of a register of designated 
persons in the organisation;  
 > Overseeing of compliance with ethical 
obligations and review of ethical 
declarations to identify and manage 
conflicts of interest;  
 > Implementation of annual disclosure 
cycles to remind designated persons of 
their obligations; and
 > Introduction of induction and refresher 
training.
The garda ethical framework is particularly 
complicated. While the public sector 
ethics framework applies to a substantial 
proportion of the garda workforce, the Garda 
Code of Ethics applies to the entire garda 
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workforce and overlaps with the public 
sector framework.  In the Garda Síochána, 
the disclosure requirements for ‘public 
servants’ extends to all garda members of 
superintendent rank and above, all garda staff 
of assistant principal level grade and above, 
and certain persons in designated posts 
related to information and communications 
technology and procurement.  In addition, 
garda staff at all grades are simultaneously 
bound by the Garda Code of Ethics and the 
Civil Service Code of Conduct.  As a result, 
the ethical framework in the Garda Síochána 
is extensive and complex and a large 
proportion of the garda workforce will have 
overlapping, if not competing, obligations 
and responsibilities.  
The first statement of ethical principles in 
the Garda Síochána was the Declaration of 
Professional Values and Ethical Standards 
approved by the Garda Commissioner 
in May 2003 and reproduced in Garda 
HQ Directive 82/03.  The Declaration was 
eventually replaced by the Garda Code of 
Ethics, which has had a long and complicated 
gestation.
Section 17 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005 
provided for the Minister to establish a 
Code of Ethics setting out standards and 
practice for garda members.  The legislative 
provisions allowed the Minister to instruct 
the Garda Commissioner to propose a Code 
of Ethics, after consulting with specified 
parties which included the Standards in 
Public Office Commission.  Following this, 
the Minister could then formalise the Code 
in Regulations made under the Act.
These provisions were subsequently 
amended in the 2015 Garda Síochána 
(Policing Authority and Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act, transferring responsibility 
for drawing up the Code of Ethics to the 
Policing Authority.  While a proposed 
Code of Ethics was first sent to the Minister 
for Justice and Equality in July 2009 for 
the purpose of establishing the Code by 
regulation, the Code was not published  until 
the Policing Authority did so in January 2017.
The Garda Code of Ethics is a written guide 
to the principles that everyone working in 
the Garda Síochána is expected to uphold. 
The Code complements the Garda Decision-
Making Model, which places ethics and 
human rights at the centre of decision-
making in the organisation.  The Code sets 
out nine standards of conduct and practice for 
the whole garda workforce: Duty to Uphold 
the Law, Honesty and Integrity, Respect 
and Equality, Authority and Responsibility, 
Police Powers, Information and Privacy, 
Transparency and Communication, 
Speaking Up and Reporting Wrongdoing, 
and Leadership.  Guidance regarding the 
ethical standards is provided through 53 
separate ethical commitments which clarify 
and contextualise the duty of garda members 
and garda staff.  
The Code reflects the core values of policing 
which have been practised by generations of 
garda members and echoes the sentiments 
expressed by the first Garda Commissioner, 
Michael Staines, at the founding of the 
organisation that “the Garda Síochána will 
succeed, not by force of arms or numbers, but on 
their moral authority as servants of the people”. 
A central theme running through the Code 
is the ‘common good’ and the principle that 
everyone bound by the Code will treat others 
the way they expect to be treated themselves.
The Policing Authority has an important role 
in monitoring progress on implementing 
the Code.  In particular, this oversight has 
focused on the extent to which the Code has 
been embedded into everyday policing and 
into internal processes and procedures.  Up to 
2018, the Policing Authority’s Code of Ethics 
Committee took the lead in this regard but 
responsibility has since passed to the Policing 
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Authority’s Development Committee.  The 
Policing Authority has reported that the 
issue is frequently discussed at public 
meetings with the Garda Commissioner and 
his senior team and is also prominent in the 
agreement on the annual policing priorities 
in accordance with Section 20 (1a) of the 2005 
Act.
A number of steps have been taken to 
embed the Code within the Garda Síochána. 
Initially, early in 2017, this involved the 
distribution of soft copies of the Code to all 
members, followed by the distribution of 
hard copies towards the end of 2017.  When 
members received a hard copy of the Code, 
they were required to sign it and to make 
a formal commitment to its observance. 
The number of those signing the Code is 
tracked by the Garda Síochána and regularly 
reported to the Policing Authority.
The Garda Decision-Making Model was 
adapted in 2019 to place the Code, as well 
as human rights, at the model’s core.  Ethics 
training, which focuses on the new Garda 
Decision-Making Model and the Code, is 
now a central element of recruit training. 
As part of this inspection, the Inspectorate 
reviewed training materials for garda recruit 
training.  The Inspectorate found that this 
training material is comprehensive and 
heavily focused on ethical decision-making 
in all aspects of policing.  A substantial 
proportion of the training involves group-
based ethical scenario exercises to draw 
out recruits’ understanding of the ethical 
principles of various situations they are 
likely to encounter in their careers.
The remainder of the garda workforce has 
received ethics training through continuous 
professional development classes since 
2017.  During focus groups held by the 
Inspectorate, garda members were critical of 
5  The role of leadership in promoting ethical police behaviour: The findings of qualitative case study research, College of 
Policing (2015)
the way in which the Code was introduced. 
The approach adopted gave the impression 
that it was more of a disciplinary tool than an 
aid to ethical decision-making in professional 
practice.  They were also critical of the 
emphasis placed on Code of Ethics training 
after an extended lacuna in continuous 
professional training as a result of financial 
austerity measures from 2008 onwards.  Most 
members felt that the opportunity could 
have been better used to upskill them in 
other ways.  Garda staff also criticised the 
training for being too heavily focused on 
the role of garda members and for failing to 
explore ethical issues relevant to their role 
more comprehensively.
Ethical Leadership
It is commonly accepted that police 
leaders should have the autonomy, within 
established regulatory and budgetary 
frameworks, to decide how best to respond to 
law and order situations.  This is commonly 
referred to as operational independence.  This 
level of independence trickles down to the 
whole police workforce and takes the form 
of police discretion.  The discretionary use 
of policing powers is at the heart of policing 
and has been reflected in the common law 
definition of the police constable.  It is 
impossible to regulate for every single police 
action in advance through laws, regulations 
or standard operating procedures.  In this 
way, there is a clear link established between 
ethical leadership and ethical policing.
In 2015, the UK College of Policing carried 
out a research study5 examining the role of 
leadership in promoting and embedding 
ethical behaviour in policing organisations. 
The study focused on in-depth interviews 
with serving police officers up to and 
including the rank of Chief Constable across 
five police services in England and Wales. 
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The study concluded that ethical leadership 
requires an active shift from autocratic styles 
of leadership to more open and inclusive 
approaches.  The factors that constituted 
effective leadership were intertwined with 
those that promote ethical behaviour. A 
range of leadership values were important, 
including honesty, integrity, visibility, 
transparency and consistency.
The study highlighted how police leaders are 
both the figureheads and role models for good 
conduct in setting the organisation’s ethical 
standards as well as clearly communicating 
and enforcing these same standards.  A 
transformative and participative leadership 
style is critical in senior leaders, and 
visibility and clear communication are vital 
to promoting the organisation’s commitment 
to integrity in policing.
High levels of discretion in policing leave 
it particularly vulnerable to unethical 
behaviour and in response leadership needs 
to be balanced and flexible.  This includes 
providing a consistent and fair application 
of rewards and sanctions.  It is also the case 
that open and democratic styles of leadership 
will secure better commitment from the 
police workforce.  Frontline supervisors can 
have the greatest influence on staff acting as 
day-to-day role models and supporting and 
empowering the workforce.  As such, senior 
leaders and supervisors need to be more 
aware and self-reflective if they are to have a 
greater impact on ethical behaviour.
Part I outlines how the Criminal Justice Sector 
develops  understanding of the threats  posed by 
internal  corruption and how the Garda Síochána’s 
governance structures prioritises its efforts to mitigate 








Chapter 1  
Strategy and Governance
Overview
One of the key objectives of this inspection 
was to assess the evidence of strategic 
leadership displayed by the Garda Síochána 
around the corruption threat, including its 
analysis and understanding of this threat 
and its approach to prioritising the response. 
Equally important was an assessment of the 
governance arrangements in operation to see 
if they are ‘fit for purpose’ in the light of any 
strategic analysis.  
For any organisation to effectively respond to 
the challenges of corruption it must recognise 
the threat posed as well as understand its 
own response.  Another way of describing 
such an approach is effective governance. 
In much international literature good 
governance is tightly linked with the fight 
against corruption, for example, in guidance 
from the United Nations Office on Drugs 
And Crime, Council of Europe, World Bank, 
Geneva Global Governance Centre and Basal 
Institute of Governance.
However, the risk of corruption within the 
Garda Síochána cannot be addressed in 
isolation.  Developing effective counter-
corruption governance is dependent on 
a wider understanding of all the known 
threats across the entire criminal justice 
sector.  Tackling corruption independently 
could lead to the displacement of a threat to 
a more vulnerable area rather than an actual 
reduction in the risk.
Strategic Understanding of 
Threat 
A strategic threat assessment is a 
necessary first step by the management 
of any organisation in understanding and 
responding to their strategic risks.  Such 
assessments allow an organisation to achieve 
a deeper understanding of the threats it faces 
and the necessary strategic response.  This is 
achieved through a comprehensive collection 
and analysis of all relevant data and 
information.  The risk profile which emerges 
from this must be tested and challenged to 
ensure a full and detailed understanding of 
the issues concerned as well as capturing 
emerging trends and identifying critical 
organisational and personnel weaknesses. 
The process goes hand in hand with the 
wider processes of governance and control in 
the organisation, including developing and 
implementing a strategic risk management 
action plan and communicating the key 
risks and management response to the wider 
organisation.
International and Comparable 
Practice
The fifth round of GRECO evaluations has 
identified a number of countries with good 
strategic threat and risk processes which 
enable them to identify vulnerabilities 
and reduce the occurrence of corruption. 
Countries such as Belgium, the United 
Kingdom, Estonia and Denmark have all 
adopted risk-based approaches.  
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For example, in Estonia, GRECO (2018a)
found that the Internal Control Bureau 
(ICB) of the Police and Border Guard Board 
(PBGB):
“… evaluates corruption risks in the 
PBGB annually, by carrying out both 
a corruption threat analysis and a risk 
assessment.  The risk assessment classifies 
every structural unit of the PBGB as low 
to high risk, whereas the threat analysis 
is a future-oriented document based on 
intelligence gathered by the ICB as well as 
past incidents.  Based on both documents, 
the ICB prepares an annual action plan, 
which includes the activities of the ICB for 
the prevention and detection of offences 
(including corruption offences) committed 
by officials and employees of the PBGB.” 
In the United Kingdom, an overall National 
Counter-Corruption Strategic Threat 
Risk Assessment (STRA) is produced 
by the National Crime Agency (NCA) 
working in partnership with each UK 
police service and other law enforcement 
agencies such as the Border Force. This threat 
assessment aims to:
 > Identify key corruption threats and 
emerging issues; and
 > Highlight individual and organisational 
vulnerabilities.
To facilitate the consistent analysis of 
information across such a wide range of 
organisations, data is captured using 12 
standardised and agreed categories.  This 
standardisation of data collection allows 
trends and emerging threats to be tracked 
regionally and across time.  This use of 
6  The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime has provided an internationally shared defini-
tion of an organised criminal group as “a group of three or more persons existing over a period of time acting in concert 
with the aim of committing crimes for financial or material benefit”.  This definition was also adopted in the EU’s Council 
Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 https://www.europol.europa.eu/socta/2017/defining-seri-
ous-and-organised-crime.html [last accessed  29 September 2020]
a standardised methodology to define, 
capture and measure corrupt activities is 
widely recognised as an important feature 
of effective strategic threat assessment.  For 
example, the UN Guide for Anti-Corruption 
Risk Assessment (2013) advises that:
“In designing an anti-corruption 
programme, the enterprise should define 
what it understands to be corruption and 
its various forms, as this will provide the 
reference for the risk assessment process.” 
A key element in the development of 
strategic analysis of the corruption threat, 
both within law enforcement and the wider 
public sector is a better understanding of the 
intentions of those who seek to advance their 
criminal enterprises through corruption of 
the workforce.
The European Union’s 2017 Serious and 
Organised Crime Threat Assessment 
(SOCTA) found that:
“[Organised Crime Groups6] use corruption 
to infiltrate both public and private sector 
organisations, relying on bribery, conflicts 
of interest, trading in influence and 
collusion in order to facilitate their criminal 
activities.  Over the past two decades, the 
issue of corruption has rapidly entered the 
agenda of international organisations and 
the EU.”
In 2019, a joint report by the European 
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction and the European Union 
Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation 
assessment found that: 
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“Drug markets are one of the most corruptive 
influences in the EU and have a serious 
impact on governance in producer and 
transit countries.  Corruption may be used 
by organised crime to obtain information, to 
facilitate the transit of illicit drugs and/or 
the diversion of chemicals to illicit markets, 
and to obstruct investigations.  Despite 
this, the extent of this problem remains both 
poorly understood and poorly monitored.”  
The heavy cost of corruption to society has 
prompted the major international standard- 
setting organisations (e.g. UN and OECD) 
to rethink their approach to corruption and 
to promote national integrity systems as a 
more effective response to the problem.  In 
particular, the OECD (2017) has suggested 
that action needs to go beyond simple 
organisational boundaries, and it advocates 
a Public Integrity Strategy which shifts the 
focus from an isolated or ad hoc approach 
to an integrated behavioural and risk-based 
approach emphasising the need for integrity 
across the whole of a society.  The OECD 
guidance is around four specific pillars:
Commitment: which stresses the 
importance of political and public sector 
leadership in terms of establishing the 
legal and institutional framework for 
cross-agency cooperation.   
Responsibility: which emphasises a 
clear division of responsibilities and 
good coordination across the public 
sector.   
Strategy: which promotes cross-sectoral 
data collection and analysis to develop 
a deeper understanding of the problem 
and to prioritise the responses.   
Standards: which is about setting 
clear values, rules and policies at the 
organisational and cross-organisational 
level.
Similarly the UN emphasises a risk-based 
approach and increased cooperation across 
the public and private spheres.
At the national level in the UK, the National 
Police Counter-Corruption Advisory 
Group reviews national threats and sets the 
counter-corruption strategy.  The group is 
chaired by a Chief Constable and consists 
of representatives from across policing and 
other law enforcement agencies such as 
the Border Force.  The Group also includes 
oversight bodies, such as Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & 
Rescue Services (HMICFRS) and other 
criminal justice partners such as the Crown 
Prosecution Service and the Probation 
Service.  This provides a national forum for 
developing a comprehensive understanding 
of corruption threats and vulnerabilities 
across the criminal justice sector as well 
as agreeing common control measures to 
address identified threats.
Key Findings and Assessment
During the course of this inspection, as well 
as meeting with senior garda managers, the 
Inspectorate also met with senior leaders in 
a number of other criminal justice agencies, 
including the Prison Service, Courts 
Service and Office of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions to assess the wider challenges 
and cooperation across the sector.  It became 
clear that there is no common understanding 
of the corruption threat across the criminal 
justice sector.  This inspection also found that 
cooperation is ad hoc and there is no formal 
process for sharing information regarding 
corruption; risks, trends or operational 
responses.  As a result, learning from one 
agency is not shared with other agencies in 
the criminal justice sector and there is no 
clear counter-corruption vision or leadership 
across the sector.   
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A significant threat for one criminal 
justice agency is likely to pose a threat 
across the entire sector.   This could range 
from weaknesses in systems to enhance 
professional integrity, to the deliberate 
exploitation of staff by organised crime 
groups.  Those seeking to corrupt criminal 
justice personnel will often target the weakest 
link, so simply strengthening one agency 
could displace the threat to another which is 
less well prepared.   By sharing knowledge 
and practice, the whole criminal justice sector 
can become far more resilient.
International standard-setting organisations 
like the UN and OECD promote greater 
cross-sectoral and cross-government 
coordination.   As reflected in the threat 
assessments of several high-profile national 
and regional law enforcement bodies (e.g. 
EUROPOL, the European Monitoring 
Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and 
the NCA), experience has shown that corrupt 
actors will adapt their methods and targets 
in response to counter-corruption initiatives 
by specific criminal justice agencies or 
bodies.  Counter-corruption evaluations have 
consistently highlighted the benefits of cross-
government coordination of a country’s 
counter-corruption efforts.  Strategic 
threat assessments have now become 
common practice in many of the countries 
benchmarked for this inspection (e.g. UK, 
Estonia and Germany).
The Inspectorate reaffirms the 2001 
GRECO finding that in the absence of a full 
intelligence picture, there can be no accurate 
assessment of corruption of public officials, 
including garda members.  The case for a 
cross-sectoral criminal justice strategic or 
executive-level understanding and response 
to corruption is therefore strong.
Recommendation
In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendation.
Strategy and Governance in the 
Garda Síochána
Beyond the identification and assessment of 
corruption threats, policing organisations 
must have an effective process to prioritise 
their response to these threats and to 
measure the effectiveness of their actions. 
The policing response should focus its efforts 
on those threats that have the potential to 
cause the greatest harm.  This requires robust 
governance which sets and actively oversees 
the police services counter-corruption 
strategy.  As the World Bank publication The 
Many Faces of Corruption (2007) makes clear:
“Combating corruption is fundamentally 
about addressing poor governance 
rather than about catching crooks”
Several good governance principles must 
underpin any counter-corruption strategy. 
Governance must always be consistent with 
the rule of law in terms of being guided 
by legislation and published guidelines, as 
well as supported by clear social values and 
The Department of Justice should 
develop, a strategic understanding of 
the risk of internal corruption across the 
criminal justice sector with the objective 
of developing an overarching strategy 
and multi-agency approach to the 
management of the corruption threats.
Recommendation 1
Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment
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broad public support.  Governance must 
be responsive and serve all stakeholders in 
a prompt and appropriate manner.  There 
should also be dedicated and adequate 
resources for receiving and attending to 
complaints and grievances.  It should be 
effective and efficient making the best use 
of the resources available to produce results 
and meet the needs of the public.   It must be 
transparent and accountable.
International and Comparative 
Practice
The UN has developed the Global Compact 
Management Model to help organisations 
who are seeking to eliminate corruption 
through respect and promotion of universal 
human rights (Deloitte & United Nations 
Global Compact, 2010).  Figure 1.1 shows the 
components of the model; these components 
provide a comprehensive and structured 
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policies through the company 















Leadership commitment to mainstream the Global Compact 
principles into strategies and operations and to take action 
in support of broader UN goals, in a transparent way
Figure 1.1 UN Global Compact Management Model
Source: UN Global Compact Management Model Framework for Implementation: Human Rights
This model contains all the elements 
necessary for effective governance of 
organisational-level issues such as counter 
corruption, and is used by UK policing 
services, where it is referred to as the Police 
Integrity Model (College of Policing, 2015).  
In a 2016 review of Police Scotland’s Counter 
Corruption Unit, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate 
of Constabulary in Scotland found that a 
local STRA had identified as many as 23 
serious and organised crime groups whose 
actions posed a threat to law enforcement 
and the public sector throughout Scotland.
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By drawing on the wider intelligence 
assessment and putting good governance 
models such as the UN Model into practice 
within policing, the counter-corruption 
threat assessment becomes the first element 
in the governance programme in any 
policing organisation.  It is used to identify 
vulnerabilities in the organisation. All 
UK police services benchmarked for the 
purposes of this report develop regular 
strategic threat and risk assessments.  These 
serve two purposes: they highlight the 
specific threats and vulnerabilities faced by 
the police service, and they feed into higher-
level national policing and cross-sectoral 
assessments. The example of the Police 
Scotland assessment underscores this point.
Subsequently, a control strategy allows 
a police service through an action plan 
to prioritise the threats that have the 
greatest consequences and to allocate 
responsibility for specific actions to address 
these vulnerabilities.  In the UK action 
plans are developed under four themes: 
Prevention, Intelligence, Enforcement, 
and Communication and Engagement. 
In particular, the plans will clarify how 
key policy holders and functional leaders 
are expected to contribute to the counter-
corruption efforts of the organisation as a 
whole.
Regular monitoring of the programme to 
identify progress or emerging issues will 
establish the degree to which the organisation 
is meeting its integrity objectives.  Within 
policing, this monitoring is supported by an 
intelligence-collection plan which gathers 
and assesses intelligence from various 
sources across the police service and beyond.
Police services also build public confidence 
and seek to deter would-be corruptors 
through public reporting on their counter-
corruption programme.  Reporting in this 
way emphasises the organisation’s strong 
commitment to integrity and transparency 
and shows the importance it places on 
the integrity of the police workforce.  In 
addition, reporting raises awareness of the 
issue among employees and supervisors 
and will enhance their capacity to prevent 
corruption and support their conviction 
and commitment to greater integrity in the 
organisation.
In each of the police services benchmarked by 
the Inspectorate for this inspection, a single 
senior police officer at either Commissioner 
or Deputy Commissioner level or equivalent 
rank took responsibility for overseeing 
and coordinating the counter-corruption 
governance programme.  This commitment 
sends a clear message that countering 
corruption is an organisational priority 
supported by senior leadership and it holds 
policy leads to account for delivery of action 
plans.  It also provides objective oversight of 
counter-corruption investigations, ensuring 
they remain necessary and proportionate to 
the corruption threat.
Key Findings and Assessment
This inspection found that the strategic 
approach to counter-corruption within the 
Garda Síochána needs further development. 
At present, control measures are largely 
based around an operational response to 
specific incidents rather than around a 
formalised strategic assessment process 
that identifies organisational threats and 
vulnerabilities and a control strategy to shape 
the Garda Síochána response.  In particular, 
the Inspectorate found:
 > At organisational level, there is no 
strategic analysis available to identify 
current and emerging corruption threats 
with an assessment of their potential 
harmful consequences.  However, there 
is an ongoing process to develop this 
type of analytical approach, which is 




 > The Garda Síochána has no process for 
co-ordinating and tasking the collection 
of intelligence to inform its strategic 
understanding of corruption threats or 
for measuring how these threats change 
over time in response to organisational 
activity or a changing environment;
 > There is currently no commonly 
shared  definition of corruption within 
the Garda Síochána or  process for 
ensuring that incidents or information 
indicating  corruption or a vulnerability 
are captured using standardised 
and agreed categories.  Without this 
process, consistent analysis will not be 
possible in the future; 
 > There is no single senior police leader 
who is accountable for the governance 
of counter-corruption practices, policies 
and procedures or who has oversight 
of all counter-corruption activity.  At 
present key counter-corruption policies 
are spread across a number of senior 
management positions.  For example, 
policies relating to fraud, vetting, 
whistle-blower protection, and gifts, 
hospitality and sponsorship that are 
all managed by separate individuals. 
Consequently, there is no single 
process for prioritising actions and co-
ordinating the organisation’s response 
to the corruption threat.  Without the 
benefit of evidence-based analysis 
the development and review of any 
counter-corruption policies will lack 
the rigour necessary to determine their 
effectiveness in preventing current 
threats; and
 > With the exception of persons appointed 
to the Security and Intelligence Section, 
specific roles within the Garda Síochána 
are not risk assessed to identify 
those which are more vulnerable to 
compromise or corruption.
The absence of a structured counter-
corruption governance programme within the 
Garda Síochána has significant implications 
for its ability to identify key vulnerabilities, 
to mitigate threats through targeted policy 
development and to effectively measure 
the success of the counter-corruption 
control strategy and actions.  Additionally, 
the lack of a single leader responsible or 
accountable for tackling corruption in all its 
guises limits the effectiveness of counter-
corruption governance, which in turn may 
undermine the confidence of the public and 
the workforce.
Based on the international practice identified 
by the Inspectorate, strategic governance of 
counter corruption requires three elements to 
be effective, as described in the next sections. 
Threat and Risk Analysis  
There should be a forward-looking analysis 
of existing and emerging corruption threats 
to the police service, including an assessment 
of how likely they are to occur within the 
organisation taking into account existing 
systems of control.  This analysis will draw 
on information regarding known incidents 
of corrupt behaviour, intelligence indicating 
potential wrongdoing and vulnerabilities 
identified by audits or inspections.  In the 
Garda Síochána examples of threats could 
include the unauthorised provision of 
sensitive information, abuse of authority for 
personal gain, or sexual misconduct.
Identification of Vulnerable Roles  
There should be a risk assessment of those 
roles within the policing service which are the 
most susceptible to corruption.  Identifying 
such roles must be properly informed by the 
analysis of threats.  In terms of the Garda 
Síochána, if for example the threat analysis 
identified sexual misconduct as a significant 
threat those roles within the workforce that 
have greater access to vulnerable individuals 
should be considered a higher risk.
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Counter-Corruption Strategy  
There needs to be an overarching counter-
corruption strategy establishing the 
organisation’s priorities for action which 
is based on the identified threats and 
vulnerabilities and their likely consequences. 
Not all corruption threats or vulnerabilities 
should be treated equally.  Those that could 
cause the greatest harm must receive the 
closest attention.  This is why in the UK the 
threat of Abuse of Power for Sexual Gain 
(APSG), even though relatively rare, is a 
top priority because even a single incident 
would have grave consequences in terms 
of public confidence and the integrity of 
a police service.  The strategy should be 
accompanied by an action or delivery plan 
which addresses each of the prioritised 
threats in turn.  Each delivery plan should 
cover a broad range of activities under a 
common theme and involve senior leaders 
from across the organisation, not just those 
with responsibility for counter-corruption 
operations.  For example, if fraud or theft 
is identified as a priority within the Garda 
Síochána then those leaders responsible for 
property management, financial controls and 
internal audit will all have a role in the action 
plan.
The organisational response to corruption 
must be correctly focused and proportionate 
to the potential consequences.  Resources 
should be focused on those threats that can 
lead to the greatest harms for individuals 
and the organisation.  For this reason, 
governance should be led by a senior member 
of the Garda Síochána at either Assistant 
Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner 
level.  This person will have the necessary 
authority and responsibility for reducing the 
risk of corruption within the Garda Síochána.
A model showing the necessary elements for 
effective counter-corruption governance  is 

































Figure 1.2 Model of counter-corruption governance based on Intelligence-led policing 
principles
Source: Intelligence-Led Policing Principles adapted by the Garda Inspectorate
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In this model, delivery plans to counter each 
prioritised threat consist of four separate 
elements:
 > Professional integrity: Professional 
integrity is promoted and corruption 
prevented through effective policy 
and practice in the management of 
associations, relationships and conflicts 
of interest.  For example, the control of 
inappropriate relationships and the 
receipt of gifts helps ensure policing 
decisions are impartial and in the 
public interest at all times.
 > Organisational Resilience: This relates 
to the organisation’s ability to prevent 
internal corruption through the strength 
of its internal control mechanisms and 
supervision of discretionary powers. 
For example, vetting strengthens the 
workforce, and an information security 
policy prevents unauthorised use of 
sensitive or personal information.
 > Intelligence and Investigation: 
Intelligence collection should be 
focused on understanding corruption 
threats and supporting active 
investigations.  Investigations should 
prioritise those threats with the most 
significant consequences and be 
independent and fair.
 > Communication and Engagement: 
This should provide key anti-
corruption messages and help staff to 
‘spot the signs’ of corruption and not 
be reluctant to report it.
Each of these themes and the Garda 
Síochána’s current capacity to deliver them 
will be discussed and developed in the 
forthcoming chapters of this report.
Without a formal governance process in the 
Garda Síochána, threats may not be properly 
understood and, more significantly, may 
never be identified.  Consequently, counter-
corruption plans may not be focused on those 
threats that have the greatest consequences. 
It may also be the case that prevention 
plans are disproportionate or insufficient, 
leading to an excessive use of resources or 
weakening of controls.  Additionally, the 
absence of accurate and standardised data 
makes it difficult to determine the impact of 
any initiatives to address corruption.
Recommendation
In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendation.
The Garda Síochána should develop 
and implement a governance process for 
identifying and mitigating the threats, 
risks and potential harms associated with 
internal corruption. This process must 
include:
• The appointment of a senior police 
leader with responsibility for counter 
corruption.
• The development of a strategic 
assessment of corruption threats.
• The setting out of a counter-
corruption control strategy that 
establishes priorities for action.
Recommendation 2
Strategy and Governance in the 
Garda Síochána

Part II examines how personal integrity, corporate 
responsibility and professional boundaries can 
strengthen the garda workforce against the pernicious 
effects of corruption.  It also examines the effectiveness 
of existing corporate governance practices in the Garda 
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Chapter 2
Managing Relationships and Associations
Overview
The concept of Democratic Policing is 
fast becoming the cornerstone of modern 
police practice.  It relies on improving the 
relationship between police organisations 
and the community.  The key priorities of 
democratic policing include: serving the 
needs of civilian and democratic institutions, 
police organisations being accountable to 
the law rather than to politicians, and police 
officers being guided by principles of respect 
for human rights and transparency in all 
their activities.
This chapter focuses on the effectiveness of 
Garda Síochána strategies for promoting 
the professional integrity of the workforce 
by managing relationships and associations 
that could undermine democratic policing 
principles.
In considering which areas to examine in 
more detail, the Inspectorate has drawn 
on international practice.  International 
practice consistently highlights the need to 
prevent the police workforce from engaging 
in conduct that is unduly influenced by a 
personal motive or that could undermine 
the perception of impartiality or give the 
impression that the public interest is not 
being properly served.  The Inspectorate 
believes a lack of effective strategies in 
these areas could adversely impact on the 
ability of the police service to maintain the 
necessary standards of professional integrity 
among the workforce and hinder its ability to 
prevent corruption.  Such a lack could also 
allow the perception that the organisation 
serves the personal interests of the leadership 
or workforce.
Professional Boundaries
A professional standards policy would 
help to clarify the boundary between what 
behaviour is and is not acceptable in the 
Garda Síochána.  As such, it is important that 
the Garda Síochána develops a culture that 
supports its workforce to build appropriate 
relationships and sets clear professional 
boundaries about the nature and limits of 
these relationships.  It should also equip 
its workforce with the necessary tools to 
manage their own professional boundaries.
A number of principles should underpin any 
professional relationship, and in the case of 
policing these primarily relate to protecting 
public safety and maintaining public order. 
The wellbeing of persons in need should 
always be paramount.  It is the responsibility 
of every member of the garda workforce to 
set and maintain appropriate professional 
boundaries.  Professional boundaries 
should apply to all forms of communication, 
including social media, and should be 
exercised with fairness, clarity, consistency 
and transparency at all times.
International and Comparable 
Practice
The New Zealand Police Service’s policy 
on maintaining professional distance 
(2008) recognises that professional policing 
relationships are inherently unequal 
because they require the public to disclose 
confidential and personal information and a 
police officer can take certain coercive actions 
against the people, such as stop and search, 
arrest and detention.  Under the New Zealand 
guidelines, police officers are expected to be 
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aware of their need to maintain professional 
boundaries and appropriately manage any 
relationship where a conflict of interest 
arises.  They also have a duty to avoid 
unethical or inappropriate relationships. 
As well as clarifying the duty on individual 
officers and staff, the guidelines lay out 
certain obligations for the organisation 
itself, which include a duty to clearly define 
what an inappropriate relationship is and 
to implement measures to limit the risks of 
potential conflicts of interest in the personal 
relationships of its officers and people they 
have contact with.
The College of Policing in the UK has 
also published guidelines (undated) on 
maintaining professional boundaries.  These 
guidelines go hand in hand with the code 
of ethics and set out broad principles from 
which police services can determine their 
policies and procedures.  In particular, the 
guidelines include the following principles:
 > Inappropriate sexual conduct or 
unprofessional behaviour undermines 
public trust and confidence in policing;
 > The guidelines apply to all police 
officers, police staff and volunteers, 
such as special constables (similar to 
garda reserve members in the Irish 
context), in terms of their relationships 
with members of the public, but do not 
apply to relationships with colleagues;
 > Failure to adhere to them can amount 
to a breach of professional standards 
or a criminal offence depending on the 
circumstances;
 > Staff must be fully aware of the 
imbalance of power between them 
and members of the public and 
maintain an appropriate professional 
relationship accordingly. For example, 
the guidelines stipulate that police 
personnel should not engage in 
sexual conduct or other inappropriate 
behaviour while on duty and should 
not pursue or establish an improper 
sexual or emotional relationship with a 
person with whom they have come into 
contact professionally;
 > This duty extends to the times when 
police personnel are off duty in the case 
of an ongoing incident or investigation;
 > Police personnel should inform their 
supervisor if a person with whom they 
have come into professional contact 
attempts to pursue an improper 
sexual or emotional relationship with 
them, and agree any necessary control 
measures including disengagement;
 > Police personnel should not use 
a professional relationship with a 
member of the public to pursue a 
relationship with someone close to 
that person (e.g.  a family member) and 
they should never end a professional 
relationship for the sole reason of 
pursuing a personal relationship; 
 > Police personnel should never use 
police systems to check a person’s 
background in order to assess whether 
a personal relationship would be in 
breach of the professional standards; 
and
 > Police personnel should speak up 
regarding concerns that a colleague is 
acting in breach of the guidelines and 
supervisors should ensure that officers 
are aware of their obligations under the 
guidelines.
While social media can bring substantial 
benefits to policing it also poses additional 
risks.  Concerns have been expressed in the 
UK that misuse of social media by police 
personnel has led to associations which may 
make them more susceptible to corruption.
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Key Findings and Assessment
While all of the standards of conduct and 
practice set out in the Garda Code of Ethics 
have some significance as regards setting 
professional boundaries, the third standard, 
Respect and Equality, has a particular 
significance.  The Code recognises the special 
responsibility of the Garda Síochána to 
uphold human rights and equality and the 
special duty of members and staff to children 
and other vulnerable persons.  The garda 
workforce is expected to treat everyone with 
fairness and to avoid discrimination, and 
to challenge discriminatory language and 
behaviour in others.
The Garda Síochána does not at present 
have a policy or guidelines which support 
the garda workforce to develop suitable 
professional boundaries in their dealings 
with the public.  This inspection also found 
that there was only a limited understanding 
among those interviewed of the harmful 
consequences that could result from the 
absence of effective control measures to 
prevent inappropriate relationships. 
The development programme for the 
proposed Garda Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU) 
does contain a commitment to develop 
a professional boundaries policy.  To be 
effective, it is important that the policy and 
guidelines clearly set out all the duties and 
responsibilities of garda members and staff. 
The policy should also lay the foundation for 
other related policies and practices, such as 
notifiable associations and abuse of power 
for sexual gain, and be compatible with 
policies and guidelines on conflict of interest 
in the Garda Síochána.
Recommendation
In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendation.
Abuse of Power for Sexual 
Gain
Abuse of power by police officers for 
sexual or emotional purposes is commonly 
understood as any behaviour of police 
personnel which takes advantage of their 
position in order to pursue a sexual or 
inappropriate emotional relationship. This 
is recognised as an emerging corruption 
risk by many police services in common law 
jurisdictions.  
The abuse of power for sexual gain (APSG) 
can be hugely harmful to victims and 
represents a significant breach of trust.  In 
addition, the exposure of such cases could 
reduce the likelihood of other victims 
reporting crimes because confidence in the 
Garda Síochána has been damaged.
International and Comparable 
Practice
In 2013, the Independent Police Complaints 
Commission (IPCC) in the UK conducted 
research into the nature and extent of APSG. 
While the IPCC concluded that there was no 
evidence to suggest that the problem was 
widespread it did clearly recognise it as a 
distinct form of corruption in policing in the 
UK.  In recent national strategic assessments 
of corruption in the UK, APSG has been 
identified as one of the more significant 
corruption risks for policing.
The Garda Síochána should develop, 
publish and implement an overarching 
policy and guidelines on professional 
boundaries for the garda workforce.
Recommendation 3
Professional Boundaries
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To better contextualise the issue, the IPCC 
research drew comparisons with the 
emergence of similar sexual misconduct in 
other professions, such as among medical, 
religious and social care professionals. 
Perpetrators of such abuse tend to target 
vulnerable individuals, including those with 
alcohol, drug or mental health difficulties 
or those who have previously experienced 
sexual or domestic violence.
In terms of how the problem has affected 
policing in the UK, the IPCC concluded 
that there were common themes in many 
of the cases examined, including police 
computer system misuse, poor supervision 
and missed opportunities to identify 
and intervene in such cases.  The victims 
were disproportionately women while 
the perpetrators were disproportionately 
men.  Certain structural failings were 
also identified, in particular, a certain 
organisational blindness to the risk.  As a 
result, police organisations failed to identify 
the issue and put appropriate control 
measures in place.  Suitable control measures 
would include, for instance, policies on 
professional boundaries or APSG, awareness 
raising among supervisors (particularly of 
the common indicators of such behaviour) 
and better exchange of information between 
police services in relation to dismissal of 
police officers for such behaviour.
In 2017, the National Police Chiefs’ Council 
in the UK launched a National Strategy to 
Address the Issue of Police Officers and Staff Who 
Abuse Their Position for Sexual Purposes.  The 
strategy has five strands: 
 > Prevention: this focuses on providing 
guidance to supervisors and police 
personnel, building awareness of the 
issue particularly among supervisors 
and organisations dealing with 
vulnerable victims, and improving 
training and selection processes;
 > Intelligence: this will support better 
risk assessment, closer inter-agency 
cooperation, effective confidential 
reporting mechanisms, and improved 
technical intelligence-gathering 
capability for Anti-Corruption Units;
 > Enforcement: this will standardise case 
reporting and referral mechanisms and 
enhance investigations, victim supports 
and prosecutions;
 > Engagement: this refers to developing 
communication and awareness-raising 
strategies; and
 > Governance: this involves the creation 
of new structures with a National 
Counter Corruption Advisory 
Group and strategic leads at senior 
management level in all police services.
The ethical standards in this area have 
evolved and adapted over several years. 
These standards range from a general duty 
on professionals to conduct themselves in 
such a way as to avoid conflict between their 
professional and private lives to more ex-
plicit prohibitions on professionals engag-
ing in particular relationships.
The Medical Council of Ireland, the 
Nursing and Midwifery Board of Ireland, 
and CORU – The Health and Social Care 
Regulatory Body for Ireland all have clear 
prohibitions on certain relationships in their 
codes of professional conduct and ethics. 
The professional standards of these bodies 
prohibit their members from using their 
professional position to form relationships 
of a sexual, inappropriate emotional or 
exploitative nature with persons they have 
met in a therapeutic or professional capacity, 
or such person’s partner, spouse or other 
close relative.
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Another particularly good example of 
international practice from a policing 
perspective involves police services in the UK 
which are obliged to implement clear policies 
and guidelines on professional relationships 
based on the guidelines published by the 
National Police Chiefs’ Council.  The Police 
Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) has a 
particularly comprehensive policy, which 
prohibits contact between police officers 
and members of the public involved in an 
ongoing investigation and places a duty 
on police officers to notify their supervisor 
about a relationship with anyone with whom 
they formerly had professional contact.
The PSNI produced a simple chart as 
shown in Figure 2.1 as part of their policy 
guidelines on maintaining professional 
boundaries between police and members of 
the public.  This provides a clear guide for 
members of the workforce to determine the 
appropriateness of a sexual or emotional 
relationship they may have formed with 
members of the public whom they have 
interacted with during the course of their 
professional duties.  
Figure 2.1 PSNI Overriding Principles relating to sexual or emotional relationships with 
members of the public with whom there has been contact in a professional capacity
Source: Police Service of Northern Ireland, Corporate Policy Service Instruction SI3217, Maintaining a Professional 
Boundary between Police and Members of the Public
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Key Findings and Assessment
Unlike in police services in the UK there is no 
policy on APSG in the Garda Síochána and 
there is no awareness raising or guidance for 
the garda workforce leaders or supervisors, 
particularly as regards common indicators 
of APSG-type behaviour.  During the course 
of this inspection, the Inspectorate found 
that while there were documented cases of 
sexual misconduct and violence by garda 
members investigated by the Garda Síochána 
Ombudsman Commission (GSOC) and the 
garda authorities, at no level within the 
Garda Síochána were these cases identified 
as a corruption threat.  In addition, there 
was no shared definition or understanding 
of what constituted APSG between the two 
organisations.
Beyond the common international 
understanding of APSG, other  cases of sexual 
impropriety in the Garda Síochána have 
occurred and there are several examples of 
sexual misconduct by members of the Garda 
Síochána that have resulted in a criminal 
conviction.  GSOC has investigated several 
allegations of sexual misconduct by members 
of the Garda Síochána over recent years. 
GSOC’s annual report for 2018 included a 
case summary of a garda member who was 
convicted of a sexual assault during that 
year.  GSOC also reported in its 2019 annual 
report that a separate case was decided in 
2019 which concerned an investigation by 
GSOC of a garda member convicted of a 
sexual assault.  The conviction has been 
appealed. Some sexual crimes, such as the 
possession of child pornography by garda 
members, were investigated by the Garda 
Síochána. 
The Inspectorate also found that there was no 
prohibition in policy on garda trainers and 
students pursuing an emotional or sexual 
relationship while engaged in a training 
relationship.  This type of relationship is 
universally acknowledged as a clear example 
7 Please note that Recommendation 28 provides a framework for the identification and investigation of APSG.
of a power imbalance and the absence 
of a prohibition in policy is contrary to 
international practice.
A number  of  non-governmenta l 
organisations were consulted in the context 
of this inspection.  They similarly highlighted 
several anecdotal cases of sexual misconduct 
within the Garda Síochána.  One organisation 
in particular shared its experiences of victims 
of sexual violence being overwhelmingly 
anxious not to criticise or complain about 
garda handling of cases.  Victims of sexual 
violence are acutely aware of their reliance 
on subjective credibility assessments by 
investigating and other garda members 
if their cases are to progress.  They drew 
attention to this example as a way of 
demonstrating the power dynamics of the 
relationship between victims and garda 
members and the harm that this power 
differential can result in.
Recommendation
In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendation.
The Garda Síochána should develop, 
publish and implement a strategy and 
policy to mitigate the threat of Abuse of 
Power for Sexual Gain.7
This policy should highlight the dangers 
of relationships where a position of power 
can be abused for emotional or sexual 
purposes and provide guidance for the 
garda workforce and supervisors on the 
key indicators of such relationships and 
the appropriate organisational response 
to the issue.
Recommendation 4
Abuse of Power for Sexual Gain
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Notifiable Associations
The garda workforce is drawn from the very 
communities that they are expected to serve 
and, as such, it is inevitable they will bring 
existing associations with them and form 
new associations through their professional 
lives.  It is vital that garda management 
are fully aware of any inappropriate 
associations and that they take any control 
measures necessary to prevent associations 
that may compromise the workforce or the 
organisation and its systems.
Associations that could pose a risk to 
professional integrity can occur in a number 
of ways.  First, they can occur through new 
exposure to individuals who are associated 
with crime or who could otherwise exploit 
access to a member of the garda workforce. 
This can occur through membership of 
sporting clubs and gyms or through a new 
personal relationship.  Secondly, existing 
relationships such as with long-term friends 
or colleagues may become a risk.  This 
could be because of a criminal conviction or 
association, or because of a new occupation 
such as that of private investigator or 
journalist.  In all these cases, the Garda 
Síochána needs to be aware of the association 
and to take proportionate steps to protect the 
organisation’s reputation and integrity.
International and Comparable 
Practice
Professional standards and policies related to 
counter corruption in the UK recognise the 
critical importance of properly managing 
relationships and associations in the policing 
context.  The general aim of such policies is 
to protect the integrity of the organisation 
and its personnel, in particular from persons 
who might seek to corrupt its officers or staff 
or compromise their professionalism.
It is very common for UK-based police 
services to have policies and procedures 
related to notifiable associations.  Police 
services which have particularly good 
examples of such policies include 
Merseyside, Gwent, North Wales, and Devon 
and Cornwall.  These policies impose certain 
duties on police officers, staff and volunteers 
such as special constables to notify a 
designated supervisor of certain personal 
associations.  These associations can be with 
an individual, a group or an organisation. 
The policies lay down detailed principles 
about the types of association which must 
be notified.  As regards individuals, the 
guidelines stipulate that associations with 
persons who have unspent convictions, who 
are the subject of pending investigations 
or criminal charges, who are the subject of 
adverse criminal intelligence, who have 
been dismissed as police officers, or who 
are journalists should all be notified to a 
supervisor.  Personnel should also notify 
any association with a group or organisation 
where they would expect to come into 
contact with such persons or which has the 
potential to otherwise compromise the police 
officer, staff member or volunteer, or which 
promotes discrimination in any form.  These 
policies also prohibit membership of political 
organisations or active involvement in 
politics.  The guidelines stipulate that police 
systems should never be used by a member 
of the police service to check if a particular 
association of theirs is of a notifiable type. 
This task is for supervisors from Anti-
Corruption Units.  There is also a duty to 
speak up if an individual becomes aware of 
a notifiable association by a colleague.
Key Findings and Assessment
During the course of the inspection, the 
Inspectorate was informed on several 
occasions of criminal investigations that had 
identified members of the Garda Síochána 
who were socialising with associates of 
criminal suspects or had family members 
themselves linked to criminal activity. 
These associations came to light only as a 
consequence of the investigation and had not 
been disclosed by the members concerned. 
The Inspectorate was also provided with 
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details of a case involving an applicant for the 
Garda Síochána who had excluded details of 
a family member with criminal connections 
from their vetting information.  This matter 
came to light only when this person had 
commenced their training at the Garda 
College and another garda member who had 
served in the area where the applicant lived 
raised concerns about the family association 
with a supervisor.
While the Garda Síochána does not at present 
have a policy or guidelines on the notification 
of certain associations or relationships, the 
development programme for the proposed 
Garda Anti-Corruption Unit does contain 
a commitment to develop such a policy. 
It is important that any such policy and 
guidelines clearly set out which associations 
and relationships members of the garda 
workforce are obliged to report and the 
arrangements for reporting and managing 
such relationships.
Recommendation
In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendation.
Covert Human Intelligence 
Sources
The increasing emphasis on intelligence-
led policing underscores the need for a 
modern police service to better understand 
the criminal environment.  Central to such 
improved understanding is the use of covert 
human intelligence sources (CHIS).  These 
are people who can provide information 
that can assist with police investigations. 
The use of CHIS has traditionally been 
associated with the detective function and 
in that context is utilised in connection with 
specific crimes or investigations.
However, the use of CHIS is a difficult, 
challenging and potentially high-risk 
activity.  In the Garda Síochána, members 
are specifically selected and trained as CHIS 
‘handlers’ and ‘controllers’.  Collectively 
they operate as a ‘source management 
team’ whose role is to ensure the safety of 
the individual and to obtain information 
that can be used to keep people safe.  The 
management team must remain objective 
in their dealings with the CHIS, alert to 
the possibility that some information may 
be inaccurate or malicious, and conscious 
of not compromising themselves or any 
ongoing investigations.  In addition, the 
CHIS depends on the management team to 
keep their identity protected.
The provision of gifts of any kind (with 
the accruing sense of obligation) to the 
management team by a CHIS has the 
potential to adversely affect the nature 
of the relationship.  At the very least, 
this could result in the objectivity of the 
relationship being compromised (potentially 
unconsciously) leading to a less rigorous 
assessment of the information provided.  In 
extreme circumstances, it may even erode the 
professional boundaries necessary to ensure 
the safe and secure management of the CHIS 
and the case.
International and Comparable 
Practice
Commenting on their November 2019 Audit 
of the FBI’s Management of its Confidential 
Human Source Validation Processes, the 
Inspector General of the US Department of 
Justice stated: 
The Garda Síochána should develop, 
publish and implement a policy and 
guidelines on notifiable associations 
which all  members of the garda 
workforce are obliged to report. 
Recommendation 5
Notifiable Associations 
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“Ineffective management and oversight 
of confidential sources can result 
in jeopardising FBI operations, and 
placing FBI agents, sources, subjects of 
investigation, and the public in harm’s 
way.”
Similar to other police interactions with 
those who depend on them for their safety, 
the CHIS-police relationship may result in 
an imbalance of power that could be abused 
by members, or former members, for sexual 
gain.
In 2019, the UK Home Office issued a 
Revised Code of Practice for CHIS.  The 
Code provides detailed guidance on the 
authorisation and use of CHIS by all public 
authorities, including the police.  The Code 
lays down a single set of standards for 
all public authorities.  It includes special 
considerations for certain categories of CHIS, 
particularly vulnerable persons and children. 
Such persons should be considered suitable 
as a CHIS only in the most exceptional 
circumstances and should be authorised by 
a nominated officer in each public authority. 
Other special safeguards include limiting the 
duration of such authorisations, enhanced 
risk assessments, more regular reviews 
and the presence of an appropriate adult at 
meetings with child sources.
The New Zealand guidelines for police 
officers on professional distance has 
designated sexual or emotional relationships 
between police officers and CHIS as 
unethical and has strongly prohibited such 
relationships.
Key Findings and Assessment
This inspection examined aspects of CHIS 
management in the Garda Síochána in 
the context of managing professional 
relationships.  The Inspectorate found 
there were robust policies in place for 
official interaction with CHIS; however, the 
absence of a framework for managing other 
professional relationships in the Garda 
Síochána means there are no guidelines 
in relation to maintaining professional 
boundaries with a CHIS outside of the 
formal interaction process.  The CHIS 
Charter does not explicitly prohibit sexual or 
emotional relationships with a CHIS or the 
acceptance of gifts or hospitality from them. 
It is noteworthy that the Morris Tribunal 
(2005) criticised the Garda Síochána for poor 
supervision of members’ relationships with 
sources and in some instances there was 
evidence to suggest they were inappropriate. 
Furthermore, there are no guidelines in 
relation to contact between members of the 
management team and a CHIS once the 
relationship has ended.
Recommendation
In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendation.
The Garda Síochána should revise its 
Covert Human Intelligence Sources 
Management Policy to prohibit the 
acceptance of gifts or hospitality from 
a Covert Human Intelligence Source. 
This should reinforce the obligations in 
other related garda policies dealing with 
professional boundaries, relationships 
and associations with an emphasis on 
the management of Covert Human 
Intelligence Sources.   In particular, 
the revised policy should impose an 
obligation on garda members to disclose 
all relationships with a current or former 
Covert Human Intelligence Source.
Recommendation 6
Covert Human Intelligence Sources 
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Substance Misuse
Policing is widely recognised as a highly 
stressful occupation and substance misuse 
is seen as a growing problem in the 
international law enforcement context. 
There are multiple routes into substance 
dependency and misuse.  These include 
coping with work and life stresses, or self-
medication for physical or psychological 
injuries.  The occupational demands of 
policing, such as rotating shift work, can 
greatly impact on officer wellbeing in terms 
of fatigue and can interfere with family and 
other personal supports.  For some, this can 
lead to substance misuse.
The 2015 US President’s Task Force on 
Twenty First Century Policing identified two 
risk factors, in particular, associated with 
substance misuse among police officers.  One 
was the greater risk of occupational injury, 
either physical or psychological, while the 
other was the greater exposure to drug users, 
drug culture and organised crime networks 
involved in illicit drugs.  All of these can have 
a normalising effect on substance misuse.
Police organisations therefore need effective 
strategies to mitigate the threats that could 
result from members of the workforce using 
illicit drugs.
International and Comparable 
Practice
In the UK, substance misuse among members 
of the police workforce has been recognised 
as an increasing threat for many years.  While 
chief officers have broad authority to require 
testing, including random drug testing of 
personnel, some services have begun to 
question the effectiveness of random testing 
because the tests rarely yield positive results.
In a 2015 report, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate 
of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services 
(HMICFRS) found that just over half of police 
services in England and Wales were using 
random drug testing, with the remaining 
using intelligence-led testing targeted at 
officers at higher risk of being involved in 
drug misuse.  HMICFRS recommended that 
all services should have a comprehensive 
policy on substance misuse and drug testing 
which provided flexibility in the testing 
regime to allow for random and targeted 
testing.  It further stated that random drug 
testing was an important safeguard for 
police officers working undercover and 
that programmes of random drug testing 
provided an important awareness-raising 
opportunity.
Many UK police services have revised their 
substance misuse policies since that report. 
Good examples of such policies include 
Merseyside, Wiltshire, South Yorkshire and 
North Wales Police Service, as well as the 
Police Service of Northern Ireland.  Some 
of the more common features of substance 
misuse policies and procedures include the 
following:
 > An objective to maintain the integrity 
of policing and a safe working 
environment;
 > Regular testing of officers in high-risk 
or vulnerable positions (e.g.  protective 
services, serious crime, undercover, 
firearms and driving pursuit) as well 
as random testing;
 > Pre-employment testing of new 
recruits; 
 > Management testing in terms of post-
incident testing and testing for the 
purposes of developed vetting (i.e.  a 
heightened level of vetting in the UK 
which allows access to secret level 
material);
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 > Voluntary disclosure and access to 
welfare programmes outside of the 
normal testing regime and modification 
of a police officer’s duties during any 
treatment periods;
 > Specification of the prohibited 
substances;
 > Providing for certain safeguards, 
including testing by accredited third-
party contractors, split samples and 
independent testing of disputed 
samples;
 > The use of various sampling methods, 
including oral fluids, urine, breath and 
hair;
 > Acknowledging the risk posed to 
officers involved in substance misuse of 
coercion by organised criminal groups 
and the risk that a substance misuse 
habit leaves officers susceptible to 
criminal behaviours, including fraud, 
theft and corruption;
 > Acknowledging the risk to public and 
workplace safety from the impairment 
of an officer’s ability to perform their 
duties effectively; and
 > Acknowledging that substance misuse 
can undermine the safety of a criminal 
conviction in cases involving identified 
officers.
Key Findings and Assessment 
In 2018, the Garda Representative Association 
commissioned a Wellbeing Survey of garda 
members.  The survey follows on from a 
similar study in 1998, which found that 
welfare supports in the organisation were 
inadequate and that the culture at that 
time discouraged members from disclosing 
difficulties and seeking appropriate support. 
The 2018 survey suggests that one in every 
six members displays symptoms consistent 
with a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder.  While this rate was similar to that 
among other first responders in comparable 
police services it was at the higher end of 
the scale of these comparisons.  The survey 
report went on to acknowledge that this has 
significant implications for substance misuse 
and other life and health outcomes for garda 
members.
The present approach to confronting illicit 
drug use by the garda workforce requires an 
investigation by experienced investigators. 
Such investigations can be both time and 
resource consuming in order to satisfy 
the criminal evidence threshold required 
to bring a prosecution.  In most cases, the 
subject must be found in possession of illegal 
drugs in order to bring the investigation to 
a successful conclusion.  The protracted 
time frame for such investigations poses a 
considerable risk to public safety and the 
health and safety of other members of the 
garda workforce because of the requirement 
to keep the investigation confidential for 
extended periods.  In the interim, this 
places considerable constraints on the 
organisation’s ability to manage the subject 
of the investigation and any risk from their 
behaviour to colleagues and the public more 
generally.  
As part of this inspection, the Inspectorate 
consulted widely at all levels of the Garda 
Síochána about the issue of substance misuse 
and the use of illicit drugs among the garda 
workforce was acknowledged as a serious 
concern.  Misuse of alcohol and prescription 
drugs was also reported and there was a 
broad consensus in support of testing across 
the organisation.  The cost of testing and 
risk of legal challenges were identified as 
possible impediments to the introduction 
of an effective testing programme and some 
concerns were raised about privacy and 
gender equality issues linked to specific 
approaches to testing.
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A substance misuse testing programme 
linked with effective disciplinary and 
dismissal processes could substantially 
expedite the time required to deal with 
cases of drug misuse and mitigate some of 
the risks concerned.  Furthermore, it could 
have a positive effect on perceptions of the 
integrity of the organisation highlighting the 
consequences for the workforce.
Introducing a testing regime in the Garda 
Síochána presents a good opportunity for 
more effectively managing the consequences 
of substance misuse by the workforce in 
terms of identifying and mitigating the risks 
concerned.  
Recommendation
In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendation.
The Garda Síochána should develop, 
publish and implement a substance 
misuse and testing policy and procedure. 
As a first step, all new entrants should 
undergo mandatory pre-employment 









Members of the Garda Síochána workforce 
should execute their duties impartially, 
honestly and in the public interest.  They 
have a fiduciary duty for the proper care of 
financial and other resources and should be 
aware of the standards regarding accepting 
gifts and hospitality.  They should not have 
private interests which conflict with their 
public position or take advantage of their 
position for personal gain or that of their 
families or close associates.  
There are three basic ethical values which 
underpin every corporate governance system: 
fairness, accountability and transparency.  As 
values they have featured in a wide variety 
of both national and international reports 
and standards documents.  While the three 
values are equally important perhaps the 
most relevant in terms of conflict of interest 
is transparency.
Conflict of Interest
As a general principle public servants are 
expected to be honest, fair and unbiased in 
their decisions.  Furthermore, public bodies 
have a duty to ensure that conflicts of interest 
are identified and appropriately managed in 
such a way as to protect the integrity of their 
employees and the public body itself.  This is 
designed to maintain public confidence.
Conflict of interest in public services is a 
growing public concern and new challenges 
arise as the State and non-state sectors work 
more closely together.  However, a balanced 
approach is required because too strict an 
approach can be unworkable and costly and 
can interfere with personal rights.
An effective conflict of interest policy should 
do the following: identify all the risks 
concerned, prohibit unacceptable forms of 
private interest, raise awareness among the 
public and public service, and ensure there 
are effective procedures for resolving conflict 
of interest situations in the organisation. 
While it is common practice for top-level 
decision-makers to make regular disclosures 
of interests, some countries are increasingly 
requiring disclosure by lower-level public 
officials in high-risk areas such as policing.
In 2014, the OECD Survey on Managing 
Conflict of Interest put Ireland behind the 
OECD average for disclosure across all 
categories, including executive, legislative, 
judicial and other high-risk areas.
The OECD (2003) guidelines on conflict of 
interest set out four principles for public 
servants, as follows:
 > Decisions makers should at all times 
serve the public interest without any 
regard for personal gain;
 > Their actions must be transparent and 
they should at all times act in a way 
that will bear close public scrutiny;
 > Decision-makers should promote 
individual responsibility and should 
demonstrate integrity by serving as an 
example in all of their actions; and
 > Public organisations should create an 
organisational culture which does not 




International and Comparable 
Practice
The New Zealand Police Service has a 
comprehensive policy for managing conflicts 
of interest within the service8.  The policy 
acknowledges that conflicts of interest 
arise frequently in policing and in order 
to minimise risk they must be routinely 
declared and managed.  The policy defines 
conflict of interest as a situation where 
personal and professional interests may 
conflict with a person’s position, obligation 
or responsibilities as a police employee. 
Conflicts of interest occur naturally and 
frequently in policing, particularly in small 
communities where police employees may 
live close to and work in such communities. 
It is important to bear in mind that a conflict 
of interest is not wrong in and of itself, but 
that it is the actions that are taken in response 
to such conflicts that may be unethical.
The policy applies to all police employees 
and all aspects of their work, including every 
incident, every investigation and all corporate 
or organisational duties.  A partnership 
approach is adopted and employees must 
recognise and report any conflicts of interest 
to their supervisor, who must work with 
the employee to assess the risk and identify 
any appropriate action necessary.  There 
are additional policies and procedures for 
dealing with specific conflicts of interest that 
arise as a result of the following: secondary 
employment, gifts and gratuities, personal 
relationships and public procurement, and 
special care is required in relation to the use 
of public funds and access to confidential 
and sensitive information.
While the policy acknowledges that conflicts 
of interest can be difficult to identify, police 
employees must be alert to the possibility in 
8 Since our inspection New Zealand Police Service have published an updated policy for managing conflicts of interest 
https://www.police.govt.nz/sites/default/files/publications/managing-conflicts-of-interest.pdf [last accessed 29 Septem-
ber 2020]
any of their dealings with the public and be 
aware of the risk such conflicts might do to the 
professional reputation of the organisation. 
The policy sets out a comprehensive list of 
examples of where a conflict of interest might 
arise and of particular policing roles which 
might be vulnerable to it.
There are clear procedures for reporting 
possible conflicts and making specific 
declarations for situations involving 
investigations, procurement or general 
conflict of interest situations.  Managers and 
supervisors are encouraged to create an open 
environment where ethical and conflict of 
interest issues can be discussed freely.
In 2015, the Northern Ireland Audit Office 
produced its Conflict of Interest Good 
Practice Guide.  The guide is underpinned 
by and builds on the ‘Seven Principles of 
Public Life’ or the Nolan Principles, which 
were first elaborated by the UK Committee 
on Standards in Public Life and are intended 
to apply to anyone who serves the public in 
any way.  The guide describes a conflict of 
interest as a situation where an individual 
has two different interests which overlap.  It 
also provides a broad definition of conflict 
of interest as a situation which involves 
“a conflict between the public duty and the 
private interests of a public official in which 
the official’s private-capacity interest could 
improperly influence the performance of his or 
her official duties and responsibilities”.  It clearly 
describes interests and relationships, such 
as with family and associates, which may 
conflict with the public duties of the official 
concerned.  It also identifies the principal 
risks associated with conflict of interest, 




As pointed out earlier in this report the 
Standards in Public Office Commission 
has also published a guide to best practice 
in ethics compliance, including managing 
conflict of interest.  
Key Findings and Assessment
The Garda Code of Ethics obliges members of 
the garda workforce to declare and manage 
any actual or potential conflicts of interest 
that might impair their ability to carry out 
their duty or weaken public confidence in the 
Garda Síochána.  This includes any conflict 
that might arise from a personal or business 
relationship outside of the organisation. 
However, while there are guidelines for 
dealing with conflicts in specific situations 
(for example, procurement and selection 
processes), there is no garda policy or 
procedure to facilitate reporting or active 
management of the broader risks associated 
with conflicts of interest in the policing 
context.  During focus groups with the garda 
workforce it became clear that there was no 
commonly accepted understanding of what 
constitutes a conflict of interest or how it 
should be managed.
While many superintendents demonstrated 
an understanding of what could amount to 
a conflict of interest and how it should be 
managed, such as reallocating prosecution 
decisions where the suspect or victim was 
known to them, there was no formal process 
for capturing this and the understanding of 
the issue and how it should be managed was 
more limited in frontline staff.  
The Inspectorate also found that there 
remains a concern both within the 
organisation and among some members of 
the public that conflicts of interest continue to 
influence decisions.  This included situations 
involving management of overtime, local 
appointments, discipline investigations and 
the investigation of crime.
While not yet in place, the development 
programme for the proposed Garda Anti-
Corruption Unit does contain a commitment 
to developing a comprehensive conflict of 
interest policy.
Identified Good Practice
Selection panels organised by the 
Garda Human Resource Management 
Department have an effective process 
for mitigating against conflicts 
of interest. This process provides 
guidance on what amounts to a conflict 
of interest namely: 
“A conflict of interest arises when an 
individual has two different interests 
that overlap.  A conflict of interest 
involves a conflict between the public 
duty of a Selection Board member and 
the private interest of the member in 
which the member’s private-capacity 
interest could improperly influence 
the performance of his/her official 
duties and responsibilities.  A conflict 
of interest can also be perceived.  A 
perceived conflict of interest exists 
where it could be perceived, or appears, 
that private capacity interests could 
improperly influence the performance 
of a selection board member’s official 
duties and responsibilities.” 
Panel members are required to make a 
declaration that no such conflict exists 
before participating in the selection 
panel.  There is a similar process and 
declaration for managing conflicts 
of interest that could arise within 





In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendation.
Gifts, Hospitality and 
Sponsorship
During the course of their duties in the 
community or as a result of their relationships 
with other persons or organisations, the 
garda workforce may be offered gifts or 
hospitality from time to time.  These can 
range from a small gift of appreciation from 
a grateful member of the public to quite 
substantial offers of corporate hospitality, 
usually provided to more senior personnel 
in the organisation.
It is becoming an increasingly common 
corporate practice for commercial and public 
bodies to prominently publish information 
related to gifts or hospitality received by 
senior executives as well as any offers 
declined.  This practice is part of a trend 
towards greater transparency regarding 
remuneration, expenses and business 
interests of senior leaders or directors within 
large organisations in order to make the 
actions of senior executives more transparent 
to all stakeholders.
International and Comparable 
Practice
During the course of this inspection, the 
Inspectorate found transparent policies 
and up-to-date, comprehensive gifts and 
hospitality registers in place in the South 
Yorkshire Police, Merseyside Police, the 
Metropolitan Police Service, Police Scotland, 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 
New Zealand Police and Victoria Police 
in Australia.  For analysis purposes, the 
Inspectorate examined the registers of those 
police services with the most similar policing 
environments and functions to those of the 
Garda Síochána.  This examination found 
that between 1 July 2018 and 30 June 2019, 
Police Scotland published 385 entries, New 
Zealand Police published 205 entries, the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police published 
186 entries and Victoria Police published 
84 entries.  These registers applied to police 
personnel of all ranks and grades, and to 
gifts or hospitality accepted as well as those 
declined.
Figure 3.1 shows an extract of declarations 
published online by the New Zealand 
Police.  The register includes gifts to all of the 
workforce, ranging from the Commissioner 
to frontline staff.
The Garda Síochána should develop, 
publish and implement a policy and 
guidelines on the declaration, recording 














Figure 3.1 Extract of declarations from New Zealand Police’s 2018-2019 Gift and Hospitality Register
Source: Information from New Zealand Police website; summarised by the Garda Inspectorate
Posi�on of person(s)  District or Service 
Centre 




Constable Canterbury District Bo�le of wine, confec�onery and 
hand cream 
$ 25 Individual 04/07/2018 Accepted, but wine subsequently securely disposed of 
Area Commander and Area 
Execu�ve Officer 
Eastern District Meal vouchers $ 200 Walker Pain�ng & Decora�ng 06/07/2018 Declined 
Māori, Pacific & Ethnic 
Services 
Māori, Pacific & 
Ethnic Services 
Cash $ 100 NZ Alcohol Harm 17/07/2018 Accepted and subsequently donated to charity 
Constable Waitematā District JB Hi-Fi voucher $ 100 JB Hi-Fi 20/08/2018 Accepted and subsequently used as a spot prize at a course 
to assist young adults to obtain their drivers licences 
Commissioner Execu�ve Hosted �ckets to All Blacks match 
in corporate box
 
$ 370 Air New Zealand 04/09/2018 Declined 
Assistant Commissioners 
(two) 
Execu�ve Lunch $ 50 High Commission of Canada 17/09/2018 Accepted 
Detec�ve Sergeant Waikatō District Cheese hamper $ 30 Fonterra 10/10/2018 Accepted and shared among team 
Detec�ve Sergeant Auckland City 
District 
Drink/Finger food voucher $ 100 JIREH Hospitality Group 24/10/2018 Accepted but not redeemed 
Business Advisor Finance BP Voucher $ 60 BP Oil NZ Ltd -Cunningham Lindsey 
NZ Ltd, t/a Sedgwick 
30/10/2018 Declined 




Restaurant Voucher $ 50 Property Ins�tute New Zealand 09/11/2018 Accepted and retained for group use 
Sergeant Response and 
Opera�ons Group 
Dress watch with presiden�al 
emblem 
$ 300 Korean Security Team 04/12/2018 Accepted and a dona�on made to charity in recogni�on of 
the gi� 
Execu�ve Assistant Execu�ve Honey Samplers $ 50 Air New Zealand 14/12/2018 Accepted 
Detec�ve Constable Auckland City 
District 
Prezzy card and confec�onery $ 55 Individual 20/12/2018 Declined 
Constable Southern District A bag containing a plas�c drink 
bo�le and USB s�ck 
$ 25 Camp Quality 06/01/2019 Accepted 
Senior Procurement 
Manager 
Infrastructure Network/marke�ng event $ 30 FCM Travel 23/01/2019 Declined 
Eastern Bay of Plenty 
Police 
Bay Of Plenty 
District 
6 x AED devices $ 13800 Eastern Bay Energy Trust 28/01/2019 Accepted and distributed to small community sta�ons and 
road policing vehicles 
Canterbury District Canterbury District Book $ 25 Individual 28/02/2019 Accepted for the shared resource library 
Preven�on South Manager Central District Milwaukee "Tick" bluetooth 
tracking device 
$ 70 Milwaukee Tools NZ 22/03/2019 Accepted and retained for use by team 
Inspector Coun�es Manukau 
District 
Gi� hamper including alcohol and 
food items 
$ 100 Individual 10/04/2019 Accepted and subsequently donated to charity 




The volume, depth and transparency of this 
register demonstrates how well the internal 
policy is embedded into practice and the 
service’s commitment to managing the issue 
as a corruption risk.
With regard to effective policies in this area, 
North Wales Police has a comprehensive 
policy framework related to counter-
corruption.  In respect of gifts, gratuities 
and hospitality, the policy links to the 
wider ethical and integrity framework and 
clarifies the legal context in which gifts and 
hospitality will be managed by the service 
and lays out a principles-based approach 
to the practice.  For a gift to be acceptable 
under the policy it must be genuine and 
made in circumstances where the donor 
is genuinely expressing appreciation.  It 
must also be justifiable to the extent that it 
would not appear to a reasonable person to 
undermine the impartiality or independence 
of the officer and it must be free in that there 
is no expectation of reciprocity on the part of 
the donor.  Finally, it must be transparent in 
so far as the offer of the gift and the identity 
of the donor will be made public.  All offers 
of gifts made to the police workforce must 
be declared and recorded in the Register of 
Gifts, Gratuities and Hospitality.  These rules 
also extend to the acceptance of a gift by a 
spouse on behalf of the police officer or staff 
member concerned.  The register is reviewed 
regularly by the Anti-Corruption Unit 
and cross-referenced with other registers, 
such as registers of business interests and 
procurement.
Other good practices identified by the 
Inspectorate include the publication of 
all gifts and gratuities registered by UK 
Chief Police Officers, and the practice in 
the South Yorkshire Police Service of the 
Anti-Corruption Unit regularly challenging 
entries in the register to ensure they are in 
line with ethical behaviour.
The 2019 guidelines to civil servants from 
the Standards in Public Office Commission 
in Ireland states:
“Civil servants should not receive or accept 
benefits of any kind from a third party which 
might reasonably be seen to compromise 
their personal judgement or integrity.  
The actions of civil servants should be 
above suspicion and not give rise to any 
actual or potential conflict of interest, and 
their dealings with commercial and other 
interests should be able to withstand the 
closest possible scrutiny.” 
The guidelines state that particular care 
should be taken in relation to gifts from 
donors who stand to derive a personal or 
commercial benefit from their relationship 
with the department or office concerned. 
Cash, gifts, cheques or vouchers that may 
be exchanged for cash may not be accepted, 
regardless of the amount.  Civil servants may 
not solicit gifts, directly or indirectly and 
may not approach any business with which 
they have contact through their official duties 
seeking sponsorship or support for any club, 
charitable organisation, association, trade 
union or other organisation.  Civil servants 
should also not accept special facilities 
or discounts on private purchases from 
suppliers with whom they have had official 
dealings.
Key Findings and Assessment
The garda policy on the acceptance of gifts, 
hospitality and sponsorship is set out in 
HQ Directive 32/2018 and applies to all of 
the garda workforce.  The policy defines a 
number of terms, including gifts (modest 
and significant value), hospitality, routine 
hospitality and sponsorship, and sets out the 
procedure for accepting gifts or hospitality. 
There is a general prohibition on soliciting 
gifts and hospitality or accepting special 
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facilities or discounts on private purchases. 
The policy also sets out the circumstances 
in which a gift or hospitality might be 
accepted without requiring prior approval 
or recording.  The policy contains a non-
exhaustive list of circumstances in which 
prior approval is not required but the 
overriding consideration is reasonableness. 
In circumstances where prior approval is 
required, the approving person must be either 
a principal officer or chief superintendent 
and an application must be made in writing. 
A record of such gifts (including those which 
were declined) must be kept in the Register 
of Gifts, Hospitality and Sponsorship. 
This register should contain the date and 
the identity of the garda member or staff 
concerned, as well as the value, the details of 
the donor and the decision of the approving 
person.  There are a number of special rules 
concerning sponsorship, which requires 
prior approval in all circumstances and 
should be recorded in the register.
The Executive Director of Human Resources 
and People Development is responsible 
for collating all registers completed in the 
Garda Síochána, publishing them on the 
garda website each month and ensuring the 
policy is fully complied with.  A separate 
register must be maintained for the Garda 
Commissioner.  The registers and associated 
applications must be open at all times for 
inspection or audit by the Internal Audit Unit 
or the Garda Professional Standards Unit. 
The Inspectorate found that no registers 
have been published since the introduction 
of the policy.  When the Inspectorate asked 
to see a copy of the records held by Executive 
Director of Human Resources covering the 
period 1 January 2018 to 31 May 2019 the 
Inspectorate was told that there were no 
registers for the period requested.
During inspection visits to divisions, 
the Inspectorate found that the level 
of understanding of the principles and 
procedures underlying this policy was poor. 
The common understanding was that there 
was a total prohibition on receiving gifts and 
hospitality in the organisation and little if any 
awareness of the special rules that applied 
to sponsorship.  Examples of gifts, such as 
tickets to sporting or other events being 
received by senior ranks and alcohol and free 
meals by other garda ranks and staff, were 
openly discussed at focus groups held.  While 
there was a general impression that there had 
been a noticeable decline in the receipt of gifts 
over recent years, examples were provided 
to show that the practice has not completely 
ceased.  This inspection also found that the 
sponsorship of certain sporting clubs and 
societies in the Garda Síochána could lead 
to possible conflicts of interest in terms of 
the sponsors being involved in supplying 
services and equipment to the organisation 
or being dependent on the organisation for 
licences and other authorisations in order to 
operate.
While the garda policy came into effect 
on 11 June 2018, the corporate register has 
never been completed or published on the 
garda website in line with the policy.  There 
is also limited transparency of the practice 
of receiving gifts and hospitality despite 
a policy being in place for over two years. 
This inspection found no evidence that 
the decisions of approving persons were 
being examined or challenged at corporate 
level.  It was also found that there is limited 
transparency of the garda policy with only 
a 600-word summary of the policy available 
to the public while the detailed procedures 
and guidance document is marked restricted. 
Public visibility of the policy and gifts 





In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendation.
Business and Other Interests
The clear separation of an individual’s 
private and work life is a relatively recent 
occurrence in historical terms.  Duty rosters 
for police officers began to be introduced 
from the middle of the twentieth century 
before which there was little if any distinction 
between the personal and professional life of 
a police officer.  To an extent the idea that a 
garda member is never off duty is still part of 
the public consciousness in Ireland and part 
of the culture of the organisation itself.
The question of how to regulate the off-duty 
conduct of police officers is not unique to 
the Garda Síochána.  The approach adopted 
by the Garda Síochána for dealing with the 
off-duty activities of its members is a list of 
prohibited spare-time activities contained 
in the Disciplinary Regulations and Garda 
Code.  
The Garda Síochána should raise 
awareness of the garda policy on gifts, 
hospitality and sponsorship both within 
and outside of the organisation and take 
steps to ensure full compliance with the 
policy among the garda workforce.  In 
particular:
• The Anti-Corruption Unit should 
take responsibility for monitoring 
organisational compliance with the 
policy.
• Failure to submit a monthly register 
of gifts, hospitality and sponsorship 
should be subject to challenge by the 
Anti-Corruption Unit.
• Gifts, hospitality and sponsorship 
received should be triangulated 
against other sources, such as 
procurement contracts and Standards 
in Public Office declarations.
• The Anti-Corruption Unit should 
audit the registers and challenge the 
responsible manager and recipient in 
relation to selected entries.
• The gif ts ,  hospital i ty  and 
sponsorship registers should be 
published by the Anti-Corruption 
Unit at regular intervals including 
when no gifts, hospitality or 
sponsorship have been recorded for 
the period.
Recommendation 9
Gifts, Hospitality and Sponsorship
• Gifts, hospitality and sponsorship 
offered to or received by ranks 
from superintendent and assistant 
principal and above should be 
published in such a way that the 
person concerned can be clearly 
identified.  This should extend to 
inspectors who regularly exercise 
the functions of a superintendent. 
All other gifts should be published 
against the relevant division/
department.
• Gifts, hospitality and sponsorship 
should not be accepted from 
organisations that could be subject 
to a non-public duty charge, those 
with a commercial relationship with 
the Garda Síochána, or those subject 




In order that police actions are impartial 
and are seen to be impartial and thereby to 
maintain public confidence in policing, it is 
necessary to make a clear distinction between 
the professional duties and private interests 
of the garda workforce.  This requires 
systems and processes to identify, report and 
manage any conflicts of interest which might 
arise.  
International and Comparable 
Practice
In the UK, the police workforce may not 
engage in any employment or business 
activity which is incompatible with their work 
in the police.  Such activities are generally 
considered vulnerable to corruption and 
before a member of the workforce can engage 
in secondary employment or have a business 
interest they must first inform their chief 
officer.  It is a matter for the chief officer to 
determine whether the activity is compatible 
with their policing role or not.  This duty 
extends to special constables, police staff and 
recruit police officers.
The Association of Chief Police Officers 
(2012) in the UK has issued guidelines to 
ensure that more consistent decisions are 
made in respect of secondary employment 
and business interests.  These guidelines lay 
down six principles to assist chief officers:
 > The business interest or occupation 
must not interfere with the impartiality 
of the person concerned;
 > The decision-maker must consider 
the potential impact in terms of 
undermining confidence in policing;
 > The decision must be proportionate to 
the seniority and role of the applicant;
 > The decision-maker must consider 
the implications for the performance 
of the police officer or staff member 
concerned;
 > The decision must comply with equality 
and diversity legislation; and
 > The decision must recognise the duty of 
care to the person concerned in terms of 
their health, safety and wellbeing.
During the course of this inspection, the 
Inspectorate examined the business interest 
and secondary occupation policies of the 
Merseyside and North Wales Police Services. 
These policies provide extensive rules 
based on the guidelines of the Association 
of Chief Police Officers and apply to the 
whole police workforce and the extended 
police family including volunteers (although 
acknowledging that volunteers were likely to 
be otherwise employed), certain contractors, 
and the spouse and family members of those 
subject to the policy.  The policies outline the 
roles and responsibilities of line managers, 
chief officers and the Professional Standards 
Departments and Anti-Corruption Units.  All 
decisions are recorded and transparent, with 
anonymised details published on the website 
of the police service concerned.  There are 
provisions for appealing or reviewing 
decisions as necessary.  The policy for 
North Wales Police also had special rules 
for members of the workforce who are also 
private landlords or who volunteer with 
charitable or other organisations.  
Figure 3.2 shows examples of business 
interests and activities and whether they are 
compatible, conditional or non-compatible 
for persons in employment in North Wales 
Police.  Staff who are unsure whether their 
interest is compatible or whether it may 
fall within the conditional category are 
instructed to seek advice from the Anti-
Corruption Unit.  
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Another dimension to business interests is 
personal liabilities and debts.  In its 2009 
annual report, the Standards Commission 
in Ireland expressed the view that all public 
officials should be required to disclose 
their liabilities as well as their assets under 
the Ethics Acts.  In coming to this view, 
the Commission cited the requirements of 
the National Asset Management Agency 
Act 2009, which obliges members of 
staff assigned to the Agency to provide a 
statement of interests comprising both assets 
and liabilities to the CEO.
The Group of States against Corruption 
(GRECO) Fifth Round Evaluation of several 
Member States has also suggested that 
police officials should be required to provide 
information on their liabilities.  However, it 
is not a common practice and is confined 
to very limited circumstances, usually 
confidential disclosure to the tax authorities. 
GRECO recommended that those Member 
States that do not require the disclosure of 
liabilities should regulate for an obligation 
on police management and those in certain 
vulnerable police posts to declare both their 
assets and liabilities.  The OECD Toolkit on 
Figure 3.2 North Wales Police Compatible Employment Guidance
Source: North Wales Police Counter Corruption Policy
Compatible Conditional Non-compatible
Sports Coaching Nursing Licensed Trade 
Sports Refereeing Supply Teaching Security Consultancy 
Lecturing (non-police related) Promoting/endorsing third party 
products 
Doorperson/Bouncer 
Landscaping Youth Work Private Detective 
Holiday Letting Property management Bailiff 
Hairdressing Entertainer Financial Advisor 
Beauty Therapy ATC, ACF, Sea Cadet, Sea 
Scout Leaders 
Neighbourhood Warden 
Lodgers (subject to Police 
Regs) 
Child Minding (Police houses) Political Agent 
Shopkeeping (non-licensed) Driving Legal Advisor 
Business Consultant Property renovation Fire Fighter 
Computer Consultancy Driving Instruction Journalism (News Media) 
Cartoonist Journalism (non-news media, 
e.g.  hobby/interest newsletter 
Counting Votes (Elections) 
Sportsperson Sales Person Lecturing Police Issues 







Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public 
Sector also recommends that liabilities (other 
than minor debts) should be disclosed by 
public officials (OECD, 2005).
Another issue which has come to the fore 
in GRECO’s latest round of evaluations 
concerns secondary employment. In 
general, Member States operate principles-
based regimes for regulating secondary 
employment among police officers.  With 
such approaches, there is a strong prohibition 
on involvement in politics, which is in line 
with the approach adopted by the Garda 
Síochána.  In all of the other Member States 
evaluated police officers were required to 
notify their superiors, who must consent to 
the outside employment.  Another important 
principle was that the primary duty of police 
officers must be to their police service and 
not to a secondary activity.
Belgium and Estonia in particular came in for 
some criticism as a result of recent changes 
to their regimes.  Both countries had changed 
from a very restrictive approach to one which 
was more permissive.  In the case of Belgium, 
this change occurred as a result of the 
integration in 2018 of policing and security 
services, which had different regimes prior 
to their integration.  The relaxation of the 
regime was heavily criticised by police 
representative bodies and other groups. 
The GRECO evaluation team went on to 
recommended that the Belgian process for 
sanctioning secondary employment should 
be more strictly governed using objective 
and transparent criteria.  
The 2008 annual report of the Standards 
in Public Office Commission in Ireland 
recommended that any proposed code of 
ethics or professional standards for the 
Garda Síochána include a commitment that 
a garda member should not engage in, or be 
connected to, any business or activity which 
9  Ethics in Public Office Act 1995; Standards in Public Office 2001.
would be inconsistent with their official 
position or which would undermine public 
confidence in the Garda Síochána.
Key Findings and Assessment
There is no specific policy for managing 
the external business interests of the garda 
workforce and the organisation relies on 
the statutory duty of disclosure on public 
servants.  The Ethics Acts9 provide for 
annual disclosure of ‘registrable interests’. 
This disclosure relates to “the following 
categories of interests: occupational incomes, 
shares, directorships, interests in land (including 
premises), gifts, other property and services, 
travel facilities, living accommodation, meals or 
entertainment and contracts to supply goods or 
services to the public service”.  The intention of 
the Ethics Acts is to provide for appropriate 
disclosure of any interests which could 
materially influence a public official in the 
performance of his or her official functions. 
Designated public servants under the Acts 
are required to make annual statements of 
interests, statements of material interest 
when their circumstances change, and 
evidence of tax clearance.  The duty of 
disclosure also extends to the interests of the 
spouse and close relatives of the designated 
public servant.
In the Garda Síochána, persons at 
superintendent rank or assistant principal 
grade or above have all been designated 
under the Ethics Acts, as have certain 
specified posts in the organisation associated 
with information and communication 
technology or procurement.
Figure 3.3 shows the number of declarations 
made under the Ethics in Public Office Act by 
designated members of the garda workforce 
for the years 2016, 2017 and 2018.  The 
































D E P U T Y  C O M M I S S I O N E R
A S S I S T A N T  C O M M I S S I O N E R
C H I E F  S U P E R I N T E N D E N T
S U P E R I N T E N D E N T
C H I E F  A D M I N I S T R A T I V E  O F F I C E R
E X E C U T I V E  D I R E C T O R
C H I E F  M E D I C A L  O F F I C E R
P R I N C I P A L  O F F I C E R  
( O R  E Q U I V A L E N T )
A S S I S T A N T  P R I N C I P A L  
( O R  E Q U I V A L E N T )
Declara�ons from 2016 Declara�ons from 2017 Declara�ons from 2018
HIGHER EXECUTIVE OFFICER
(CERTAIN POSTHOLDERS)
Figure 3.3 Disclosures of interest made by designated positions under the Ethics in Public 
Office Act for 2016, 2017 and 2018
Source: Garda Síochána Finance Directorate; analysis by the Garda Inspectorate
The data shows that declarations within the 
Garda Síochána under the Ethics Acts has 
increased from 33 in 2016 to 297 in 2018. 
This is a significant source of information on 
potential conflicts of interest and requires 
detailed examination and verification in 
order to identify and mitigate any risks for 
the organisation and the designated officials 
concerned.  However, there is no formal 
process in the Garda Síochána for reviewing 
and verifying declarations.
The Standards Commission promotes the 
practice of designated persons making 
‘nil returns’ as good practice within 
organisations.  During the course of this 
inspection, the Inspectorate found that the 
policy and approach in the Garda Síochána 
in this regard is unclear.  An examination of 
Ethics in Public Office declarations by the 
garda workforce illustrates this point.  While 
the Inspectorate was told on several occasions 
that it was the policy of the organisation 
that designated officials were required to 
make ‘nil returns’, garda workforce figures 
published by the Department of Justice 
and analysed by the Inspectorate highlight 
a considerable gap between the number 
of Standards in Public Office returns and 
the number of persons in ranks designated 
under the Ethics Acts.  For example, while 
in 2018 there were 45 chief superintendents 
and 165 superintendents in the Garda 
Síochána, only 41 chief superintendents 
and 137 superintendents completed ethical 
declarations.
This inspection found that designated 
persons, including executive-level officers, 
were not fully aware of their additional 
obligations under the garda policy as 
opposed to their basic duties under the 
Ethics Acts.  Persons fulfilling the duties in 
an acting capacity of designated persons 
under the Acts were not required to disclose 
their interests even though they routinely 
carried out such additional duties and 
received allowances for this purpose.  There 
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was also no evidence that there were any 
compliance measures other than reminding 
designated persons of their obligations under 
the Acts and no effort was made to confirm 
the veracity and accuracy of disclosures or to 
cross-reference the disclosures against other 
available records.  Similarly, disclosures were 
not relied upon to identify possible conflicts 
of interest by designated persons.
Recommendation
In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendation.
Post-Employment Activities
It is generally accepted that the influence and 
authority of an employer over an employee 
ceases when the employment relationship 
comes to an end.  However, it is frequently 
recognised that conflicts of interest may 
continue to arise in several different contexts 
even after an employment relationship.  For 
example, a conflict of interest may impact 
on the performance of an employee during 
the transition period from one employment 
to the next.  A previous employment can 
provide an undue advantage in terms of 
favourable treatment for the person seeking 
employment in a new organisation.  Post-
employment, a previous employment 
relationship can provide an advantage to 
the ex-employee in terms of reach back to 
their former employer regarding access to 
confidential information and influence in 
decision-making.
Post -employment  restr ic t ions  are 
increasingly seen as an effective approach 
to mitigating the impacts of conflicts in both 
the private and public sectors.  In the private 
sector this is frequently achieved by way 
of post-employment restrictive covenants, 
while in the public sector they are usually 
regulated by law or by statutory codes of 
The Garda Síochána should develop, 
publish and implement  a policy and 
guidelines relating to the holding of 
business and secondary interests by the 
garda workforce including:
• A requirement for members of 
the garda workforce to declare all 
personal commercial interests and 
those involving family and friends 
to the Garda Commissioner.
• The replacement of the prohibited 
spare-time activities guidelines 
with an objective and transparent 
principles-based approach to 
secondary employment.  
Recommendation 10
Business and Other Interests
The Garda Síochána should ensure there 
is clarity regarding completion of the 
Ethics in Public Office declarations.
Recommendation 11
Business and Other Interests
• Declarations should be completed 
upon appointment to positions 
designated under the Ethics Acts.
• Those regularly designated to 
temporarily perform in a higher 
rank as assistant principal or 
superintendent should be required to 
complete the declaration of interests. 
• There should be guidance regarding 




conduct.  Irish law recognises a common 
law right for employers to protect trade and 
confidential information and a common law 
duty of fidelity and loyalty on employees. 
The courts have found that post-employment 
restrictive measures are lawful where they 
are intended to protect a legitimate interest 
and are proportionate and reasonable.  In 
particular, the courts have examined two 
aspects of post-employment restrictions: 
duration and territorial application. 
Restrictive measures for a period of up to 12 
months have been accepted by the courts, 
and territorial restrictions must be reasonable 
to the extent that they would not prevent an 
ex-employee from earning a living.
In the public sector, post-employment 
activity is more commonly referred to 
as the ‘revolving door’ and it is widely 
acknowledged that the risks associated 
with this have been growing in response 
to increased outsourcing of public services 
including certain aspects of policing services. 
It is also recognised that this activity can 
have a detrimental effect on the reputation 
of the police service and public confidence 
in the impartiality of policing.  Transparency 
International has recommended that any 
post-employment process should build in the 
following protections for the organisation:
 > There should be a clear policy and 
approval process for taking up external 
appointments;
 > There should be no ambiguity 
regarding the positions in the police 
service to which the approval process 
applies;
 > There should be a cooling-off period 
during which designated officers may 
not take up an appointment; and
 > There should be a publicly available 
reg is ter  o f  post -employment 
appointments.
International and Comparable 
Practice
The Civil Service Code of Standards and 
Behaviour, which has its legal basis in 
Section 10(3) of the Standards in Public Office 
Act 2001, applies to all serving civil servants 
including garda staff, and imposes certain 
duties and obligations on civil servants with 
respect to external appointments.
This includes an awareness of any potential 
for conflict of interest from accepting an 
appointment outside of the civil service, 
particularly if it is with an organisation with 
which a civil servant had official dealings 
as a civil servant or which could gain an 
advantage over competitors by employing 
that person.  Civil servants must also inform 
the appropriate authority if they intend to 
take up such employment and if they hold 
a designated position, as defined under the 
Act, cannot, within 12 months of resigning 
or retiring from the civil service, take up 
such an appointment without first obtaining 
the permission of the appropriate authority. 
In the case of designated positions, for 
roles up to and including principal officer, 
the appropriate authority is the Secretary 
General of the department concerned, and 
for officers at assistant secretary level or 
above, the appropriate authority is the 
Outside Appointments Board.
The Canadian Federal Conflict of Interest 
and Post-Employment Code, which extends 
to police officers of the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP), imposes a 
range of post-employment restrictions on 
public servants.  These include: a duty to 
inform a designated official (i.e.  the Ethics 
Commissioner) of an offer of employment, a 
duty not to be influenced by the prospect of 
future employment in any of their decisions 
or actions, and a prohibition on benefiting 
from contracts or transactions that occurred 
while they were public servants.  There is 
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also a 12-month cooling-off period regarding 
employment with any organisation with 
which they had significant official dealings 
(RCMP External Review Committee, 2015).
The GRECO Fifth Round Evaluation 
of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Netherlands, Poland and Spain identified 
that post-employment restrictions on 
police officers are imposed in very limited 
circumstances.  However, in Belgium and 
Finland there were prohibitions on taking up 
employment in the private security industry 
and in France there was a duty on national 
police officers to seek approval from the 
Ministry of Interior.
Since January 2018, all Chief Officers in 
all police forces in England and Wales are 
required to notify their Chief Constable and 
Police and Crime Commissioner (who must 
satisfy themselves there is no conflict of 
interest) of any post-service employment for 
a period of up to 12 months from leaving the 
police service and any decision of the Chief 
Constable or Police and Crime Commissioner 
must be published on that force’s website. 
In the UK, officers retiring or resigning 
from the National Crime Agency must seek 
authorisation for any employment taken up 
in the first two years of leaving the agency 
that is outside of the public service arena.
Key Findings and Assessment
This inspection established that there are 
no restrictions on garda members taking 
up employment which may bring them 
into conflict with their former role in the 
Garda Síochána.  This is in contrast to the 
situation of garda staff, who have restrictions 
imposed on them by the Civil Service Code 
of Standards and Behaviour.
During interviews, several examples 
were identified of former garda members 
undertaking new occupations with direct 
links to their previous role in the Garda 
Síochána.  This includes staff who supervised 
an external service provider accepting a role 
with the contractor, and retired immigration 
staff providing immigration and related 
advice on a commercial consultancy basis.
The situation in the Garda Síochána is clearly 
out of line with the international practice 
outlined above and, in particular, important 
safeguards against conflict of interest such as 
cooling-off periods and prior approval.
Recommendation
In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of  international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendation.
Integrity Health Check
An ethical or integrity declaration, which is a 
periodic review of a police officer’s adherence 
to the ethical and integrity standards of a 
police service, is an important method of 
managing the kinds of conflict of interest 
that frequently arise in policing as a result of 
certain relationships, financial and business 
activities, secondary interests or spare-time 
activities.  Providing guidelines to staff 
ensures that they understand what standards 
of behaviour are considered acceptable.  It is 
also an important opportunity to remind the 
police workforce of the public’s expectations 
The Department of Justice should 
carry out a review of post-employment 
activities of the garda workforce, and 
develop suitable rules and processes 
to reduce the risk of conflict of interest 
arising after a member of the garda 





of them and their police service.  Requiring 
declarations in line with organisational 
policies is vital to monitor ethical standards 
and non-compliance with declaration 
requirements can also be a source of 
important information.
International and Comparable 
Practice
In order to preserve ethical behaviour and 
integrity in police workforces, police services 
in other jurisdictions, such as the South 
Yorkshire Police, include integrity health 
checks as part of their annual performance 
review for the police workforce.  Integrity 
health checks provide an opportunity 
to discuss the dangers of inappropriate 
relationships and interests, as well as general 
standards of behaviour.
Other integrity themes which are commonly 
discussed in the context of an integrity health 
check include unmanageable debt, substance 
misuse, and inappropriate use of police 
computer systems.  At the end of the health 
check discussion, the police officer or police 
staff member and their supervisors sign 
an integrity health check document.  This 
outlines what issues were discussed, any 
action deemed necessary and any integrity 
or ethical concerns raised during the health 
check.  Figure 3.4 shows the integrity health 
check used by South Yorkshire Police.  
Public confidence in the police depends on police officers and staff demonstra�ng the highest 
level of personal and professional behaviour. There are a number of policies that exist in order 
to safeguard officers, staff and the organisa�on and it is important that supervisors ensure that 


























 Maintaining Professional Boundaries – Supervisors must discuss with their staff the need 
to maintain professional boundaries at all �mes. This is an opportunity to confirm that 
officers and staff have a clear understanding of the professional boundaries guidance and 
to ensure that they are not using their posi�on to start sexual or improper emo�onal 
rela�onships with members of the public they have met through police related work.  
 
 Business Interests – Officers and staff are required to no�fy the force of any business 
interest including paid or unpaid work outside of their police role. Supervisors should 
confirm that these ac�vi�es and any changes to authorised business interests have been 
declared in accordance with the force policy – Business Interest & Secondary Employment  
 
 No�fiable Associa�ons – All officers and staff must be reminded of the No�fiable 
Associa�ons policy and ensure any relevant associa�ons they have are  declared to line 
managers and dealt with in accordance with force policy – Self Repor�ng of Criminal or Civil 
Allega�ons and Inappropriate Disclosable Associa�ons   
 
 The Standards of Professional Behaviour – These reflect the expecta�ons that the police 
service and the public have of how police officers and staff should behave and includes a 
duty to challenge and report improper conduct. Please click here for full details of the SYP 
Standards of Professional Behaviour for both Police Officers and Police Staff.  
 
 Other integrity issues that supervisors may wish to raise at a health check mee�ng include:  
o Unmanageable debt issues  
o Gi�s, Gratui�es and Hospitality   
o Appropriate use of police systems 
o Substance misuse  
 
Figure 3.4 South Yorkshire Police Integrity Health Check
Source: Information provided by South Yorkshire Police
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Key Findings and Assessment
This inspection found that there are limited 
opportunities for garda members to reaffirm 
the values and principles contained in their 
oath of office during the course of their 
careers.  In addition, there is no requirement 
on them to cooperate in formal periodic 
reviews of their professional standards and 
integrity or to notify significant changes in 
their circumstances to their supervisors, such 
as relationship breakdowns or situations 
of unmanageable debt, which could have 
serious implications in terms of personal 
integrity.  The Inspectorate believes that 
regular integrity health checks at key 
career points, such as on promotion or on 
selection for specialist posts, provide an 
appropriate opportunity to have open and 
frank discussions about matters related to 
standards of behaviour and integrity and 
to confirm compliance with all relevant 
counter-corruption practices and policies.
Recommendation
In light of these key findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendation.
The Garda Síochána should undertake 
periodic integrity health checks of the 
garda workforce.  These should occur 
if not on an annual basis at the very 
minimum at critical career points such as 





Part III examines the Garda Síochána’s defences 
against corruption and highlights a number of systems 
which are vulnerable to corrupt actors.  It also 
examines what practices are in place to protect against 
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Chapter 4 
System-Based Approaches to Preventing 
Corruption
Overview
To a large extent, the problem of police 
corruption has always been presented as 
bound up in the actions of a few individual 
police officers.  The ‘bad apple’ myth has 
been pervasive not just across different 
countries but also over long periods of time. 
Perhaps the most damaging implication of 
this conceptualisation of police corruption is 
that little if anything is required other than 
the investigation and punishment of those 
culpable.  Such an approach is flawed in 
several fundamental respects.  For example, 
it assumes that a punitive approach will have 
a deterrent effect, it often fails to identify 
other persons implicated in wrongdoing or 
the full scale of the corrupt behaviour itself, 
it fails to hold supervisors or managers to 
account and it does not confront structural 
problems in policing itself.
Misconduct and corruption is increasingly 
identified as the product of organisational 
weakness and wider systemic failures in 
policing.  Chapman in his 2014 Review of 
Police Discipline Systems in England and Wales 
came to the startling conclusion that “if you 
have good people and bad processes, bad processes 
will win nine times out of ten.”  Just listing a 
few of the characteristics of policing since 
the start of the twentieth century reinforces 
such a view.  Modern policing has high 
levels of discretion, low managerial and 
public visibility, peer group secrecy, frequent 
exposure to law breakers, and increased 
opportunities for misconduct.  Scandal after 
scandal and review after review found that 
the problem has penetrated all police ranks 
and all aspects of police organisations.
Effective systems of internal controls and 
intrusive supervision are perhaps the two 
most important managerial tools that any 
policing organisation has to respond to the 
problem of corruption or misconduct.  
Well-structured systems, including robust 
internal controls, support both detection 
and prevention of unethical and corrupt 
behaviour among police workforces.  The 
purpose of such systems is to ensure that the 
police service operates in line with its stated 
purpose at all times.  The key tasks of an 
internal control system include: 
 > Assessing whether the corporate and 
operational goals of the service have 
been fully met;
 > Checking that  a l l  necessary 
precautionary measures have been 
taken and that information, personnel 
and other resources are fully protected; 
and
 > Confirming that the actions of the 
service are legitimate, necessary, 
proportionate and in line with 
human rights obligations, and that 
they promote respect for ethical 
values, norms and rules within the 
organisation.
Internal controls must address three specific 
levels in any police service: the individual 
level, which involves building awareness and 
understanding of the organisation’s values 
and norms; the process level, which involves 
developing and reviewing procedural rules 
and identifying weaknesses and risks and 
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the institutional or organisational level, 
which focuses on identifying and correcting 
vulnerabilities resulting from managerial or 
organisational weaknesses in information, 
financial or security systems.
Vetting
Vetting is the process for identifying people 
who are unsuitable to be members of a police 
service or undertake specific policing roles. 
This may be because of criminal activity or 
association, evidence of dishonest conduct, 
or behaviour that is inconsistent with the 
Code of Ethics or a vulnerability.  It can also 
include illegal drug use or unmanageable 
financial liabilities that could expose them 
to coercion.  Vetting is an essential element 
in any ethical and professional standards 
framework.  
Ineffective vetting of the police workforce 
exposes the public and the police service 
to a number of risks including corruption 
or coercion of the workforce, public safety, 
national security and fraud.  Long term, it 
can result in the corrosion of organisational 
values and behaviours and will ultimately 
damage public trust in a police service. 
Vetting of the police workforce needs to be 
continuously monitored, subject to regular 
formal review, and proportionate to the 
potential risk posed by certain roles.  
International and Comparable 
Practice
A recent literature review by Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & 
Rescue Services (HMICFRS), Police Integrity 
and Corruption, identified five critical 
recruitment standards for policing.  These 
are: thorough criminal history checks with 
clear guidance on disqualifying offences, 
character reference checks, psychometric 
testing for unethical character traits, 
substance misuse testing and panel style 
interviews which probe candidates’ ethical 
values and awareness (Newburn, 2015). 
Common selection screening techniques also 
used by other police services have included: 
home visits, background checks on family 
and associates, a higher recruitment age, 
financial and credit checks and requirements 
for higher educational standards.
Vetting is a recognised recruitment and 
monitoring tool used by most police services 
around the world and by international bodies 
such as the UN, the OSCE and the Group of 
States against Corruption (GRECO).  During 
their Fifth Round Evaluation of the UK, 
GRECO (2018b) noted that all background 
checks are carried out against the Authorised 
Professional Practice (APP), a comprehensive 
vetting code of practice published by the 
College of Policing in the UK.   Checks extend 
to previous employment with other law 
enforcement agencies, and family members 
and associates, as well as financial checks.  
There is also regular in-service vetting and 
enhanced vetting for specialist or vulnerable 
posts which may be specifically targeted by 
corrupt actors.  There is an ongoing duty on 
police personnel to declare any changes in 
personal circumstances (e.g. marital status 
or address).  At any stage, intelligence may 
come to light which can trigger a vetting 
review.  
The College of Policing in the UK issued its 
APP standards on vetting in October 2017. 
The APP sets out a rules-based approach to 
vetting where the roles and responsibilities 
of all parties, including recruits, police 
service personnel, volunteers, contractors 
and vetting units are well documented and 
clear.  There are two separate regimes for 
vetting in the UK.  The first, Force Vetting, 
is concerned with protecting access to police 
assets while the second, National Security 
Vetting, is intended to protect state security. 
There are three separate levels of Force 
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Vetting (i.e. Recruit Vetting, Management 
Vetting and Non-Police Vetting), each with 
different rules and requirements.  There are 
a number of minimum standards related 
to checkable history, minimum residence, 
foreign enquiries, identity authentication, 
decision-making and transparency and 
appeals.  The APP also lays down standards 
with regards to the types of checks expected, 
including national convictions and financial 
and biometric checks, as well as additional 
vetting requirements for senior positions or 
vulnerable posts.
Financial assessments are carried out as part 
of the vetting process and debts which are 
in line with a candidate’s income will not be 
considered problematic as long as candidates 
can meet regular commitments.  The APP 
states that “debts only become a problem where 
they are substantial and individuals fail to take 
remedial action or where they are caused by 
compulsive behaviour, such as gambling”.
The APP also recommends that police 
services, as part of pre-employment 
screening, check content on publicly available 
social media sites for the purposes of service 
reputational reassurance and compatibility 
with the Code of Ethics.  
In general, non-police personnel who 
are accompanied and under constant 
supervision while on police premises and 
who are not permitted access to police 
information systems or classified material 
will not require vetting checks.  However, 
the APP does lay out minimum personal 
vetting requirements for unaccompanied 
workers such as electricians, vehicle recovery 
operators and some volunteers.
The Inspectorate also identified other 
examples of good international practice. 
This includes the Royal Netherlands 
Marechausse, which screens all prospective 
employees and re-screens for all positions 
at regular intervals after recruitment.  The 
German Federal Ministry of the Interior and 
the Federal Police are required under law 
to carry out a risk assessment of all posts 
and identify those which are vulnerable 
to corruption.  Additional training and 
supports are provided to persons occupying 
such posts and annual ethical retraining is 
mandatory for such post holders.
Thorough criminal checks are an essential 
part of any vetting process.  In an era of 
increased mobility and travel the risk of 
police service candidates having foreign 
convictions is increasing.  In this regard 
international cooperation in terms of 
information exchange is critical.  The 
European Criminal Records Information 
System (ECRIS), which is a decentralised 
system for exchanging criminal conviction 
information between Member States of 
the EU, can support and enrich the vetting 
process in Member States.
In the UK, the vetting units for the police 
services in South Yorkshire and Merseyside 
are under the same business group as their 
Anti-Corruption Units.  As such, vetting 
units have access to all intelligence relating 
to staff integrity and a vetting review will be 
triggered as a result of credible information 
or intelligence coming to the attention of an 
Anti-Corruption Unit.
The UK also maintains a record of police 
employees and volunteers who have been 
discredited and are unsuitable for re-
employment.  The Police Barred List is a 
list of all officers, special constables and 
staff members who have been dismissed 
from policing through the Police Conduct 
and Performance Regulations as well as the 
equivalents for police staff.  Details of officers 
and special constables included on the list 
will be published by the College of Policing, 
unless there is justification for keeping this 
information private.
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The Police Advisory List is a list of all 
officers, special constables and staff 
members who have resigned or retired 
during an investigation or who leave 
before an allegation comes to light.  It also 
includes designated volunteers who have 
had their designated status withdrawn 
due to conduct or performance matters. 
Both lists are held and administered by the 
College of Policing. 
Key Findings and Assessment
During the course of this inspection, the 
Inspectorate found that vetting in the Garda 
Síochána is a three-stage process involving 
criminal record checks, local enquiries and 
intelligence checks.  Vetting is conducted 
for all of the garda workforce before their 
appointment.  There is, however, no coherent 
recruitment and vetting policy framework 
in the Garda Síochána and the following 
deficiencies have been found in the vetting 
process:
 > There are inconsistencies between the 
vetting process for the recruitment of 
trainee gardaí and the vetting process 
for the recruitment of garda staff.  In 
the case of garda trainees, checks 
are carried out in relation to their 
extended family while no checks are 
carried out in relation to the family of 
garda staff with the exception of those 
applying for some specialist positions 
such as the Garda Síochána Analysis 
Service.  Reviews following incidents of 
misconduct by probationer gardaí have, 
in some cases, subsequently turned up 
intelligence on garda databases linking 
them to inappropriate or undisclosed 
activity prior to their recruitment into 
the Garda Síochána;  
 > Criminal record checks are confined 
to garda prosecutions and convictions 
recorded on PULSE and do not 
include prosecutions or convictions 
by any of the other state bodies with 
a power to prosecute (e.g. Revenue 
Commissioners);
 > No financial background checks are 
carried out for those applying to join 
as garda trainees or garda staff;  
 > Vetting checks for persons who have 
resided outside of Ireland (i.e. foreign 
enquiries) are carried out by the 
Security and Intelligence Branch and 
are restricted to security information 
only;  
 > Checks are not carried out against the 
police disciplinary records of former 
UK police personnel or against the 
UK’s National Barred Police Officers 
Database;  
 > The disciplinary records of applicants 
who were previously in the Defence 
Forces or who served in the army of 
another country are not checked;  
 > Social media history checks are not 
carried out as part of recruitment 
background checks to assist in 
identifying possible inappropriate 
behaviour, attitudes or associations;  
 > In-service vetting in the Garda Síochána 
occurs only when a member applies for 
promotion and is limited to checks for 
complaints of bullying and harassment, 
garda discipline records, and criminal 
proceedings and garda convictions; 
 > Appointments to specialist roles 
or vulnerable posts do not receive 
additional vetting with the exception 
of appointments to the Security and 
Intelligence Branch; 
 > Garda members are not subject to 
the vetting checks required under the 
Children First Act 2015 despite having 
professional contact with children and 
vulnerable adults; 
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 > There is inconsistent practice in 
relation to the vetting of contactors or 
those providing services to the Garda 
Síochána. While background checks 
may be carried out in relation to the 
main contracting companies providing 
services, agents or sub-contractors may 
not be similarly checked.  Contract staff, 
with the exception of those providing 
agreed IT services, are not routinely 
screened against approved databases 
or lists when entering the garda estate; 
and
 > N o  b a c k g r o u n d  c h e c k s  a r e 
carried out on persons providing 
accommodation to garda students 
who are accommodated off campus 
while in training at the Garda College 
Templemore.
There are a number of inconsistencies and 
gaps in the Garda vetting process when 
benchmarked against international and 
comparable practices.  To protect the integrity 
and reputation of the Garda Síochána it is 
therefore critical that vetting procedures are 
improved.
Recommendation
In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendation.
The Garda Síochána should develop a 
single policy and approach for vetting the 
garda workforce and those contracted to 
provide services.
• The level of vetting should be tiered 
to take account of access to police 
systems and identified threats.  
Recommendation 14
Vetting
• Vetting should include pre-
employment and regular in-service 
reviews. For example, appointments 
to designated or vulnerable posts or 
promotion should attract re-vetting 
and staff in designated or vulnerable 
posts should be subject to additional 
vetting and provided with ethical 
training and supports.  
• All in-service vetting should be 
conducted by a vetting section within 
the Anti-Corruption Unit.  
• The policy should allow for a vetting 
review of anyone in the garda 
workforce at the discretion of the 
Head of the Anti-Corruption Unit.
• Recruitment vetting should in 
addition to existing checks consider: 
the European Criminal Records 
Information System, credit checks, 
financial intelligence, social media, 
convictions by other state bodies, 
military records, and other police 
disciplinary records if appropriate.
• All contractors providing a service 
to the Garda Síochána should have 
personal vetting at an appropriate 
level.
• The Anti-Corruption Unit should 
be responsible for assessing all 
information relating to an individual 
where a risk has been identified 
during vetting, and should provide 
a recommendation to the Garda 
Commissioner on the appropriate 
action to take.
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Property and Evidence 
Management
Property and evidence management is an 
important function of any police service and 
has become increasingly complex in response 
to changes in the law and jurisprudence. 
There are increasingly sophisticated 
requirements for the storage of biological 
materials and the safe storage of hazardous 
materials.  The need to guarantee the 
integrity of the evidential chain of an exhibit 
is critical to the successful prosecution of 
a case.  The failure to effectively manage 
exhibits can have serious implications for 
criminal prosecutions, particularly in high-
profile cases.  
Any weaknesses in the property and evidence 
control systems create vulnerabilities for a 
police service and the loss or misplacement 
of an exhibit can lead to the impairment 
of an investigation or failure of a criminal 
prosecution.  Wilful interference with 
evidence or exhibits by a member of the 
workforce, because of corruption or coercion, 
can have similar consequences and the 
theft of high-value items for personal gain, 
such as illegal drugs, firearms or cash, can 
seriously undermine confidence in a police 
service.  The implications of a breakdown in 
evidence management controls for the Garda 
Síochána include a loss of trust, erosion of 
integrity or damage to the perception of their 
competence.
Comprehensive and effective policies and 
procedures are critical to the effective 
management of property and evidence, 
particularly in relation to staff safety, facility 
security and cataloguing and tracking 
processes.  The key elements of an effective 
Property and Evidence Management System 
should include:
 > Organisational considerations, such 
as clear policies and procedures; 
professional,  well-trained and 
competent staff; and contingency 
planning and access to facilities;  
 > Cataloguing and tracking processes, 
which should clearly define the chain 
of evidence, provide specific protocols 
for certain categories of property (i.e. 
cash, drugs and firearms) and have a 
clear and well-documented audit trail; 
 > Safe and secure storage facilities 
which consider good design layout 
and workflows, personnel and facility 
security, and temporary storage 
arrangements;  
 > Audits, inventories and inspections, 
which should be regular, intrusive and 
carried out by experienced managers 
in order to provide a high degree of 
assurance regarding the system; and 
 > Evidence and property disposal, which 
should focus on disposal cycles and 
comprehensive documentation as 
well as specific protocols for certain 
categories of property (i.e. cash, drugs 
and firearms).
International and Comparable 
Practice
The UK has extensive guidance and rules 
on property and evidence management. 
Common Policing Standards in relation to 
investigation management usually require 
material recovered during searches to 
be handled appropriately, labelled and 
packaged in accordance with the instructions 
and guidelines of police services.  Each police 
service has detailed evidence and property 
management instructions or guidelines. 
These outline the duties and obligations of 
the police workforce and supervisors as well 
as property officers, with the latter being 
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responsible for accurately accounting for 
and securing evidence and property in the 
possession of the police.
In the West Yorkshire Police Service Evidence 
and Property Policy it is the responsibility 
of all police officers to ensure that all 
seized evidence is taken to the station for 
safe storage at the earliest opportunity.  In 
addition, they are responsible for marking 
all exhibits and property with the Retained 
Property Reference Number before such 
property goes to the station to be stored in 
an overnight or permanent property store.
In the PSNI, Instructions and Guidelines 
are in place for the seizure, handling and 
disposal of property.  Members of the police 
workforce who seize or receive property 
from a member of the public, either for 
safekeeping or as evidence, are responsible 
for recording property management 
information immediately and providing 
this information to the member of the public 
along with a reference number.
In England and Wales, and in Northern 
Ireland statutory Codes of Practice deal 
with the exercise of coercive powers by 
police officers, for example, powers of arrest, 
detention and seizure.  In particular, Code 
of Practice B under the Police and Criminal 
Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 and 
Code B of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 (PACE) set out the rights of owners 
regarding the seizure and retention of 
property.  Both Codes stipulate that when 
property is retained by a police service, the 
person who owned or had control of the 
property immediately before it was seized 
must be provided with a list or description 
of the property within a reasonable time. 
Key Findings and Assessment
A Property and Evidence Management 
System (PEMS) was originally introduced 
by the Garda Síochána in 2008 as a pilot 
project in a small number of locations.  The 
2017 report of the Garda Audit and Risk 
Committee noted that property management 
was to be prioritised within the five-year 
Modernisation and Renewal Programme 
(MRP) 2016–2021 by way of the following 
three-step approach:
 > Adoption of a standardised property 
and evidence management system 
across all divisions with a standardised 
computer system integrated into the 
Garda Information System.  This was 
introduced in 2016; 
 > The integration of PEMS records 
within the PULSE system together 
with software to barcode and register 
all items.  This process started in 
September 2017; and  
 > The development of a PEMS strategy 
and policy and the provision of 
adequate storage facilities.  While the 
strategy and policy were published 
during this inspection, the provision 
of adequate storage facilities across 
divisions will take several years to 
achieve.
Several new policy and procedural 
documents concerning property and 
evidence management were issued by the 
Garda Síochána in November 2019.  These 
documents updated and replaced the 
previous PEMS Manual from 2008.  HQ 
Directive 60/2019 together with the PEMS 
Policy and PEMS Procedure documents 
impose an obligation on the organisation 
to safeguard property and exhibits which 
come into the possession of the Garda 
Síochána.  The documents lay out the roles 
and responsibilities of garda members 
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and PEMS managers and obliges everyone 
concerned to ensure that all property comes 
into their possession lawfully and that their 
actions comply with data protection rules, 
the Garda Code of Ethics and the new PEMS 
procedures.
PEMS is part of the integrated PULSE IT 
system and access to the system is controlled 
and audited.  Each item of property coming 
into a PEMS store is catalogued using a 
unique reference number generated on the 
PULSE IT system and property flows are 
tracked using barcode-scanning technology. 
In the case of lost property, the person who 
finds the property or who surrenders it to 
the Garda Síochána is issued with a PULSE-
generated receipt.  Property removed 
from persons taken into garda custody 
and retained for investigative purposes is 
catalogued and receipted on PEMS.
Property management concerns identified 
during the inspection include: 
 > Inadequate storage for property outside 
of normal PEMS store business hours;
 > The absence of an audit trail for store 
security and access controls; 
 > Insufficient storage capacity for high-
value and hazardous property; 
 > Inadequate training and security advice 
for newly appointed garda staff such as 
PEMS managers; and
 > The absence of a process for the 
contemporaneous recording of 
property seized during the search of a 
premises.  
The Garda Síochána Anti-Fraud Policy 
requires the maintenance of a corporate 
Fraud Register and it is the practice to record 
allegations relating to the loss of or failure 
to properly manage property in this register. 
The Inspectorate examined the register from 
the beginning of 2018 to May 2019 and found 
that it contained a total of 18 entries, of which 
13 related to allegations of failure to properly 
manage or account for property taken from 
the public.  Several of these records related 
to cash discrepancies.  In one case, there was 
an €18,000 difference between the value of 
the cash recorded at the time of seizure and 
at the time it was subsequently audited.  
Concerns regarding property and evidence 
management are not uncommon in police 
services.  Such concerns were raised in 
the Garda Síochána several years ago, and 
the organisation has taken active steps 
to address weaknesses in property and 
evidence management.  This includes 
updated IT systems and procedures, as 
well as a programme of civilianising the 
management of property stores.  However, 
this inspection found that there are some 
existing weaknesses, such as the capacity and 
security of property stores and the training 
of PEMS managers.  
Identified Good Practice
One location visited by the Inspectorate 
demonstrated a particularly strong 
understanding of the risks associated 
with the storage of evidence, high-
value goods, dangerous substances 
and firearms.  The Inspectorate also 
found evidence of formal security 
reviews to identify threats, action plans 
to mitigate the identified risks and an 
inspection process to verify property 
records.
SYSTEMS-BASED APPROACHES TO PREVENTING CORRUPTION
74
Recommendations
In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendations.
Information Security
When a police ICT system becomes 
compromised it can have any or all of the 
potential consequences below including 
harm to:
 > National security;
 > The safety of the public;
 > Operational activity and investigations;
 > Operational tactics; and
 > The reputation of the service.
Another possible consequence is significant 
financial loss.
A key threat to the integrity of Garda 
Síochána ICT systems is the unauthorised 
disclosure of information by a member of the 
garda workforce.
The overarching goals of good information 
security include keeping information 
confidential and providing access and 
authority to make changes to such 
information by authorised persons only.  
The following are the basic principles of 
information system security (Garfinkel, 
2003):
 > System security must be balanced 
against utility.  There is no point in 
guaranteeing absolute security over 
information systems if this results in 
access not being available where and 
when it is required;
 > Careful consideration should be given 
to the privileges of users in relation to 
the system and the separation of system 
duties (e.g. the person responsible for 
checking and verifying information 
should not be the person inputting the 
information).  Access to information 
systems should be aligned with a 
person’s role within the organisation;
The Garda Síochána should ensure 
that all property stores have adequate 
systems, processes and facilities to 
achieve the safe and secure management 
of property including:
• Effective training and security advice 
for property store managers.
• Secure separated storage for 
hazardous and high-value property.
• An approved system for managing 
property when the property store is 
not open.
• A security system for recording the 
details of anyone who accesses the 
property store.  
Recommendation 15
Property and Evidence Management
The Garda Síochána should introduce a 
practice of recording contemporaneously 
property seized during a search and on 
completion of the search leaving the 
record with a person present at the search 
site.
Recommendation 16
Property and Evidence Management
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 > Users should be assigned only the 
minimum privileges necessary for them 
to carry out their responsibilities;
 > A system should always have multiple 
independent defences;
 > Organisations should always plan so as 
to minimise the impact of any system 
failure.  This would include taking 
precautions such as regular back-ups 
of data;
 > A number of key attributes should be 
recorded every time the information 
system is accessed and there should 
be a comprehensive audit trail of any 
activity concerning the information 
held on the system.  This should 
identify: what information was 
accessed, when and where this took 
place, who accessed it and what, if any, 
changes were made to the information; 
and
 > Organisations should periodically carry 
out a risk assessment of their systems 
and test the integrity and adequacy of 
its security features.
International and Comparable 
Practice
A review of ICT security practices in a 
number of UK police services revealed that 
ICT monitoring systems were far more 
sophisticated than those used by the Garda 
Síochána.  For example, Anti-Corruption 
Units (ACUs) have primary responsibility 
for proactively monitoring IT use with 
the assistance of specialist software.  In 
addition, ACUs use their strategic and 
tactical understanding of the corruption 
risks within the police service to better 
target their monitoring activities, and staff 
suspected of wrongdoing will have their 
10  Case of Bărbulescu v.  Romania, [GC], no.  61496/08, ECtHR 5 September 2017
ICT system’s history checked for evidence of 
computer misuse or risk indicators of further 
misconduct or criminal activity.
The Merseyside Police Service ICT 
Acceptable Use Policy provides for the ACU 
and the Information Assurance Coordinator 
to carry dual responsibility for monitoring 
compliance with the policy, while the ACU 
is solely responsible for auditing ICT systems 
and investigating computer misuse in the 
service.  
Lawful business usage monitoring, which 
is common in commercial entities, is an 
emerging practice in law enforcement 
agencies.  However, caution is advisable 
because jurisprudence is still developing in 
this regard.  The European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) recently overturned a 2016 
ruling10 by a Romanian Court concerning the 
dismissal of an employee for using a private 
messaging service on a business-issued ICT 
device.  The activity had come to light as a 
result of surveillance software used by his 
employer to monitor computer activity in 
the organisation.  The ECtHR found that 
it was unclear whether his employer had 
warned him that his communications were 
being monitored and that his right to privacy 
had not been ‘adequately protected’ because 
some of the communications were ‘intimate 
in nature’.  While the ECtHR made clear in 
the ruling that firms are not prohibited from 
monitoring employees’ communications at 
work or dismissing employees for misuse, 
they must have sufficient safeguards against 
abuse of such powers.
In the Merseyside Police policy, the 
information security duties of users 
extend not just to ICT devices but also 
to paper records, including notebooks. 
Under the policy, supervisors have special 
responsibility for mobile devices and are 
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required to account for them to the ACU 
on a regular basis.  Before gaining access to 
ICT systems, users must be vetted to a level 
commensurate with the sensitivity of the 
information and systems they are accessing 
and any permanent location used to access 
ICT systems must be regularly risk and 
security assessed.
Key Findings and Assessment
The PULSE system, the primary Garda 
ICT system, is a vast repository of sensitive 
information.  This includes intelligence 
relating to criminals; details of the progress 
of ongoing investigations; and personal 
details of victims, vulnerable individuals and 
others who have interacted with the Garda 
Síochána.  Such information is a valuable 
commodity to many persons outside of 
the police service with harmful intent, 
including terrorists, organised crime gangs, 
those seeking to exploit vulnerable persons 
or those who would use such information 
to gain an advantage in some commercial 
activity.
Several new policy and procedural 
documents concerning information systems 
security were issued by the Garda Síochána 
in November 2019.  The Garda Information 
Security Policy states that it focuses on 
maintaining the integrity of the information, 
which should be intact, complete and 
accurate, ensuring the availability of 
information to authorised users when 
it is needed for a legitimate purpose, 
and maintaining the confidentiality of 
information by restricting access to persons 
who are authorised.
The Garda Acceptable Usage Policy sets 
out the general approach to managing 
information security and includes the 
roles, responsibilities and obligations of 
the garda workforce in relation to the 
integrity, availability and confidentiality 
of data and information resources.  It also 
includes the responsibilities of the Garda 
ICT Section:  maintaining the Information 
Security Management System, developing 
policy and procedures, assessing security 
risks, increasing awareness of the control 
environment and managing security threats 
and incidents.  The policy does not provide 
any obligations that garda personnel have 
under data privacy and protection laws and 
regulations.
In general terms, users are prohibited from 
allowing access to garda ICT systems to 
non-garda personnel at any time and they 
must safeguard their own accounts and ICT 
credentials and ensure that data held on 
removable media is encrypted at all times. 
Using ICT systems for illegal purposes, 
sending or sharing offensive material, 
and using unlicensed software are strictly 
unacceptable.  Capturing or sending business 
materials, in either image or text form, unless 
for an official purpose is also prohibited, 
as well as using cloud storage, personal 
email or messaging services.  Using the ICT 
system for personal gain or downloading or 
streaming inappropriate material is similarly 
unacceptable.
There is a duty on users to immediately 
report information on data security breaches 
and supervisors have a duty to report any 
such notifications to the Executive Director 
of ICT.  Unlike other jurisdictions where 
the ACU has responsibility for monitoring 
compliance, under the garda policy, the 
Executive Director is responsible for 
monitoring compliance and for investigating 
data security breaches.  
There is a separate procedure document for 
mobile devices.  This document similarly sets 
out the roles, responsibilities and restrictions 
on users and the data security rules for 
officially issued mobile devices.
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During the course of this inspection, the 
Inspectorate found that in general good 
access controls and audit trails around 
information systems were in place.  This 
includes management reports for incidents 
of interest, known as IOI reports, which are 
regularly produced and reviewed by local 
management.  These provide local managers 
with a list of all enquiries made in the 
Garda PULSE system in their policing area, 
including the date and time of the search 
and the identity of the person making the 
search, along with details of the search, such 
as whether it related to a vehicle, person or 
location.  A rationale for the search must 
be included when a member of the garda 
workforce generates a PULSE enquiry. 
This is a free-text entry made by the garda 
member.  In this way, multiple searches 
of a particular incident or of a high-profile 
individual will be identified and garda 
members can be challenged in relation to any 
information security breaches.
While the process itself provides a level of 
scrutiny, the Inspectorate identified gaps in 
the IOI reporting process and the ICT audit 
process which could allow members of 
the garda workforce with access to PULSE 
to identify persons with vulnerabilities 
as regards substance misuse, domestic 
violence (but not sexual violence) or mental 
health without being flagged in the IOI 
process.  While such searches are captured 
by a secondary, more comprehensive audit 
process in PULSE, these kinds of searches 
can be identified only in non-standard 
reports generated by a query on the Garda 
Information Assurance System (IAS).  In 
addition, searches conducted by those 
granted ‘hidden’ status, such as detectives, 
those on drug units and those in the Security 
and Intelligence Branch do not appear on the 
IOI report.  
This inspection also found that the IOI 
process is more concerned with compliance 
than with identifying inappropriate use of 
police systems.  Focus groups with all ranks 
confirmed that even the most rudimentary 
efforts to justify the reason for an enquiry 
in the free-text field would be enough to 
avoid a challenge by a line manager.  The 
Inspectorate was informed that an entry in 
the free-text field exceeding five letters, such 
as ‘Enquiry’ as the reason for the search 
on PULSE would generally not attract any 
attention, while a shorter explanation such as 
‘ENQ’ would.  Criminal misuse of the PULSE 
system is generally discovered as a result of 
separate intelligence which identified that 
an individual was inappropriately using the 
system rather than by active monitoring of 
system use.
Figure 4.1 provides a representation of a 
typical IOI report and illustrates how the 
top 10 reasons for enquiries made on PULSE 
for a specific period are monitored.  Local 
garda managers can review the IOI report to 
examine the level of detail garda members 
provide when making enquiries on the 
system.  Data on PULSE can be searched only 
by using three criteria: person, vehicle and 
location.  
In Figure 4.1, the IOI report shows that ‘Enq’ 
and ‘E’ are the most commonly used enquiry 
terms for the period and these may well 
attract the attention of a supervisor.  Other 
terms used, such as “Enquiry re previous 
incident” or “Information required in relation 
to suspect” are fully compliant with policy 
and would not alert local management to any 
possible unethical behaviour.  If a member of 
the garda workforce identified a vulnerable 
person, they could hide their usage of PULSE 
by entering sufficient detail for their enquiry 
without alerting local managers.  
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Figure 4.1 Representation of a typical Garda Síochána IOI report
Source: Template provided by Garda Síochána; representation prepared by Garda Inspectorate using data from 
multiple IOI reports.
Representa�on of Typical IOI Inquiry Report (RPT_COMP000) - GARDA INSPECTORATE 
About this Report: This report lists all inquiries of a par�cular type (Person, Loca�on or Vehicle) made between two dates by 
persons assigned to a par�cular sta�on (or unit), district or division. The report also summarises the top 10 inquiry reasons 
used. This report can be used as a tool in assessing compliance with data protec�on guidelines. 
*The Grand Total Inquires figure includes all inquiries for the specified selec�on and not just the Top 10 reasons. 
Top 10 Inquiry 
Reasons 
Person Vehicle Loca�on All IOIs 
# Inquiries % Total # Inquiries % Total # Inquiries % Total # Inquiries % Total 
Enq 10 6.76% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 10 3.80% 
E 1 0.68% 7 6.48% 1 14.29% 9 3.42% 
Enq address  8 5.41% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 8 3.04% 
Intel 8 5.41% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 8 3.04% 
Address 4 2.70% 0 0.00% 4 57.14% 8 3.04% 
Enquiry re previous 
incident 7 4.73% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 7 2.66% 
Informa�on required 
in rela�on to suspect 0 0.00% 7 6.48% 0 0.00% 7 2.66% 
Enq for summons 6 4.05% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 6 2.28% 
Enq re parking 
offence  0 0.00% 5 4.63% 0 0.00% 5 1.90% 
Court outcome  3 2.03% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 3 1.14% 
Grand Total 
Inquiries* 148 100.00% 108 100.00% 7 100.00% 263 100.00% 
 
The Inspectorate found that the Garda 
Síochána does not have either a policy for 
lawful business monitoring or the capability 
to proactively monitor its ICT systems with 
the type of sophisticated technology used in 
other police services.  
The Inspectorate was also informed that 
investigations into serious criminality 
by a member of the garda workforce did 
not automatically result in an audit of the 
garda member’s PULSE search history. 
For example, in a case of a garda member 
suspected of child sexual exploitation 
or sexual violence outside of their work 
environment, their use of garda systems 
was not investigated to establish if there is 
any evidence of similar behaviour within the 
workplace.  
As with any large organisation awareness of 
data and information security is an ongoing 
concern in the Garda Síochána.  The ICT 
information security policies and procedures 
have recently been updated, and technical as 
well as organisational safeguards, including 
the newly established Data Protection Unit, 
are continually reviewed in response to 
emerging threats and trends.  While ICT 
security would be considered robust in the 
Garda Síochána the inspection did reveal 
some corruption-related vulnerabilities. 
These included the inability of the Garda 
Síochána to proactively monitor ICT 
systems for indicators of misuse and failure 
to routinely review the usage of garda ICT 
systems by persons suspected of or identified 
as engaging in corrupt behaviour.  
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Recommendations
In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendations.
The Garda Síochána should develop and 
publish a Lawful Business Monitoring 
Policy and acquire technology that 
enables the proactive surveillance of ICT 
systems to prevent and detect the misuse 
of information held within them.  
Recommendation 17
Information Security
• The Anti-Corruption Unit should 
be responsible for challenging, 
through divisional supervisory and 
governance structures, the use of 
garda ICT systems on both a random 
basis and where the access has raised 
concerns of inappropriate use.
Recommendation 18
Information Security
The Garda Síochána should assign to the 
Anti-Corruption Unit responsibility for 
identifying misuse of information and 
communications technology devices and 
systems by the garda workforce.  
To facilitate this responsibility:
• The Anti-Corruption Unit should 
proactively monitor all garda 
information and communications 
technology devices and systems 
based on intelligence, analysis and 
organisational learning.
• The Anti-Corruption Unit should 
review an individual’s use of garda 
information and communications 
technology systems following 
identified or suspected unethical 
behaviour or misconduct by that 






A Rapid Evidence Assessment Review in 
2015 by the College of Policing in the UK of 
what works in terms of promoting ethical 
behaviour and preventing wrongdoing 
in organisations identified strong ethical 
leadership as the single most important factor 
in influencing organisational behaviour. 
Reforms which combined strengthened 
ethical leadership with a systems-based 
approach were found to bring about more 
permanent and longer-lasting change within 
organisations.  The Review also found that 
while training has been shown to change 
behaviours and attitudes in police officers, 
strong supervision and opportunities 
to reinforce such training in real-world 
situations is necessary to make such changes 
permanent.
A recent literature review by Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & 
Rescue Services, Police Integrity and Corruption 
(2015b), concluded that robust internal 
supervision and accountability for actions 
were central to any successful corruption 
control strategy.  Failings in leadership 
and supervision have been identified as 
contributory factors in virtually every major 
enquiry into police corruption.
The Inspectorate has previously raised the 
critical importance of frontline supervision 
in three reports: Front Line Supervision 2012, 
Changing Policing in Ireland 2015 and Policing 
with Local Communities 2018.  In these reports, 
the Inspectorate repeatedly emphasised the 
importance of leadership and supervision 
in terms of delivering high standards 
of policing.  In particular, the reports 
highlighted the important role of sergeants 
and inspectors in delivering an effective 24/7 
policing service.
In considering which aspects of leadership 
and supervision to examine, the Inspectorate 
selected those areas where a wide degree 
of discretion existed and where rigorous 
supervision and leadership was considered 
to be important in ensuring that policing 
activities are delivered fairly, consistently, 
free from the risk of coercion or corruption 
and in line with the Garda Code of Ethics. 
Discretion without strong supervision 
in areas such as the cancellation of fixed 
charge penalty notices creates a weakness 
in any counter-corruption architecture as it 
provides opportunities for undue influence 
and unethical decision-making.  
Discontinued Court Cases
The District Court is the lowest court of the 
judicial system in Ireland as constituted 
under the Courts and Court Officers Acts and 
is a court of local and summary jurisdiction. 
Its criminal jurisdiction covers summary 
offences and some indictable cases of a minor 
nature.  The majority of cases dealt with by 
the District Court are commenced by the 
Garda Síochána.
Section 8 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005 
provides a general power for any member of 
the Garda Síochána to institute and conduct 
a criminal prosecution in the name of the 




The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) 
has given a general direction to garda 
members in relation to the institution and 
conduct of criminal prosecutions.  The most 
recent direction was issued by the Director 
on 8 November 2011 and is commonly 
referred to as General Direction 3.  The DPP 
has also issued a set of guidelines and a 
Code of Ethics for all prosecutors, including 
the Garda Síochána.  The General Direction 
sets out three separate categories of case. 
The DPP is responsible for instituting and 
conducting the first category of case.  In 
the second category, the Director consents 
to summary disposal in the District Court 
following submission of a file by the Garda 
Síochána.  The third category involves cases 
where the Director consents to summary 
disposal in the District Court but without 
the need for the Garda Síochána to submit 
a file.  The General Direction also lays down 
principles which should guide the Garda 
Síochána in circumstances when it may be 
appropriate to seek advice or a direction from 
the DPP in relation to a case which would 
usually fall into a category not requiring a 
specific direction.
International and Comparable 
Practice
International practice is virtually non-
existent in relation to police services 
independently prosecuting criminal cases. 
The Garda Síochána is unique in this 
respect.  As the Commission on the Future 
of Policing in Ireland has reported it is now 
widely accepted that the investigation and 
prosecution processes should be separate. 
The Commission and the Inspectorate have 
both recommended that all prosecution 
decisions should be taken out of the hands 
of the Garda Síochána and given to a 
national prosecution service.  However 
within Ireland, there are clear standards set 
by the DPP for prosecutors, which provide 
valuable comparable practice against which 
to benchmark Garda prosecution practices.
In October 2016, the DPP issued the fourth 
edition of the Guidelines for Prosecutors as 
well as a Code of Ethics.  The guidelines set out 
the general principles which should underlie 
the approach to criminal prosecutions in the 
State.  While the guidelines and the Code 
are aimed at professional prosecutors, such 
as solicitors and barristers, they are also 
explicitly aimed at garda members, who are 
responsible for instituting the vast majority 
of criminal proceedings in the State.
The guidelines impose a duty on garda 
members, when prosecuting under the 
authority delegated to them by the DPP, to 
comply with all the duties of a prosecutor as 
set out in the guidelines and the Code.  One 
such duty is the requirement to record and 
explain decisions to withdraw or strike out 
criminal proceedings.  During interviews a 
senior member of the DPP explained how 
this duty is discharged within the DPP. 
Under their system any decision by a DPP 
prosecutor at court to vary the original 
prosecutorial decision must be justified and 
recorded in writing on a specific form that is 
returned to senior DPP management for their 
information.  
The Code is intended to enhance and 
promote the standards and general 
principles necessary for the proper and 
independent prosecution of offences.  This 
Code supplements rather than replaces other 
professional codes or standards such as the 
Garda Code of Ethics and the Civil Service 
Code of Standards and Behaviour as well as 
the standards set by the legal professional 
bodies (i.e. the Law Society and Bar Council). 
The Code underscores the importance of the 
independence of prosecutors, who must 
“exercise their functions free of any extraneous 
influences, inducements, pressures, threats or 
interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter 
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or for any reason”.  There is also guidance 
in the Code regarding what constitutes a 
conflict of interest and how they should be 
managed.  
Key Findings and Assessment
During this inspection, the Inspectorate 
examined a representative sample of recent 
garda prosecution files at District Court level. 
In general, local practices had developed 
around the handling and supervision of cases 
in each of the garda divisions visited and the 
following inconsistencies and deficiencies 
were identified:
 > It was not unusual for cases to be 
discontinued at court because of non-
attendance of garda members and 
with little if any explanation.  This 
was found in 13% of cases examined. 
While some cases were referred to local 
management for their information, 
there was no consistent process for 
ensuring that cases were reviewed 
to identify why the prosecution had 
failed;
 > While the DPP’s Guidelines for 
prosecutors were well known among 
garda members, particularly court 
presenters, there was limited awareness 
of the DPP’s Code of Ethics for 
prosecutors;
 > Record-keeping practices varied 
significantly between the divisions 
inspected, with considerable gaps in 
the recording of information about 
why a case was discontinued at court. 
In many cases examined, there was no 
clear rationale recorded in a case file 
to explain why a prosecution case was 
discontinued; 
 > There was limited oversight by 
supervisors such as sergeants or 
inspectors of cases prosecuted directly 
by garda members;
 > District Court outcomes are updated 
automatically on PULSE by the Courts 
Service.  The relevant field in the 
database for recording court outcomes 
is free text and, as such, the accuracy 
of the information is dependent on the 
quality of the entry by the district court. 
There is no standard categorisation of 
why cases are discontinued, which 
significantly hampers the capacity 
to examine the many reasons why a 
prosecution has failed.  Furthermore, 
there can be considerable delays in the 
updating of court outcomes and there 
are concerns about the quality of PULSE 
entries, which can be inaccurate; and
 > The absence of timely and accurate 
information on court proceedings 
coupled with weak processes for 
capturing garda members’ decisions 
to discontinue prosecutions creates a 
significant supervision vacuum.  For 
example, there is no criminal justice 
court case tracking system that could 
identify prosecution cases that fail and 
the reasons why.  The discontinuing 
of cases without effective supervision 
could allow corrupt behaviour or poor 
practice to go unnoticed.
To establish the reasons why prosecution 
cases fail, the Inspectorate examined 79 
discontinued cases from June to August 
2019.  Figure 5.1 shows the various reasons 
recorded for discontinuing those cases.  
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Analysis found that the two most common 
reasons provided for cases being discontinued 
were key evidence being unavailable at court 
(13%) and non-attendance of a garda member 
(13%).  However, in 8% of files examined no 
explanation was recorded to explain why 
a prosecution had been discontinued.  The 
types of discontinued cases included serious 
threat to public safety such as driving while 
intoxicated, and public order offences.  When 
criminal justice controls such as a criminal 
conviction, disqualification from driving or 
the issue of penalty points are not applied, 
future behaviour may not be managed and 
the threat to public safety remains active. 
In addition, the potential risk of corrupt 
exploitation in this process is clear and is a 
significant risk to the reputation of the Garda 
Síochána.  
The level of discontinued cases arising 
from non-attendance of a garda member is 
a significant proportion of all discontinued 
cases.  
Figure 5.1 Reasons for discontinued cases from June to August 2019


























































































The sergeant who performs the role 
of court presenter in Monaghan 
has developed a robust process for 
reducing the number of court cases 
struck out because of garda non-
attendance.  The sergeant identified 
an issue with garda members not 
attending courts, particularly when 
they were prosecuting the case 
themselves and as a result there was no 
file available for a presenter to review. 
The sergeant introduced a case tracking 
system for all cases at the district 
court including where individual 
garda members are prosecuting.  The 
sergeant requires a tracking form for 
each scheduled case and checks all 
files on the forthcoming court list to 
ensure that all paperwork has been 
submitted.  When presenting cases 
in court he has a list of all unit duties 
and if a garda member does not attend 
he will seek an adjournment to when 
the individual’s unit is on a shift that 
coincides with the court sitting.  After 
court he circulates an email to all garda 
members informing them of when their 
cases are scheduled, and posts a list on 
the station notice board.  
Dur ing  our  examinat ion  of 
discontinued cases in Monaghan we 
found no examples of cases being 
discontinued because of garda non-
attendance at court.
Recommendation
In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendation.
Fixed Charge Penalty System
The Fixed Charge Penalty System has been 
in operation in Ireland since its introduction 
under the Road Traffic Act 2002.  For much 
of that time senior garda members have had 
wide discretionary powers to cancel a Fixed 
Charge Penalty Notice (FCPN).
The primary objectives of the Fixed Charge 
Penalty System are to contribute to safer 
driving and reduce road traffic fatalities.  A 
penalty notice can be issued either as a result 
of interception by a garda member (at the 
roadside) or from a static or mobile GoSafe 
camera.  Notices predominantly relate to 
offences committed while driving, such 
as speeding or mobile phone use, but the 
The Garda Síochána should strengthen 
supervision of cases it prosecutes.  This 
should include:
• Introducing suitable guidelines 
and procedures to improve record-
keeping.  In particular, there must be 
requirements to explain in detail a 
garda decision to discontinue a case 
and to record explanations for a case 
being struck out in the District Court.
• Reviewing discontinued cases 
should form part of the divisional 
Performance and Accountability 
Framework (PAF) review process 
to identify patterns or performance 
concerns.
• Ensuring discontinued cases that 
arise from the non-attendance of a 






process can also be used to deal with a range 
of other traffic and public order offences. 
The Notice always involves a fine but with 
certain specified road traffic offences a fixed 
number of penalty points will be recorded 
against the driving licence of the person 
concerned.
There have been several reviews of the Fixed 
Charge Penalty System, most notably by the 
Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission, 
the Comptroller and Auditor General 
and the Inspectorate.  A number of these 
examinations were in response to allegations 
of inappropriate cancellation practices in 
the Garda Síochána.  The reviews all found 
evidence of inadequate and inconsistent 
performance, poor management and lack of 
supervision, and deficits in accountability 
and oversight of the system.  In 2015, the then 
Minister for Justice and Equality established 
the Independent Oversight Authority under 
the stewardship of the former President of 
the Circuit Court, Judge Matthew Deery. 
The Authority has reported ‘substantial 
compliance’ with the process since its 
establishment.
Section 87 of the Road Traffic Act 2010, as 
amended, provides for a statutory exemption 
for members of emergency services, 
including ambulance, fire and police, from 
the road traffic laws relating to the imposition 
of a Notice.  The DPP has advised the Garda 
Síochána that two conditions must be met 
in order to satisfy the statutory exemption, 
namely that garda members must be driving 
or directing a vehicle in the performance of 
their duties, and that the use of the vehicle 
must not endanger the safety of other road 
users.  Garda policy states that in order to 
ensure the personal safety of members and 
other road users, the statutory exemption 
should be relied upon only in exceptional 
circumstances.  While the policy states that 
the onus of proof lies with the applicant to 
set out all the facts relevant to the exemption, 
these should be supported by documentary 
evidence wherever possible.
Garda members seeking the cancellation 
of a Notice must submit a Category C 
Cancellation Request Form to a supervisor 
and usually through their local district 
superintendent, who is responsible under 
the policy for reviewing the request and 
endorsing it as appropriate.  The endorsed 
request and any supporting documentation is 
sent to the Cancelling Authority in the Fixed 
Charge Processing Office. The cancellation of 
notices is now restricted to three  Cancelling 
Authorities, who are senior members of 
chief superintendent and superintendent 
rank attached to the Garda National Traffic 
Bureau.
International and Comparable 
Practice
The situation in the UK is slightly different 
to the extent that the exemption, under 
the Road Traffic Act 1984 and Traffic Signs 
Regulations and General Directions 2016, 
relates to emergency vehicles as opposed to 
drivers.  While there is no legal definition of 
what constitutes a justification for claiming 
the emergency vehicle exemption, the use 
of the exemption is closely scrutinised 
and police officers may only exercise the 
exemption from speed limits, traffic lights 
and traffic signs where there is a clear and 
justified requirement.
Devon and Cornwall Police is a good 
exemplar of practice in England and Wales. 
Scrutiny of the exemption is a two-stage 
process.  The first step for claiming the 
exemption requires police officers to justify, 
in the prescribed format, to an independent 
authorising officer of at least inspector 
rank that the exemption was exercised 
legitimately.  If the authorising officer has 
any doubts as to the justification, the case 
must be referred to the Crown Prosecution 
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Service for independent and objective 
consideration.
In the Metropolitan Police Service, police 
drivers who exceed the posted speed limit 
by certain specified limits (i.e. 70 mph in 
30 mph zone, 90 mph in 40 mph zone or 
110 mph in 50 mph zone) will in addition 
have their standard of driving during the 
incident reviewed by the Police Driving 
Standards Unit.  This unit may recommend 
a supervision intervention or other sanction 
against the police driver including a 
requirement to be reassessed for driving 
duties. 
Key Findings and Assessment
In Judge Deery’s 2018 report, the Oversight 
Authority noted that statutory exemption 
applications continued to be made by garda 
members without an explanation justifying 
the breach of the road traffic laws in terms 
of exceptional circumstances (Deery, 2018). 
This issue was also highlighted in the 2017 
report.
The Garda Professional Standards Unit 
(GPSU) conducts periodic reviews, which 
includes cancellations on the basis of the 
statutory exemption.  The Inspectorate 
has examined the GPSU review for the 
period January to December 2018.  This 
review identified that when considering 
an application for an exemption, garda 
managers did not routinely apply the 
exceptional circumstances test and in 
particular they did not consider whether 
there was a necessity to exceed the speed 
limit.  A number of other inconsistencies in 
record management were also identified.
The Inspectorate examined a sample of 
statutory exemption files in the Fixed Charge 
Penalty Office for the period August 2018 to 
August 2019.  During this period there were 
459 requests for the statutory exemption 
of FCPNs by garda members using official 
vehicles or private vehicles.  Like the GPSU, 
the Inspectorate found a lack of detail in the 
applications and that assessments of local 
managers did not challenge the exemption 
claims and lacked rigour.
During the examination of the applications, 
the Inspectorate noted the following:
 > T h e  d o c u m e n t a r y  e v i d e n c e 
accompanying applications was, for the 
most part, made up of self-declarations 
with no independent assessment 
of facts by supervisors or by the 
superintendent;
 > Applications seldom included a 
complete assessment of those factors 
that could place another road user in 
danger.  Risks such as those posed by the 
weather, road or traffic conditions, and 
high-risk factors such as the presence 
of schools or the historic frequency of 
collisions were not routinely explained 
in each application.  When these types 
of issue were included, they tended to 
consist of comments such as ‘good’ or 
‘clear’;
 > There was only one example of an 
FCPN issued at the road side by a garda 
member to a garda member.  All of the 
other FCPNs examined were issued by 
static or mobile GoSafe van cameras 
(GoSafe cameras are placed in areas at 
higher risk of traffic collisions);
 > The collision risk profile of the detected 
location is generally not taken into 
consideration in the cancellation 
decision;
 > The DPP  makes decisions regarding the 
application of the statutory exemption 
in cases of FCPNs relating to the use 
of private vehicles by garda members. 
However, currently only details 




 > For detections involving private 
vehicles, documentary evidence of 
insurance cover, driving licence or 
National Car Test was not a factor in 
cancellation decisions;
 > Driving experience and training were 
generally not considered in the cases 
examined and it was not routine 
practice to explain whether the driver 
had qualified to the standard required 
under garda policy to exceed speed 
limits (CBD2);
 > There was often a lack of evidence to 
confirm that the driver was responding 
to an incident and PULSE identification 
numbers or copies of PULSE records 
were not included in many of the files 
examined;
 > Vehicle-tracking data is not used to 
better inform cancellation decisions 
in terms of demonstrating driving 
behaviour before and after detection; 
and
 > In one file examined, the district 
superintendent identified they had a 
familial relationship with the garda 
driver and properly referred the 
case to another superintendent for 
consideration.
The Inspectorate reviewed 25 FCPN cases 
that had been cancelled as a result of the 
statutory exemption being applied and 
examined the risk factors disclosed in the 
application for cancellation.  Figure 5.2 
shows the categories of risk factor and the 
proportion of cases in which that category 
was disclosed.  
Figure 5.2 Frequency of Risk factors disclosed when considering the safety of other road 
users























In 40% of the files reviewed no reference 
was made to any road safety factors. 
Usually there was a simple self-declaration 
by the driver with concurrence from their 
superintendent that no other road users 
were placed in danger.  Applicants or their 
supervisors discussed traffic and weather 
conditions in only 48% and 44% of cases 
respectively.  There was also a complete 
absence of consideration of other high-risk 
factors or local collision history as well as 
objective or independent evidence to show 
that other road users were not endangered. 
The findings from this inspection suggest 
that garda members claiming the statutory 
exemption have a sense of impunity and 
fail to justify their actions or provide any 
evidence to support their application for 
statutory exemption.
In June 2017, a GoSafe van detected a 
garda vehicle travelling at 115kph in a 
100kph zone.
• Following referral to the garda 
unit to which the vehicle had been 
allocated, a garda member was 
identified as driving the vehicle 
accompanied by another member, 
who applied for the statutory 
exemption.
• The application for exemption 
stated that the use of excess speed 
had been the result of the crew’s 
observations of a commercial 
vehicle driving at high speed.  The 
driver of the garda vehicle stated 
they had reported the incident 
to the regional control room, but 
neither the driver nor the passenger 
obtained the vehicle’s registration 
details.
• The application was supported by 
the member’s superintendent.  
• The Cancellation Authority 
requested a record of the incident 
from the regional control room and 
checked to see if the commercial 
vehicle had also been captured by 
the detection van.  There was no 
record of the incident nor was an 
activation captured for the other 
vehicle.
Case Study A - Fixed Charge 
Penalty System
The following is an example of an 
activation of a speed camera by an on 
duty garda member and the subsequent 
application process to have the FCPN 
cancelled.
Identified Good Practice
The Fixed Charge Penalty Office now 
maintains a database tracking the 
cancellation of Notices.  The database 
captures the name of individuals who 
have sought statutory exemption. 
When a member of the Garda 
workforce makes three requests for 
exemption a report will be forwarded 





In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendations.
• Local management were asked 
to reconsider the application for 
cancellation and replied that the 
account given was ‘bona fides’.
A second review by a senior manager 
was requested by the Cancellation 
Authority as they believed the account 
lacked credibility.  This review 
subsequently reported in December 
2018 that:
• The original garda member was 
now denying driving the vehicle 
at the time of detection and stated 
that their declaration had been 
made in error.  This garda member 
said that the incident with the 
commercial vehicle had occurred 
on the approximate date at the same 
location and they had reported it to 
their unit’s office not to the regional 
control room as originally stated. 
The vehicle they were driving was 
not identified;
• A second member of the unit who 
was returning from training was 
then identified as the driver of the 
speeding garda vehicle at the time 
of the GoSafe activation;
• The vehicle log book which should 
have recorded who was driving the 
vehicle on the date of the incident 
had not been completed;  
• The local superintendent accepted 
that more action should have been 
taken to confirm the facts in the 
original cancellation request;
• A second appl icat ion for 
cancellation was submitted by the 
The Department of Transport should 
undertake a review of the current 
statutory exemption relating to the 
driving of vehicles by members of the 
emergency services.
Recommendation 20
Fixed Charge Penalty System
newly designated driver who was 
returning from training.  While 
this application, endorsed by 
a superintendent contained no 
operational justification for the 
excess speed, it was still deemed 
sufficient to confirm that they were 
on duty;
• Senior garda managers decided 
that there was no requirement to 
commence a criminal or discipline 
investigation in relation to any of 
the garda members concerned.  
This case study shows the importance 
of conducting a rigorous examination 
of an application for an exemption.
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The Garda Síochána must ensure that 
the process for cancelling a Fixed 
Charge Penalty Notice on the basis of 
the statutory exemption consider all of 
the relevant conditions, including those 
set out in regulation and policy, and be 
properly documented.  Such an approach 
should ensure that:
• The exceptional circumstances 
test is applied more rigorously in 
the decision-making process.  The 
necessity  to travel in excess of the 
speed limit, and the proportionality 
of this action, should be considered 
and balanced against the rationale for 
breaching road traffic laws. 
• All risk factors, mitigating factors and 
evidence are taken into consideration, 
including: weather and road 
conditions, driving competence, and 
factors involving high risk such as 
proximity to schools.  Vehicle data 
could also be utilised to confirm 
driving performance, and in the case 
of private vehicles, confirmation of 
driving licence, insurance and NCT 
should be required.
Recommendation 21
Fixed Charge Penalty System
Non-Public Duty
Section 30 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005 
permits the Garda Commissioner to provide 
policing services, as set out in Section 7 of 
the Act, for certain events taking place on 
private property or to which the public will 
have access.  Examples of the types of event 
which are set out in the Act include: sporting 
fixtures, concerts, festivals, exhibitions, 
conferences, film productions and 
appearances by persons likely to attract large 
crowds.  They also include police services 
related to the escort of persons or property in 
transit through the State.  The Commissioner 
may charge for such policing services subject 
to regulations made under Section 122(1) and 
the authorised charging rates are outlined 
in a HQ Directive.  This Directive sets the 
hourly rate that event organisers are to be 
charged for garda members, sergeants and 
inspectors and vary depending on the day 
the duty is performed.  As such, costs are at 
their lowest during mid-week and rise for 
weekend duties with the public holiday rate 
being the most expensive.  For example, the 
hourly rate charged for a garda member on 
mid-week duty is €56.68, €72.24 on a Sunday 
and €99.36 on a public holiday.
International and Comparable 
Practice
The ability to charge for policing services in 
the UK is generally determined by statutory 
provisions.  The responsibility for agreeing 
and recovering policing costs rests with 
the Chief Constable, while responsibility 
for policy lies with Police and Crime 
Commissioners.
The first set of guidelines for charging for 
police services in the UK was issued by the 
Association of Chief Police Officers in 2005. 
These guidelines were revised and adapted, 
usually in response to litigation.  In 2019, 
these were replaced with National Policing 
Guidelines on Charging for Police Services 
issued by the National Police Chiefs’ Council.
The guidelines outline what duties police 
services can charge for and ethical guidance 
on the circumstances in which a charge 
should be made.  There are simple decision 
trees to help police managers decide if an 
event meets the criteria for cost recovery. 
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The guidelines also contain a costing model 
which assists police services in identifying 
and allocating the correct costs, including 
basic pay, allowances, overtime payments, 
ancillary costs and overhead costs.  The 
national guidelines and individual police 
service policies are publicly available for 
event organisers to read and there is, in 
general, a transparent and ‘no surprises’ 
approach to police cost recovery.
Key Findings and Assessment
The Garda Síochána provided the 
Inspectorate with the total amount charged 
for non-public duty in 2018 and 2019 broken 
down into five main categories, namely 
arts and culture, escort/explosives, sports, 
tourism and miscellaneous.  Figure 5.3 shows 
a comparison of the total amounts charged 
by the Garda Síochána for non-public duty 
for 2018 and 2019. It  demonstrates that non-























Figure 5.3 Total amount charged by the Garda Síochána for non-public duty in 2018 and 
2019, by category of event
Source: Data supplied by the Garda Síochána; analysis by the Garda Inspectorate
This inspection found that while non-
public duty in the Garda Síochána should 
be  sanctioned in advance by the Finance 
Directorate, policing plans for non-public 
duty events or operations are drawn up by 
a district superintendent and there is wide 
discretion available to them in identifying 
costs for recovery.  Special accounting 
arrangements are in place for capturing the 
costs and receipts from the event or operation, 
which are recorded against a specific non-
public duty code number for each event. 
The Finance Directorate is responsible for 
the billing and collection arrangements  for 
all non-public duty events.
Difficulties with non-public duty were 
identified in a review of the practice in 2015 
conducted by the Garda Internal Audit 
Unit.  This review identified difficulties in 
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distinguishing where the Garda Síochána’s 
duty to the public ends and where the 
liability of event organisers begins, mainly 
due to the absence of clear guidelines for 
garda managers.  The review also found 
limited assurance that the Garda Síochána 
had recouped all policing costs possible 
under the existing arrangements because 
of a cumbersome and not-well-understood 
method for charging organisers and 
promotors.  This led to an inconsistent 
approach and wide local variation in the way 
non-public duty events were policed and 
charged.  The review recommended that a 
policy be developed to provide guidance to 
local managers.
This inspection has also identified several 
deficiencies in relation to non-public duty 
including the following:
 > Despite a recommendation in the 
Internal Audit report of 2015 a policy is 
still not in place and guidelines are only 
in draft form;
 > The absence of a transparent policy 
and guidelines for garda managers, 
organisers and promoters creates a 
risk that decisions around charges for 
policing services can easily be perceived 
as treating some organisations more 
favourably than others;
 > There are examples of events being 
charged at rates substantially different 
to the rates set out in the HQ Directive, 
and sometimes even within the same 
event different rates have been charged. 
This conflicts with the HQ Directive; 
 > Local managers have extended the 
use of non-public duty into areas not 
originally envisioned in the primary 
legislation (e.g.  tourism and escorts of 
explosives);
 > The policing of non-public duty events 
usually takes place on overtime and 
there is evidence that some events have 
been policed in such a way so as to 
maximise the recourse to overtime for 
the members policing the event; 
 > Overtime payments relating to non-
public duty do not count towards 
the identification of high earners and 
therefore such earnings are obscured 
from management oversight and 
control; 
 > Costs recorded as non-public duty do 
not impact on local budgets even if the 
policing costs are not fully recovered 
from the event organiser;
 > Examination of non-public duty 
records shows that in 2019 there were 
78 occasions when a company or event 
organiser was not charged for garda 
services recorded as non-public duty. 
A number of reasons were offered for 
this deficit, for example, because the 
event did not proceed due to inclement 
weather and there was therefore no 
policing cost.  However, failures of local 
managers to submit invoices, the use 
of garda members on scheduled duty, 
and local decisions not to charge for an 
event were also reported as reasons for 
the non-recovery of policing costs; 
 > Further examination of the 78 occasions 
revealed that in 42 cases there was 
no garda overtime recorded for the 
event.  In 36 cases however overtime 
costs totalling €592,136 were recorded 
as having been expended but not 
recovered from the organiser; and
 > The current method of calculating 
garda policing costs does not consider 
wider expenditure such as training, 




Local arrangements and ad hoc practices 
are common for the policing of non-public 
duty.  These create the potential for conflicts 
of interest to arise between those planning 
and managing the policing aspect of an event 
and those promoting or organising it.  In 
the absence of a policy and guidelines and 
with an inconsistent approach to charging 
for events, this creates a perception that 
favourable treatment is provided to some 
private organisations over others.
Recommendation
In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendation.
The Garda Síochána provided members 
under non-public duty arrangements 
to a commercial event on 23 separate 
occasions throughout a calendar 
year for a total of 757 hours.  The 
operations included weekends and 
public holidays.  The Inspectorate was 
informed that a “discounted” flat rate 
of €40 per hour per garda member was 
charged for garda services, cumulating 
in a total policing charge of €30,280. 
No explanation was provided for 
authorising a discounted rate.  Even 
allowing for a charge at the minimum 
rate for garda members midweek 
(€58.68) as outlined in the HQ Directive, 
this equates to an expected charge 
for policing services of €44,420 and 
represents a potential loss of €14,140 in 
cost recovery to the Garda Síochána.
The case study demonstrates how the 
current policy vacuum, can result in 
local managers exercising considerable 
latitude and discretion when deciding 
what costs should be recovered for a 
non-public duty event.
Case Study B - Non-Public Duty
The following is an example of 
discretionary decision-making by a 
local manager in the charging for non-
public duty services.  
The Garda Síochána should develop, 
publish and implement policy and 
guidance on charging for non-public 
duty.  Such guidance should minimise 
the opportunity for inconsistency 
and maximise transparency for garda 
managers and event organisers.  In 
support of the policy:
• The Executive Director Finance and 
Services should have responsibility 
for ensuring a consistent approach 
to the charging and recovery of non-
public duty costs.
• All non-public duty policing plans 
should be approved at a regional 





Part IV examines the identification and investigation 
of corruption and assesses the optimum operational 
structure for a counter-corruption unit within the Garda 
Síochána. It also examines a number of important 
counter-corruption strategies, including; identifying the 
Abuse of Power for Sexual Gain, reporting wrong doing 











All police services must do more than simply 
react to corruption as it occurs.  Police 
services must instead take a more proactive 
and holistic approach to protecting the 
organisation against the threat of corruption 
and minimising its impact. The early 
identification and thorough investigation 
of corruption requires strong leadership, 
effective processes and sufficient dedicated 
resources to intervene expeditiously and 
limit the potential for further harm.  In 
order to be consistent and effective, the 
oversight of corruption threats and the 
concomitant organisational response needs 
to be coordinated at the service level and to 
operate within a clearly defined framework. 
The operating model for the planned Garda 
Síochána Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU), along 
with its investigative capacity and capability, 




Sharing counter-corruption responsibilities 
across multiple functional and operational 
areas hinders the organisation’s response to 
the issue and limits strategic understanding 
of the corruption threat.  This occurs when 
knowledge and understanding of the risk 
are too widely dispersed and different 
recording and reporting procedures prevent 
a clear analysis of the problem.  Sharing 
responsibility weakens the corporate 
response and accountability, as well 
promoting inconsistent practices.  The 
absence of a single leader and a dedicated 
anti-corruption unit responsible and 
accountable for countering corruption in all 
its guises will limit the effectiveness of any 
response to tackle it.
International and Comparable 
Practice
During the course of the inspection, the 
Inspectorate engaged with a number of 
international police services.  All of the police 
services engaged with have a dedicated 
professional standards department that 
includes a distinct Anti- or Counter-
Corruption Unit.  The Unit may be located 
separately for operational and security 
purposes.  The professional standards 
department has overall responsibility 
for vetting, liaison with independent 
complaints bodies, internal investigation of 
discipline, and coordination of discipline 
cases.  Less serious misconduct matters 
may be dealt with by local managers, more 
serious or complex misconduct cases by 
the professional standards department, 
and ACUs have specific responsibility for 
preventing, identifying and investigating all 
criminal and corruption-related matters.
Professional standards departments are 
usually led by a chief superintendent who 
reports directly to a deputy chief constable 
on corruption-related issues and has 
responsibility for the ethical health of the 
service.
In 2015, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary & Fire and Rescue Services 
(HMICFRS) endorsed this structure in 
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its inspection report entitled Integrity 
Matters.  This report examined the capacity 
of police services in England and Wales to 
build integrity into their organisations and 
tackle corruption within the ranks of their 
workforces.  
Figure 6.1 outlines a typical organisational 
structure for professional standards 
departments and ACUs as identified by the 
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Figure 6.1 Typical organisational structure for UK professional standards departments 
and ACUs
Source: Created by the Garda Inspectorate following engagement with UK police services
This structure provides clear accountability 
and senior management oversight.  It also 
emphasises both the gravity with which 
corruption is viewed by the organisation and 
the operational autonomy of the ACU.
In other jurisdictions ACUs have visibility 
of all information relating to professional 
integrity and are responsible for all 
policies designed to address vulnerabilities 
to corruption in relation to both the 
organisation and its staff.  They also have an 
important role in developing key counter-
corruption messages as part of their internal 
communication strategy.  
As shown in Figure 6.2 the South Yorkshire 
Police Service ACU has a well-defined 
counter-corruption operating model. 
Priorities identified through the service’s 
Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment drive 
proactive activity such as covert operations 
and influence ongoing programmes such as 
drug and alcohol testing.  
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This model has the advantage of bringing 
a wide range of counter-corruption 
functions including prevention, intelligence, 
investigation and communication under 
one umbrella.  This allows organisational 
risks to be more effectively and dynamically 
identified and managed.  This approach also 
ensures there is clarity within the police 
service regarding the ACU’s responsibilities 
and role with regard to countering corruption 
threats.
Key Findings and Assessment
In 2019, the Garda Commissioner announced 
that the Garda Síochána was reviewing its 
strategy for tackling corruption within 
the organisation.  During this inspection, 
the Inspectorate reviewed the plan for the 
proposed new internal counter-corruption 
structures and received several detailed 
briefings from the change management 
team and its lead chief superintendent.  This 
provided a valuable insight into the vision 
for tackling internal corruption within the 
Garda Síochána.  The new structures were 
due to be implemented in early 2020, but at 
the time of finalising this report, they were 
not yet fully in place.
Currently, strategic responsibility for 
discipline and counter corruption rests with 
the Assistant Commissioner for Governance 
Figure 6.2 South Yorkshire Police Counter-Corruption Unit Operating Model
Source: South Yorkshire Police
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and Accountability.  At the time of completing 
the inspection, there is still no dedicated 
unit within the Garda Síochána with overall 
responsibility for the prevention, detection 
and investigation of internal corruption.
Many of the functions and policies relating 
to counter corruption are shared across 
operational and corporate service functions 
and this restricts the Garda Síochána’s ability 
to fully understand the nature and scale of 
the corruption threat within the organisation. 
The Inspectorate believes that this hampers 
efforts to identify corruption and address 
the underlying causes.  It has also resulted 
in an inconsistent approach to criminal and 
discipline investigations.
Within the Governance and Accountability 
Department, the Garda Síochána Internal 
Affairs (IA) Unit has no dedicated 
investigatory capacity and is only responsible 
for oversight of investigations under the 
discipline regulations and for liaising with the 
Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission 
(GSOC) in relation to its investigations. 
In addition, IA has no responsibility for 
counter-corruption prevention measures or 
management of intelligence.  
All discipline investigations are currently led 
by a chief superintendent appointed under 
the discipline regulations, who is usually 
also based in the functional area where the 
alleged behaviour occurred.  During this 
inspection, concerns that such investigations 
lacked independence were raised. The 
Inspectorate noted that such a perception 
may hinder the garda workforce from 
reporting wrongdoing, because of a lack of 
confidence that the issue would be dealt with 
impartially.
11  The Garda Síochána currently has a unit called the ACU, which is part of Garda National Economic Crime Bureau.  Its 
role is not to focus on internal garda corruption but rather it conducts criminal investigations into serious allegations of 
bribery and corruption in Irish society.
While it would be good practice for IA to be 
aware of all ongoing discipline and criminal 
investigations, this inspection found that 
they are not always informed about covert 
criminal investigations conducted by 
national units.  On occasions, IA has only 
become aware of an investigation when it 
becomes public knowledge as a result of 
some form of overt operation.  This is an 
unsatisfactory situation and could result in 
a situation where IA is unaware of the fact 
that two different garda units are conducting 
simultaneous investigations into the same 
subject.  
The proposed garda counter-corruption 
structures will include the formation of an 
Internal ACU,11 led by a chief superintendent 
who will report directly to the Assistant 
Commissioner for Governance and 
Accountability.  The key functions of the 
unit will include: integrity building and 
communications, intelligence gathering, 
analysis and coordination, support 
for people who report corruption, and 
internal vetting.  The plans also indicate 
that the unit will conduct investigations 
into suspected corruption and review 
and monitor compliance with a range of 
counter-corruption policies and procedures. 
However, none of these key functions 
had transferred to the ACU at the time of 
completing this inspection.
Recommendation
In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 




The Garda Síochána should assign overall 
organisational responsibility for the 
prevention, detection and investigation 
of corruption to the Anti-Corruption 
Unit.  To support this responsibility the 
Anti-Corruption Unit should have full 
visibility of all ongoing criminal and 
discipline investigations into members 
of the garda workforce.12
Recommendation 23
Anti-Corruption Unit Operating Model
Intelligence Function
An effective intelligence function is an 
essential element in uncovering corruption 
activity, precursor behaviours and 
organisational vulnerabilities.  Within an 
ACU, an intelligence unit assesses and 
manages information received from multiple 
sources.  The intelligence unit’s role is to 
develop this information into an intelligence 
lead, to a level that allows the organisation 
to either exploit it through investigation, 
intervention or prevention; to passively 
monitor it for future corroboration; or to 
discard it as inaccurate.  The development 
of intelligence leads in this way requires 
enrichment from other sources of 
information.  This may be through checkable 
facts such as financial transactions or records 
of computer access.  Alternatively, covert 
policing tactics such as surveillance or 
interception may be used when it can be 
justified as a necessary and proportionate 
intrusion.
Most police services use strategic intelligence 
analysis to identify existing and emerging 
threats at the organisational level.  In 
corruption terms, these might include 
12 This recommendation is made without prejudice to the powers and duties of the Garda Siochana Ombudsman Com-
mission to carry out independent investigations.
trends in Abuse of Power for Sexual Gain 
(APSG) across the service, the volume 
of unauthorised disclosure of police 
information or information on the intentions 
of organised crime groups to thwart law 
enforcement activity.  Analysis of strategic 
intelligence allows threats to be properly 
understood and actions prioritised so that 
senior leaders can put in place the necessary 
strategies to mitigate the identified risks.  
At a tactical level, analysis can identify 
intelligence leads that might indicate specific 
corrupt activities and an intelligence unit 
can develop plans to test the veracity of 
such intelligence or conduct further work to 
develop the information.  Examples include 
intelligence that an employee is accessing 
information without good cause, information 
that a specific crime group intended to 
corrupt an unknown employee, a suspicion 
of an unethical relationship between an 
employee and a member of the public, or a 
garda employee alleged to have used illegal 
drugs.  A single report of alleged corruption 
should not automatically result in a criminal 
or discipline investigation as it may be 
inaccurate, misleading, malicious or too 
general to identify an individual victim or 
location.  Once a lead is identified, there are 
a number of actions that the intelligence unit 
can take, including assessing the lead against 
other existing intelligence, other information 
or internal registers.
An ACU can refer a case for local management 
or for welfare intervention or can seek more 
information through the proactive use 
of covert tactics, such as, a covert human 
intelligence source (CHIS), confidential 
external agency reports, communication 
data, lawful intercept, surveillance and ICT 
monitoring.  These tactics may be managed 
within an ACU intelligence unit or may draw 
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on criminal intelligence, human resource 
departments or even external organisations 
such as other state or law enforcement 
agencies as appropriate.
International and Comparable 
Practice
The collection, assessment, management, 
development and dissemination of 
intelligence is arguably the most important 
function within the ACU.  Without a 
proactive intelligence capability, a full picture 
of corruption in the organisation may be slow 
to emerge and only after significant harm 
has already occurred.  Within UK policing 
it is expected that counter-corruption units 
will be proactive in seeking out corruption 
within a police service. They should 
have a separate intelligence system and 
independent surveillance, CHIS handling 
and investigation capacity.
All of the ACUs in other jurisdictions 
benchmarked for the purposes of this 
inspection have separate intelligence units 
with the capacity and capability to deliver 
the full range of intelligence functions 
either through their own staff or by utilising 
other trusted resources.  These ACUs 
had access to collection tools such as all 
criminal intelligence relating to suspected 
staff wrongdoing and financial intelligence 
including Suspicious Transaction Reports.13 
They also had digital media investigators 
and full-spectrum social media monitoring. 
The staff are trained to collect intelligence 
through CHIS handling, surveillance and 
undercover policing and had the ability to 
13  In Ireland, Suspicious Transaction Reports are made by financial institutions and other designated persons and bodies 
to either the Garda Síochána or the Revenue Commissioner in connection with suspicious financial activity.  Provisions 
for reporting such activity are prescribed under the Criminal Justice (Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing) Act 
2010.
14  The Independent Office for Police Conduct is the lead public body responsible for handling complaints against the po-
lice in England and Wales.  It conducts independent investigations of serious allegations of misconduct, including deaths 
following police contact.  In addition to investigations, it also sets standards with regard to complaint handling by police 
forces.
access communication data generated by 
private devices.  Police ICT systems can also 
be proactively monitored using auditing 
software for indications of misuse.  
ACUs also receive all reports and 
information on internal corruption supplied 
by the workforce, the public, stakeholders 
and other state agencies.  This includes 
information generated by confidential means 
such as protected disclosures, integrity lines, 
anonymised emails and phone apps.  In 
addition, each ACU has protocols in place 
for exchanging relevant information with 
other police services and law enforcement 
agencies, as well as with independent 
complaints and oversight bodies, for 
example, the Independent Office for Police 
Conduct (IOPC).14
Internal records are a key source of 
information and ACUs would be expected 
to have unfettered access to all ethical 
declarations and registers (Gifts and 
Gratuities, Notifiable Associations, Conflicts 
of Interest, Professional Boundaries, etc.), and 
visibility of all complaints and investigations 
into staff, whether by internal or external 
investigators.  
The ACUs engaged with by the Inspectorate 
manage intelligence via structured 
intelligence-handling models, which ensure 
that each intelligence lead is properly 
recorded, assessed and investigated on a 
standalone intelligence system.  Intelligence 
leads are formally reviewed at weekly 
management meetings and all agreed 
investigative actions or decisions recorded 
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accordingly.  ACUs can enrich their 
intelligence leads through collection tools, 
including, where necessary tasking other 
departments’ criminal intelligence units to 
carry out financial checks or auditing ICT 
use.  A lead would remain open and regularly 
reviewed until the ACU management 
team has decided to close the action off.  If 
further action is necessary, the ACU can 
initiate a management intervention or refer 
the intelligence for a criminal or discipline 
investigation.
All the ACU staff that met with the 
Inspectorate were experienced detectives 
who have had specific training in the 
management of intelligence and corruption 
investigations.  The College of Policing in 
the UK has developed a training course for 
corruption investigators and managers.
Key Findings and Assessment
To be effective, the Garda Síochána 
intelligence function must operate at both 
the Strategic and Tactical levels and this 
structure must apply equally to the proposed 
ACU.  This inspection found that the Garda 
Síochána key intelligence functions did not 
exist within a counter-corruption framework. 
Significant impediments to an effective 
counter-corruption intelligence system 
include the following:
 > Information that could indicate serious 
corruption or wrongdoing is not held in 
a single area within the Garda Síochána;
 > There are no dedicated resources 
focused on analysing and developing 
corruption information;
 > Strategic and tactical understanding 
of corruption threats is limited and 
operational capacity and capability is 
inadequate; and
 > There is no counter-corruption 
intelligence-collection plan that seeks 
to quantify corrupt behaviours and 
develop a wider understanding of the 
corruption threat.
At present, criminal intelligence relating 
to potential corrupt activity is collected as 
part of ongoing criminal operations and is 
managed by the Security and Intelligence 
Branch.  This can be passed to criminal 
investigators should a crime be identified.  
Financial Intelligence and Suspicious 
Transaction Reports relating to the garda 
workforce are managed by the Garda 
National Bureau of Economic Crime. 
Information relating to child sexual abuse or 
child safety received from Tusla is held by the 
Garda National Protective Services Bureau. 
In addition, specific details of corruption 
investigations are held by the Garda National 
Bureau of Criminal Investigation.  There is no 
centralised intelligence database capturing 
all of these sources of information in one 
location to support more effective analysis. 
Currently, each department collects and 
maintains its own investigation records and 
sometimes these records are in paper format 
only.
This inspection also found that there are 
no dedicated garda counter-corruption 
intelligence resources capable of collating, 
assessing and managing intelligence leads or 
cross-checking them against other databases, 
personal information or ICT activity.  For 
example, the Inspectorate was informed that 
intelligence concerning Suspicious Financial 
Transactions involving the garda workforce 
would be resolved through enquiries with 
local management without cross-checking 
against discipline records, ICT activity and 
other sources of information.  It is also the 
case that IA would not be consulted and this 
creates a considerable gap in the intelligence 
picture.  In addition, the Garda Síochána 
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does not have the necessary centralised 
systems that allow initial intelligence 
leads to be enriched through existing 
information or a structured collection 
plan.  At present, key information is shared 
across a number of different branches, and 
systems making a holistic understanding 
difficult and unnecessarily complex.  This 
creates a risk that threats may be missed or 
underestimated.
Beyond the liaison role of IA with GSOC, 
there is no unit within the Governance and 
Accountability Department responsible 
for strategic liaison with external bodies in 
relation to corruption.  It is not uncommon 
for other state agencies which target criminal 
behaviour or other bodies which deal directly 
with victims to identify possible misconduct 
by the garda workforce or those seeking to 
corrupt a member of the workforce.  This 
includes agencies such as Customs and 
Excise, the Irish Prison Service, the Irish 
Naturalisation and Immigration Service 
and other sources such as social protection 
authorities, financial institutions and 
voluntary organisations.  Similarly, given 
the transnational nature of criminal law, 
enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions 
may also identify corruption-related activity 
in Ireland.
This inspection found that the Garda 
Síochána has no intelligence-sharing or 
information-sharing protocols or agreements 
relating to counter corruption in place with 
relevant agencies or other bodies within or 
outside the State.  This would include the 
Revenue Commissioners, the Police Service 
of Northern Ireland or the National Crime 
Agency in the UK.
The Garda Síochána informed the 
Inspectorate that the ACU will have an 
intelligence function to support the following 
activities:
 > The preparation of an Anti-Corruption 
Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment;
 > The gathering, assessment and co-
ordination of all corruption-related 
intelligence and information;
 > The conducting of preliminary 
enquiries to validate or corroborate 
intelligence;
 > The monitoring of service-wide ICT 
systems;
 > The establishment of facilities to receive 
workforce reports of wrongdoing; and
 > The monitoring of all counter-
corruption policies.
While the plans examined by the Inspectorate 
identify the importance of developing 
Memorandums of Understanding with 
the Security and Intelligence Branch, it is 
unclear as to whether the ACU will be able 
to task covert human intelligence sources 
to meet the future needs of the ACU and its 
investigators.
Within the new Garda Síochána Operating 
Model, there are plans to develop regional 
intelligence and tasking units.  The 
Inspectorate believes that the Garda ACU 
should have a similar capability to underpin 
its critically important role in developing 
intelligence-led operations against internal 
corruption.
Recommendations
In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 





Investigations into corruption are very 
challenging.  For example, investigators 
need a high degree of competence to deal 
with police personnel who are aware of 
law enforcement techniques and who will 
be alert to signs of investigatory activity. 
Corruption investigations must also 
demonstrate impartiality.  This is important 
to maintain community confidence in 
policing, particularly in cases involving a 
public complaint or where an independent 
external investigation is required by law.  It is 
also important to maintain the confidence of 
the police workforce that such investigations 
will be conducted fairly, without bias or 
favour, and that they will not be influenced 
by past associations.  
Internal Investigation
International and Comparable 
Practice
Merseyside Police, South Yorkshire Police, 
and the National Crime Agency all have 
the ability to conduct independent internal 
investigations of alleged discipline or 
criminal breaches.  Discipline matters are 
investigated by the professional standards 
department or by the ACU depending 
on the severity and nature of the alleged 
behaviour.  For example, discipline cases 
involving dishonesty are investigated by 
the ACU, while cases of failure of duty, 
with no corruption element, are dealt with 
by the professional standards department. 
All criminal matters, such as sexual violence 
or supply of illegal drugs, that are linked to 
corruption are investigated by ACUs.
  
The Garda Síochána should provide 
sufficient resources to the Anti-
Corruption Unit to create a dedicated 
intelligence team with responsibility 
for developing strategic and tactical 
understanding of corruption threats 
within the Garda Síochána.  Specific 
functions should include:
• Tasking and coordinating the 
collection of all anti-corruption 
intelligence.  
• Assessing, developing, monitoring 
and managing all reports of internal 
corruption. 
• Disseminating credible leads for 
investigation or intervention.
• Maintaining a standalone intelligence 
database and case management 
system where information and 
decisions can be recorded.
Recommendation 25
The Intelligence Function
The Garda Síochána should develop 
formal arrangements for the mutual 
sharing of intelligence between the Garda 
Síochána Ombudsman Commission, 






Key Findings and Assessment
When a garda member is suspected of 
wrongdoing an internal investigation 
can follow a number of different routes 
depending on the severity of the alleged 
behaviour.  When it amounts to a minor 
breach of the discipline regulations, it can 
be resolved by way of supervisory advice, 
caution or warning.  The details of such 
actions will not be recorded on the personnel 
file of the garda member concerned.
When a less serious breach of the 
discipline regulations is suspected, a chief 
superintendent appoints a deciding officer 
(not below the rank of superintendent) to 
investigate and interview the garda member 
concerned.  Where the member is found to 
have breached the discipline regulations, 
the deciding officer may impose a penalty 
ranging from advice to a temporary 
reduction in pay not exceeding two weeks.
When a serious breach of discipline is 
suspected, a chief superintendent will 
appoint an investigating officer (not below 
the rank of inspector) to investigate the 
matter.  Once completed, the investigating 
officer makes a recommendation regarding 
whether the facts disclosed warrant the 
establishment of a Board of Inquiry, and 
if required, such a Board will be convened 
in accordance with the procedural rules. 
Where a Board of Inquiry is established, it 
may make a recommendation to the Garda 
Commissioner (the final arbitrator in such 
discipline matters) to impose a penalty 
ranging from a reduction in pay of up to four 
weeks to dismissal. 
Data supplied by the Garda Síochána for 
the period 2016 to 2018 shows that the most 
prevalent findings for breach of discipline 
regulations were neglect of duty and 
falsehood or prevarication; these amounted 
to approximately 89% of the total number 
of discipline breaches found to have been 
committed by members.
Similarly, criminal investigations involving 
a member of the garda workforce will be 
dealt with differently depending on the 
nature of the alleged behaviour.  Generally, 
investigations are overseen by the divisional 
officer, the chief superintendent where 
the incident has occurred.  The divisional 
officer will appoint a superintendent to 
lead the investigation.  If the member under 
investigation is assigned within the same 
division, an investigating superintendent 
will be appointed from another division. 
Such investigations are conducted in 
accordance with the usual rules of evidence 
and criminal procedures.  Cases involving 
a sexual motivation or child protection 
concern or those involving domestic abuse 
may be referred to the Garda National 
Protective Services Bureau for investigation. 
More serious criminal allegations, such as 
corruption, may be referred to the Garda 
National Bureau of Criminal Investigation 
for an independent investigation.  
It is important to note that there is no specific 
training provided to those investigating 
corruption or wrongdoing and there are no 
national investigatory standards in place.  It 
is also important to highlight that at present, 
Internal Affairs has neither a disciplinary nor 
criminal investigatory capacity and its role 
is limited to coordination and oversight of 
ongoing investigations.
Concerns were raised with the Inspectorate 
by garda members at various ranks and by 
the garda staff associations about a lack of 
confidence in the local arrangements for 
disciplinary and criminal investigation 
of the garda workforce.  These concerns 
included previous interactions between 
the investigator and the member under 
investigation, examples being career-
long friendships or workplace conflicts. 
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Another issue raised was that the absence 
of an independent investigator and an 
independent investigation unit increased the 
perception that some cases are not dealt with 
impartially and professionally.
At some future point, the Garda Síochána 
intends to assign responsibility for conducting 
criminal and discipline investigations to 
the ACU.  However, the current approach 
will remain in place for a minimum of 12 
months from the establishment of the ACU, 
after which the situation will be reviewed. 
Despite this commitment, the Inspectorate 
is concerned about delay and also whether 
the ACU will have sufficient capacity to 
investigate all such cases.  
In the interim, the absence of an independent 
internal investigation unit may undermine 
confidence in the new ACU among the 
garda workforce and other stakeholders by 
perpetuating the perception that little has 
changed.  As it will take time to establish 
a fully functioning independent ACU 
investigation team, the current process 
for conducting investigations remains a 
significant gap in the counter-corruption 
architecture of the Garda Síochána.
There is also a continued risk that the ACU’s 
ability to capture and analyse all relevant 
information or intelligence on corruption 
will be compromised as existing structures 
effectively bypass the ACU.  This could result 
in important intelligence continuing to be 
held in silos at both local and national levels.
As a result, the Inspectorate believes 
that the ACU needs to be embedded into 
investigations at a much earlier stage than 
the proposed 12 months schedule and that 
this could be managed through a phased 
approach.  For example, in the interim, 
the ACU should have full visibility of 
all criminal investigations conducted by 
national and local units and play an active 
role in specific cases.  This should include 
more serious cases, such as abuse of power 
for sexual gain and other sexual offences. 
An ACU should also have a role in cases 
of unauthorised disclosure of information 
to ensure that ICT systems are protected. 
Assigning responsibility for conducting 
investigations to the ACU could take place 
incrementally as the investigatory capacity 
of the unit develops.  
Recommendation
In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendation.
External Investigation
International and Comparable 
Practice
Following an independent review of 
complaints handling, investigations and 
misconduct issues in relation to policing 
in Scotland a preliminary report was 
published in June 2019.  This review found 
that independence and impartiality in the 
investigation of police complaints tended to 
be tied to the seriousness and substance of 
the complaint (Angiolini, 2019).  In certain 
The Garda Síochána should provide 
sufficient resources to the Anti-
Corruption Unit to reflect the current 
assessment of risk and to ensure that the 
unit is capable of conducting independent 
discipline and criminal investigations. 
Those engaged in counter-corruption 
investigations should be experienced 






circumstances, there was a legal requirement 
for independence in the investigation. 
In particular, this legal requirement for 
impartiality includes circumstances where 
an individual’s rights under Article 2 (Right 
to life), Article 3 (Prohibition of torture 
and inhuman or degrading treatment) or 
Article 5 (Right to liberty) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) have 
been engaged.
The Independent Office for Police Conduct 
(IOPC) in England and Wales oversees the 
police complaints system and investigates 
the more serious matters.  This includes 
deaths following police contact.  It also sets 
the standards by which the police themselves 
should handle the resolution of complaints. 
The IOPC has published guidelines on when 
a matter must be referred to it by a police 
service.  These are contained in published 
statutory guidelines and reflect a similar 
human rights imperative for independent 
investigations as is highlighted in the Scottish 
review.  As well as requiring a police service 
to refer cases where a death or serious injury 
has occurred, the IOPC has also issued 
statutory guidance describing when a police 
service must refer other prescribed matters 
for notification.  The most recent guidance, 
in February 2020, includes an obligation 
to refer all cases of serious sexual offences 
and serious corruption, including abuse 
of position for a sexual purpose or for the 
purpose of pursuing an improper emotional 
relationship.  The guidance also includes 
criminal offences or behaviour liable to lead 
to misconduct proceedings, particularly 
if there are aggravating factors such as 
discrimination on the grounds of a person’s 
race, sex, religion or other status identified 
in the guidance.
During this inspection, the Inspectorate met 
with both the IOPC and senior police officers 
from police services in England.  There was 
consensus that the IOPC guidelines were 
helpful and had brought consistency and 
clarity to the circumstances in which referrals 
must be made for independent investigation. 
It is important to note that because of the 
complexities of some cases and the need 
for specialist skills not all referrals will 
lead to an independent investigation by the 
IOPC.  However, the fact that the IOPC has 
oversight of all relevant investigations was 
considered essential for maintaining public 
confidence.
Key Findings and Assessment
The Garda Síochána Ombudsman 
Commission is the independent statutory 
body responsible for oversight of complaints 
concerning garda conduct in the State.  The 
number of complaints is fairly consistent 
with approximately two thousand formal 
complaints each year, concerning more 
than five thousand separate allegations, 
with many complaints containing multiple 
allegations.  When a complaint is assessed by 
GSOC as admissible, and a decision is taken 
to open an investigation, it can be dealt with 
in the following ways.
 > Unsupervised discipline investigations 
are conducted by garda superintendents 
in line with the Garda Discipline 
Regulations.  In 2019, there were 405 
cases of this type.
 > Supervised discipline investigations 
are also conducted by garda 
superintendents but are supervised by 
GSOC investigators, who meet with 
the garda superintendents to agree an 
investigation plan.  In 2019, there were 
105 investigations of this type.
 > Non-criminal investigations which 
may involve discipline and/or systemic 
failings by the Garda Síochána.  These 
are considered serious enough to 
warrant an independent investigation. 




 > Criminal investigations, which are 
carried out by GSOC investigators in 
line with the usual rules of evidence 
and criminal procedures.  In 2019, there 
were 485 investigations of this type.
Beyond its responsibility for dealing with 
complaints, GSOC has additional statutory 
responsibility for dealing with certain 
obligations of the State under international 
law and in particular under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Article 2 of ECHR states that “everyone’s 
right to life must be protected by law” (ECHR, 
2013a).  In this regard, the European Court 
of Human Rights has interpreted Article 2 as 
containing a procedural obligation on states 
to carry out an independent investigation of 
a death following police contact.
This obligation is reflected in Irish law in 
Section 102(1) of the Garda Síochána Act 
2005, which obliges the Garda Commissioner 
to refer any matter concerning the conduct of 
a garda member that may have resulted in 
the death of, or serious harm to, a person to 
GSOC for investigation.  In addition, Section 
102(2) of the Act permits GSOC to investigate 
any matter that appears to indicate that the 
conduct of a member may have resulted 
in death or serious harm in circumstances 
where a referral was not made by the Garda 
Commissioner.  Serious harm is currently 
defined as meaning any injury which creates 
a substantial risk of death, causes serious 
disfigurement or causes substantial loss 
or impairment of mobility of the body as a 
whole or of the function of any particular 
bodily member or organ.  The statutory 
provisions provide for an independent 
investigation and in cases where a death 
follows police contact, GSOC fulfils the 
requirement for effective investigation under 
the ECHR.  The most common way for such 
investigations to be initiated is following a 
15  DSD v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2016] QB 161, [2015] EWCA Civ 646
referral by the Garda Commissioner, and in 
2019 GSOC opened 40 cases of this type.
The 2005 Act also allows GSOC to investigate 
matters in relation to the conduct of a garda 
member when it is in the public interest to do 
so, even if a complaint has not been received 
and opened.  In 2019, there were 44 cases of 
this type.
For a number of years, GSOC has raised 
concerns about the effectiveness of garda 
oversight and the definition of serious harm. 
Oversight legislation requires the referral 
of all cases involving serious harm for 
independent investigation by GSOC in line 
with the jurisprudence concerning Article 3 
of the ECHR.  However, the definition in the 
legislation does not specifically encompass 
sexual offences as a case of serious harm.  In 
2017, GSOC highlighted its role regarding 
the obligation on the State under Article 2 
concerning the death of persons in garda 
custody.  GSOC expressed the view that this 
obligation also extends to serious harm and 
that the definition of serious harm needs to 
be extended to include sexual offences.
Article 3 states simply that “No one shall be 
subject to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment” (ECHR, 2013b). 
There is now a well-established line of 
case law (most recently the case of DSD v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 201615) 
from the European Court of Human Rights 
concerning an obligation for independent 
investigation of allegations of torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment.  While the 
Court recognised that there is a distinction 
between torture and inhuman and degrading 
treatment in terms of a sliding scale of 
seriousness, a minimum threshold has not 
been established and it depends on the 
circumstances of the case.  The Court also 
held that the nature, scope and rigour of the 
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duty to investigate is identical for Articles 2 
and 3, particularly the requirements for an 
independent and transparent investigation 
in cases involving state actors.
In 2018, the Commission on the Future of 
Policing in Ireland published its report 
outlining a new vision for reforming policing. 
The first principle set out in the Commission’s 
report states that “Human Rights are the 
Foundation and Purpose of Policing.” This is 
accompanied by a recommendation that “An 
Garda Síochána should develop a comprehensive 
strategy for human rights compliance and 
promotion.” The Commission also made a 
number of key recommendations in relation 
to an independent body superseding GSOC 
that could impact on the investigation of 
corruption within the Garda Síochána. 
This includes a requirement for the Garda 
Síochána to refer a much wider range of 
incidents to the independent complaints 
body, and a recommendation that new 
legislation should make it explicit that the 
Garda Commissioner is empowered, in 
the public interest, to bring matters to the 
attention of the new body which in his or her 
opinion warrant investigation.
The Inspectorate believes that in order 
to satisfy the State’s obligations under 
international law to carry out independent 
investigations, at a minimum, referrals under 
Section 102(1) from the Garda Commissioner 
should extend to cases where a member of 
the garda workforce is suspected of sexual 
violence or APSG against a member of the 
public or another garda employee.
Recommendation
In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendation.
The Department of Justice should 
implement the necessary statutory 
framework, in line with the State’s 
obligations under the European 
Convention on Human Rights relating 
to effective independent investigation, to 
ensure that all instances of conduct linked 
to sexual violence or abuse of power for 
sexual gain arising from the actions of a 
member of the garda workforce acting in 
their professional capacity which  could 
result in a breach of an individual’s rights 
under Article 2 or 3 of the Convention are 








One of the main priorities of a Garda 
Síochána counter-corruption strategy 
should be to limit the inclination of its 
workforce to engage in corrupt behaviours. 
Critically, the Garda Síochána must prevent 
the normalisation of unethical behaviour. 
When such behaviour goes unchallenged 
for any length of time it will damage positive 
aspects of the organisation’s culture and 
dilute its values.  Prolonged tolerance of 
wrongdoing or an inadequate response to 
corrupt behaviour will undermine both 
public confidence in the Garda Síochána and 
the belief of the organisation’s workforce in 
procedural fairness.  In policing, corruption 
can result in multiple outcomes, including but 
not limited to sexual victimisation, financial 
losses, misuse of sensitive information and 
failed criminal prosecutions.
Both international and local experience has 
demonstrated that effective internal controls 
and compliance monitoring can identify 
unethical behaviours at an early stage and 
prevent them from evolving into systemic 
or critical failures that can undermine 
the integrity of the entire organisation. 
The development of internal systems and 
processes that will identify emerging 
corruption risks will therefore be a key 
function for the future Garda Síochána Anti-
Corruption Unit.
Identifying the Abuse of Power 
for Sexual Gain
As highlighted in Chapter 6, recent national 
strategic threat and risk assessments of 
corruption in the UK have identified Abuse 
of Power for Sexual Gain (APSG) as one of 
the more significant corruption risks for 
policing.
International case studies show that some 
victims may not realise that they have been 
manipulated into a sexual relationship. 
Instead they believe incorrectly that they 
are taking part in a consensual relationship, 
when in fact they have been unethically 
targeted because of a personal vulnerability 
identified through their contact with the 
police.
Based on international comparisons, 
incidents within the Garda Síochána are 
likely to be rare; however, without the 
necessary structures and intelligence systems 
in place it is difficult for the organisation to 
determine the scale of this unique threat and 
to devise effective control strategies.
International and Comparable 
Practice
The UK has developed a self-assessment 
tool for police services to assist them in 
assessing their preparedness to tackle 
APSG (Independent Police Complaints 
Commission, 2012).  In terms of intelligence, 
the assessment explores a number of areas, 
including if the police service: 
 > Has the capability to monitor usage 
of information systems by individual 
officers, apparently targeting particular 
vulnerable groups;
 > Maintains adequate procedures for 
reporting concerns by colleagues and 





 ● The perception of an officer as a ‘saviour’ or ‘hero figure’. This might manifest itself 
as gushing praise
 ● Victim has a ‘favourite officer’ or frequently requests a certain officer
 ● Unexpected visits / welfare checks by the officer
 ● Domestic abuse investigation is steered towards low level / quick resolution
 ● Physical contact
 ● Flirtatious behaviour
 ● Nicknames / pet names
 ● Unnecessary communication i.e.  through social media / phone / email
 ● Kisses on end of messages (‘x’) or other sexualised comments
 ● Contact or visits off duty
 ● Presents / gifts / letters
 ● Continued contact after an incident or case is concluded
 ● Victim will often not see that there is anything wrong with the relationship and how it 
started.
People who are particularly vulnerable to such abuse include those suffering mental ill
health, those with learning difficulties, juveniles, those who are drug or alcohol
dependent, victims of abuse and victims of an alarming or traumatic experience.
Figure 7.1 Police Service of Northern Ireland possible warning signs of abuse of position 
for sexual gain or emotional gain
Source: Police Service of Northern Ireland, Corporate Policy Service Instruction SI3217, Maintaining a Professional 
Boundary between Police and Members of the Public
 > Ensures outside individuals or 
agencies, such as social services and 
organisations from the voluntary 
sector, can easily report concerns about 
individual police officers; and
 > Has effective relationships with local 
voluntary sector organisations, such 
as women’s centres and those offering 
support to people living with mental 
illness or learning disability, or with 
substance misuse problems.
The ACUs engaged with by the Inspectorate 
ensure that these types of questions are fully 
addressed in their intelligence function and 
they use monitoring and auditing software 
specially attuned to detect inappropriate use 
of information systems.  This monitoring 
is  accompanied by briefings to supervisors 
to highlight behaviours that are deemed 
suspicious and workshops with relevant 
agencies and victim support groups to enable 
them to identify when police behaviours are 
indicative of an abuse of power.
Figure 7.1 shows possible warning signs of 
APSG used by the Police Service of Northern 




The wide publication of such warning signs 
is a key means of alerting supervisors, 
the workforce and the public to possible 
inappropriate relationships.  All of the 
ACUs visited by the Inspectorate that 
reported raising such awareness (internally 
and externally) and offering confidential 
reporting channels had uncovered cases that 
would otherwise have remained undetected. 
Importantly, as new corruption behaviours 
were identified and understood, the ACUs 
refreshed their intelligence focus and 
communication messages.
In this way, a police service must constantly 
seek out new sources of information and 
intelligence, engage with its own workforce 
and the wider public and be alert to the 
requirement to adapt or refocus.
Key Findings and Assessment
APSG is a particularly challenging form 
of corruption for the Garda Síochána 
to uncover.  It can begin when a victim 
or member of the public requests garda 
assistance, and the development of an 
inappropriate relationship can be masked 
within the subsequent police response.  In 
some cases, the person themselves may not 
recognise the abuse of power because they 
consider the relationship to be consensual.
This inspection has found that within the 
Garda Síochána there is no coordinated 
strategy to identify behaviours that might 
indicate cases of APSG.  This has resulted in 
gaps in the sources of intelligence on sexual 
misconduct that the Garda Síochána should 
be routinely accessing:
 > intelligence from members of the 
public and support organisations who 
are aware of inappropriate behaviours 
and who would report concerns 
confidentially;
 > intelligence from individuals within 
the Garda workforce who understand 
ethical boundaries and who have 
concerns about a colleague; and
 > intelligence from the proactive 
monitoring of ICT systems to identify 
employees who may be seeking to 
identify vulnerable persons through 
police information systems.
This inspection found that there are some 
strong inhibitors that may prevent victims 
from coming forward to report inappropriate 
relationships with a member of the garda 
workforce.  
In a written submission to the Inspectorate, 
the Dublin Rape Crisis Centre said that it:
“[d]oes not have statistics on whether 
investigating gardaí took advantage of those 
who contact us for support or assistance.
However, our staff highlighted that those 
who are going through the investigation 
process are overwhelmingly anxious not to 
annoy or upset the Garda.  They believe that 
any other approach could risk damaging the 
progress of their case.  Victims tend not to 
complain or if they complain to us, they do 
not want it to get back to the Gardaí.  This 
demonstrates the power imbalance between 
the victim of sexual offences and AGS.
Anecdotally, we hear from very vulnerable 
victims, such as those living in prostitution 
that they are liable to be asked for sexual 
favours.  We also hear that those who 
might be inclined to complain about the 
investigation might be at risk of prosecution 
for making a false complaint in a way that 
strikes them as malicious and personal.”
This inspection found that awareness of 
the risks of APSG and other inappropriate 
behaviour varied significantly across the 
Garda Síochána.  Many of the supervisors 
and staff interviewed expressed surprise 
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at the suggestion of the problem.  Others, 
however, were able to provide examples 
where colleagues had crossed professional 
boundaries with members of the public.  It 
was reported that responses to such actions 
ranged from unofficial interventions to 
criminal and discipline investigations. 
However, there was generally little awareness 
of precursor indicators of inappropriate 
behaviour or how to differentiate such 
behaviour from the actions of conscientious 
garda members who are trying to do their 
best for victims and vulnerable individuals.
This inspection also found a gap in 
confidential reporting systems for members 
of the public, external organisations and 
the garda workforce.  It is essential that 
the Garda Síochána develop mechanisms 
to facilitate the reporting of behaviour that 
causes people concern.  
There is also an absence of monitoring 
of garda ICT systems to identify misuse, 
particularly of those who are targeting 
vulnerable members of the community.  The 
use of police information by employees to 
identify individuals for sexual exploitation 
is an internationally recognised risk.  Those 
predisposed to commit APSG have used 
police ICT systems to seek out vulnerable 
individuals who have interacted with the 
police, often people who have contacted 
the police for help.  There is no simple 
definition of vulnerability but it can include 
victims of crime, asylum seekers, those with 
drug or alcohol addictions, people with a 
disability or those who are socially isolated. 
As such, the Garda Síochána should be 
proactively monitoring and auditing ICT 
systems to identify those who are trying to 
sexually exploit persons they have met in a 
professional capacity.
Recommendation
In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendation.
Internal Reports of Wrongdoing
The importance of providing staff with an 
opportunity to report wrongdoing is well 
understood internationally.  The OECD in 
its 2016 report on whistle-blower protection 
stated that:
“Whistle-blower protection is integral 
to fostering transparency, promoting 
integrity, and detecting misconduct.  Past 
cases demonstrate that corruption, fraud, 
and wrongdoing, as well as health and 
safety violations, are much more likely to 
occur in organisations that are closed and 
secretive.  In many cases, employees will be 
aware of the wrongdoing, but feel unable to 
say anything for fear of reprisals, concern 
about acting against the organisation’s 
culture, or lack of confidence that the 
matter will be taken seriously.  The negative 
implications of this are far-reaching for both 
organisations and society as a whole.”
Transparency International Ireland in its 
2017 Speak Up report acknowledges that 
whistle-blowing is one of the most effective 
The Garda Síochána should ensure that 
the Anti-Corruption Unit develop and 
implement an external and internal 
communications strategy on abuse of 
power for sexual gain to raise awareness 
and encourage reporting of suspicious 
behaviour.
Recommendation 28




ways of stopping wrongdoing.  The report 
highlights that many of the well-publicised 
cases of corruption, fraud and sexual abuse 
of children in Ireland have been exposed 
by colleagues who reported their concerns 
about other staff members to their employers, 
regulators or the media.
While one of the most important sources of 
intelligence relating to police corruption is 
knowledge within the workforce, creating a 
culture where staff feel comfortable to speak 
up and report wrongdoing is a challenge. 
This is frequently referred to as the ‘blue wall 
of silence’.
International and Comparable 
Practice
Internationally, police services use a variety 
of different systems to encourage the 
reporting of wrongdoing by members of 
staff.  The following are some good examples 
identified during this inspection:
 > In 2019, Police Scotland published 
up-to-date guidance on how to 
report concerns or to whistle‑blow. In 
February 2019, a contract was awarded 
to a company that will provide an 
independent whistle‑blowing advice 
line on behalf of Police Scotland.  Staff 
also have access to specific report 
forms.  Police Scotland’s publication 
of new whistle‑blowing guidance was 
accompanied by a communication 
programme and an e-learning package;
 > In England and Wales commercial 
organisations and the charity Crime 
Stoppers are contracted by police 
services to provide confidential 
anonymous reporting.  Subject to 
the consent of the person making the 
disclosure, reports are shared with a 
senior police officer as intelligence and 
a referral for contact is made to the 
ACU;
 > In South Yorkshire and Merseyside, 
the ACUs can receive confidential 
anonymous messages directly. 
Merseyside Police ACU uses a 
confidential reporting app which 
allows anonymous reports to be made 
from mobiles,  desktop computers and 
laptops; and
 > All reports received feed into the ACUs’ 
intelligence systems and the person 
making the report has the option to 
request direct contact.
Key Findings and Assessment
In Ireland, whistle-blowing is regulated 
by the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 
(hereafter referred to as ‘the Act’), which 
offers protection to workers who wish to 
draw attention to activity perceived as 
wrongdoing.  Employees of the Garda 
Síochána who wish to make a complaint 
about alleged wrongdoing in the service 
may make a protected disclosure under 
the Act.  Such disclosures may be made to 
the Garda Commissioner as employer, to 
GSOC as a designated body under the Act 
for disclosures within the Garda Síochána, or 
to the Minister for Justice as the responsible 
Minister.
The most up-to-date figures on protected 
disclosures made available to the 
Inspectorate show that within the Garda 
Síochána between January and December 
2018 a total of 29 disclosures were made 
under the Act.  Of those, two were made 
directly to the Garda Commissioner, 24 to 
GSOC and three to the Minister for Justice 
and Equality.  Under the Act, it is possible 
that the same individual could have made 
a protected disclosure to more than one of 
the possible recipients, and therefore there 
may be some duplication in the number of 
disclosures made.
Following a review of protected disclosures 
by the Policing Authority in 2016, the Garda 
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Síochána published a revised Protected 
Disclosures Policy.  This policy aims to 
encourage workers to feel confident and safe 
about raising concerns as well as providing 
avenues for workers to make disclosures. 
It also contains a commitment to protect 
workers from penalisation or any threat 
of retaliation for making a disclosure and 
provides an undertaking that any worker 
who makes a disclosure will be fully 
supported.  This policy makes it clear that 
each and every worker has the right and the 
responsibility to raise concerns, if necessary 
in confidence, and that they can be assured 
that those concerns will be listened to and 
addressed.
The Garda Síochána has committed through 
this policy to providing a mechanism 
for reporting wrongdoing in confidence, 
protecting the identity of those who wish 
to make a disclosure, and investigating the 
alleged wrongdoing.  Additionally, the Garda 
Síochána has committed to protecting those 
who report wrongdoing from penalisation 
for having made a disclosure.  The policy 
also outlines that there will be appropriately 
trained Protected Disclosure Managers, who 
will oversee all matters related to protected 
disclosures.
In the Garda Síochána, protected disclosures 
are managed internally by Legal Services. 
Three confidential recipients have been 
appointed, a male and a female chief 
superintendent as well as a female principal 
officer.  The Inspectorate searched for ways to 
contact confidential recipients via the Garda 
Portal, the primary online channel for internal 
communication within the organisation. This 
search revealed an outdated list of recipients 
who were retired, had been promoted or 
were no longer involved in the process.  Such 
an omission would not inspire confidence in 
staff seeking to make a disclosure.
As part of this inspection, the Inspectorate 
conducted a number of focus groups with 
the garda workforce to test understanding 
of and confidence in the protected disclosure 
process.  This established that there is poor 
understanding of the process and people 
said that they had little confidence in it.  It 
was frequently highlighted that the Garda 
Síochána is “too small an organisation to 
protect anonymity” and that your identity 
would be uncovered if you made a disclosure. 
However, individuals who had made a 
protected disclosure were complimentary 
about the professionalism of the confidential 
recipients and the support they had received 
at the highest levels of the Garda Síochána.  
During 2017, the Garda Síochána recognised 
the risk that an ineffective protected 
disclosures process could have on the 
reputation of the organisation and included 
it in its corporate risk register as an area 
of high risk.  While organisational culture 
and lack of staff awareness were included 
as causes of the risk, there was no record of 
any action plan to improve confidence in the 
protected disclosure process.
The Disclosures Tribunals arose out of a 
recommendation that a Commission of 
Investigation be established to ascertain the 
truth or falsity of allegations made in two 
protected disclosures.  In the subsequent 
tribunal’s Third Interim Report, published 
11 October 2018, a number of findings and 
recommendations were made by Mr Justice 
Peter Charleton including a clear call for 
those inside the organisation to place their 
public duties before misguided loyalties 
when he stated that they should:
“Treat their obligation to the public as 
superior to any false sense that individual 
policemen and policewomen should stick 
up for each other.  This obligation applies 
to the organisation as a whole.  An Garda 
Síochána must become a place where 
incompetence is not covered up, where 
laziness is called to account and where 
people respect their senior officers.”
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In 2016, Transparency International Ireland 
launched its Integrity at Work (IAW) 
programme, which now operates widely 
across the justice sector.  The aim of the 
programme is to create cultural change 
by promoting a supportive environment 
for workers to report wrongdoing.  This is 
achieved through training, best practice 
exchange, online resources and specialist 
guidance for those seeking advice on making 
a protected disclosure.
To participate in the programme an 
organisation is required to sign the IAW 
Pledge.  In doing so the organisation: 
“… recognises the importance of developing 
an ethical workplace and the valuable 
contribution of those who raise concerns 
about wrongdoing. We commit to not 
penalising, or permitting penalisation 
against, a worker who reports risks or 
incidents of wrongdoing and to responding 
to or acting upon those concerns.”
The Pledge includes a number of 
commitments by the organisation including:
 > Promoting the reporting of wrongdoing 
or the risk of harm to a responsible 
person inside the organisation or to 
external bodies as appropriate;
 > Ensuring that managers and responsible 
persons are aware of the organisation’s 
commitments under the Pledge and 
related policies and procedures, and 
are adequately trained to handle a 
report; and
 > Publicising the commitment to the 
Integrity at Work programme with 
their workers and other relevant 
stakeholders.
Membership of the programme provides 
organisations with a suite of tools to help 
them.  Importantly, this includes access for 
their workforce to free specialist legal advice 
through the Speak Up Helpline and the 
Transparency Legal Advice Centre.
While the pledge and an IAW membership 
agreement were jointly signed by the 
Garda Commissioner and Transparency 
International Ireland on 4 October 2017, 
this inspection found limited awareness 
of the IAW programme at all levels of the 
organisation.  For example, during visits, no 
posters promoting IAW or the Pledge were 
on display and the Inspectorate was unable 
to find any references on the Garda Portal. 
On the garda Corporate Risk Register, 
professional conduct and ethical behaviour 
are included as high-risk areas.  While an 
action plan was created in 2017 to mitigate 
this risk by promoting the IAW programme, 
there are no details about how this was to be 
achieved and no progress is recorded in the 
risk register.
Although, the Garda Síochána currently 
has no anonymous telephone lines or 
email facilities for the garda workforce to 
anonymously report concerns, there is a 
plan to address this gap.  This will include 
the creation of a Gateway Unit within 
the ACU which will assess and triage 
information received from an ‘integrity’ line, 
internal calls, emails and locally generated 
reports.  While the plan also includes a 
communication strategy to raise awareness 
of integrity issues with internal and external 
stakeholders, there is no specific strategy for 
promoting protected disclosures and there is 





In light of these findings, assessments 
and  review of international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendations.
Monitoring Ethical Declarations 
As previously highlighted, this inspection 
has found a significant deficit in ethical, 
integrity and counter-corruption policies in 
the Garda Síochána.  The provision of clear 
and transparent guidance to staff means 
there can be no confusion surrounding what 
standards and behaviours the organisation 
considers acceptable, and lets the public 
know what they should expect from their 
police service.  Making ethical declarations 
in line with organisational policies is an 
important affirmation by the workforce of 
their acceptance of and compliance with their 
duty to demonstrate impartiality.  
Just as important however is the police 
service’s responsibility to independently 
and proactively review ethical declarations 
in order to identify and manage potential 
conflicts of interest that can arise through 
relationships, financial and business 
activities, secondary interests or spare-time 
activities.
Such declarations are a vital source of 
information that can be used to help develop 
reports of wrongdoing or intelligence leads. 
The absence of an appropriate declaration 
can also be an early indicator of unethical 
standards.  
Having a single body responsible for 
monitoring ethical declarations by collating, 
analysing and challenging them is therefore 
an essential tactic for identifying corruption.
International and Comparable 
Practice
The Standards in Public Office Commission 
(undated) in Ireland has published a guide 
to best practice for ethical compliance.  The 
guide lists ‘Ten Actions Bodies May Take to 
Support Compliance’.  The following are the 
recommended best practice actions which 
are of direct relevance to the Garda Síochána:
The Garda Síochána should develop, 
publish and implement a strategy to 
encourage the reporting of wrongdoing. 
This includes using and promoting: 
• Protected Disclosures.
• The Integrity at Work Programme.




The Garda Síochána should ensure that 
the Anti-Corruption Unit has visibility 
of all reports of wrongdoing including 
garda-managed protected disclosures 
to ensure a holistic understanding of the 





 > Clear oversight procedures should be 
established;
 > Disclosures should be effectively 
reviewed to identify possible non-
compliance or conflict of interest risks;
 > The person to whom statements are 
submitted should review them to 
determine if there is evidence of non-
compliance or a risk of a conflict of 
interest;
 > Statements should be cross-checked 
against previous returns under the 
Ethics Acts, returns made under 
legislation, and other relevant 
information; and
 > Conflicts of interest should be managed 
proactively.
In its national overview entitled Police 
legitimacy 2016, HMICFRS identified some 
of the common policies that police services 
can use to enhance professional integrity 
and reduce the inclination of their workforce 
to act corruptly.  In particular, the report 
stressed that:
“Monitoring and assessing adherence 
to policies to prevent corruption is an 
important way to identify potential threats 
to force integrity.  Police officers and staff 
wanting to take on secondary employment 
or other types of business interest (e.g.  buy-
to-let properties) must have this approved 
by the force in advance.  The force must be 
satisfied that the interest will not threaten 
the integrity of either the individual or the 
force”.
In the UK National Crime Agency and 
South Yorkshire and Merseyside Police 
Services, responsibility for monitoring 
ethical, integrity and counter-corruption 
policies, including those mandatory ethical 
declarations, is a key functions of the ACU. 
This is primarily because these policies form 
an important part of the control strategy to 
reduce the risks from the threats identified 
in their organisational Strategic Threat and 
Risk Assessment.  This also provides some 
flexibility to vary policies to respond to 
changing threats.  The information contained 
within such declarations, or the absence 
of a declaration in certain circumstances, 
provides a valuable source of intelligence 
that could lead to the identification of 
corrupt behaviour or other matters that 
threaten the integrity of the police service 
itself.  For example, if a police officer declares 
an association with a convicted criminal, 
their use of police information systems can 
be proactively monitored to ensure there 
is no inappropriate disclosure of sensitive 
information.  In addition, the police officer’s 
role can be reviewed to check for any 
potential conflict of interest or their vetting 
reviewed to ensure that their current role 
remains appropriate.
All of the ACUs visited by the Inspectorate 
have the important role of overseeing all 
relevant registers, policies and declarations 
in connection with professional boundaries; 
notifiable associations; business and 
secondary interests; post-employment 
activity; conflict of interest; gifts, gratuities 
and sponsorship, and substance misuse and 
vetting.
Key Findings and Assessment
As discussed previously, there is currently 
a deficit of counter-corruption policies in 
the Garda Síochána prescribing key ethical 
declarations.  The absence of policies 
relating to conflict of interest, professional 
boundaries and notifiable associations is a 
gap in the Garda Síochána’s ability to probe 
the integrity of its workforce and confirm 
adherence to professional standards and 
behaviours.  This is further exacerbated by 
the limited adherence to important policies 
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which are already in place, such as the gifts, 
hospitality and sponsorship policy.  Ethical 
declarations enrich intelligence and help to 
better identify corruption risks.
This inspection found that even where 
mandatory ethical declarations were in 
place, such as the Standards in Public 
Office, Prohibited Spare-Time Activity and 
Conflicts of Interest for Selection Processes 
declarations, they are not reviewed at 
an organisational level.  At present, no 
responsibility is assigned for cross-checking 
declarations and other information held 
to identify issues of non-compliance, 
potential conflicts of interest or threats to an 
individual’s integrity.  As such, there is an 
absence of strategic triangulation of risk in 
order to identify potential ethical or integrity 
failures.
The Garda Síochána informed the 
Inspectorate that the proposed counter-
corruption strategy will recognise the 
importance of policies that address the threat 
of corruption.  A number of policy gaps 
highlighted in this report are already the 
subject of policy development.  This includes 
policies relating to substance misuse, 
business interests, professional boundaries, 
notifiable associations and conflicts of 
interest.  While the ACU will lead on the 
development of these policies and retain 
responsibility for their implementation, there 
is no current intention to assign responsibility 
to the ACU for reviewing and challenging 
ethical declarations, conflicts of interest or 
non-cooperation.
Recommendation
In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendation.
The Garda Síochána should assign 
responsibility to the Anti-Corruption Unit 
for monitoring all counter-corruption 
polices and registers, including those 
containing ethical declarations.  This 
should include:
• Gifts, Hospitality and Sponsorship.
• Notifiable Associations.
• Conflicts of Interest.
• Business Interests and Secondary 
Employment.




Part V looks at the support processes that need 
to be in place for the garda workforce across a 
range of personal and organisational factors that 
make individuals susceptible to being corrupted.  
It also develops the theme of how organisational 
learning, particularly the lessons learned from threat 
assessments and criminal or discipline investigations, 
can build greater resilience in the Garda Síochána.  
V
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Chapter 8
Organisational Support, Intervention and
Learning
Overview
In common with any policing organisation 
it is extremely rare, although not impossible, 
for someone with corrupt intentions to join 
the Garda Síochána. It is far more likely 
that external or personal factors for existing 
staff such as debt, substance addiction 
or inappropriate associations, or internal 
factors such as weak supervision or a 
permissive culture, leave members of the 
Garda Síochána susceptible to corruption. 
This may be because of a culture where the 
garda workforce believe their behaviour is 
condoned by the organisation or by their 
peers, or because they fail to recognise 
the harm their behaviour causes to them 
personally or to the organisation.  Invariably 
such a situation will slowly erode the ethical 
standards in the Garda Síochána and create 
the kinds of vulnerability that corruptors will 
seek to exploit to their own advantage.
No police service can rely solely on 
the identification and investigation of 
individual corruption cases as the principal 
strategy for countering corruption.  Such 
an isolated approach will deal only with a 
relatively small number of cases and will not 
significantly impact on the wider and long-
term health of the organisation.  As such, 
the approach must be more strategic and 
preventative in nature, and responsive to 
emerging threats.  The Garda Síochána, like 
other law enforcement organisations, needs 
to prevent staff slipping into corruption by 
tackling underlying environmental causal 
factors such as personal vulnerability, 
unethical cultures and organisational 
blindness.
The police response to external corruption 
threats must be as adroit as those who seek 
to exploit organisational vulnerabilities using 
new technologies or adapting to emerging 
opportunities.  Police leaders, investigators 
and other members of the workforce all 
need to be alert to the changing nature 
of  corruption threats, including activity 
indicative of corruption, and to the ultimate 
consequences of such threats.  
Support and Intervention
In international literature, several factors 
have been identified as having the potential 
to affect people’s behaviour and put 
organisational integrity at risk.
 > Inappropriate relationships: This 
covers a broad range of relationships, 
including friends or family with links 
to crime, associations through social 
settings such as pubs or gyms, and 
contacts with journalists or private 
investigators.  Relationships can also 
occur online, for example, through 
membership of social media groups 
whose values may be incompatible 
with those in policing.
 > Personal vulnerability:  These 
are circumstances that weaken an 
individual’s resilience and can result in 
a corruptor gaining an advantage.  This 
can arise through unmanageable debt, 
alcohol misuse or domestic instability.
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 > Behavioural vulnerability: This arises 
when an individual secretly engages in 
an activity which, if exposed, could have 
significant adverse implications for 
them.  Unlike personal vulnerabilities, 
it is the threat of compromise that 
creates the opportunity to corrupt.  This 
could include their use of illegal drugs, 
sex workers or child pornography.
 > Workplace disengagement: Loyalty 
to the organisation and acceptance of 
its ethical standards is a key inhibitor 
of unethical behaviour.  In contrast, 
those who feel they have been 
treated poorly by their employer are 
more inclined to rationalise corrupt 
behaviour.  Disengagement can be 
observed through sickness patterns, 
poor performance, public complaints 
or internal discipline.
The emergence of any of these factors does not 
automatically imply that a person is corrupt; 
however, it does indicate a raised risk that a 
person could become compromised.  This is 
even more the case where multiple factors 
are present.  For example, an individual 
with unmanageable debt who associates 
with members of an organised crime gang 
socially is at greater risk than someone who 
frequents a gym used by criminals but who 
has no exploitable weakness.  However, 
for members of the police workforce with 
roles that are of particular interest to 
criminals, such as intelligence, procurement 
or border controls, this level of risk may be 
unacceptable.
While effective and transparent policies and 
guidelines are important mitigating factors, 
they must be underpinned by welfare, early 
intervention and support programmes.  This 
safeguards vulnerable individuals, prevents 
them from becoming corrupted, and helps 
them to remain as valuable members of the 
workforce.
International and Comparable 
Practice
In the UK, national guidance to police 
services recognises the importance of 
welfare arrangements for preventing a 
personal vulnerability from developing into 
a corruption risk.
The South Yorkshire Police Intervention 
and Support Programme was developed 
to identify members of the workforce who 
exhibit common precursors to corrupt 
behaviour.  The intention of the programme 
is to identify emerging risks, and to provide 
appropriate interventions and support to 
minimise those risks.  This safeguards both 
the individual member of staff and the 
organisation.  The Professional Standards 
Department is responsible for managing the 
programme and determining the level of 
potential risk.  Interventions are tiered based 
on an assessment of the risk posed, and can 
range from monitoring and interviewing 
individuals and agreeing action plans, to 
formal discipline or criminal investigations. 
The Anti-Corruption Unit has also developed 
a welfare programme that supports members 
of the workforce who are under investigation 
or who have become victims of or witnesses 
to police wrongdoing.
The United States National Police 
Foundation (NPF) is a research organisation 
which supports policing through innovation 
and research and promotes the use of 
early intervention systems (EIS) by law 
enforcement agencies.  Such systems 
allow police services to identify possible 
behavioural and performance issues among 
individuals or groups within police units 
or departments.  These include excessive 
or aggressive use of force, excessive sick 
leave or absenteeism, off-duty employment, 
external and internal complaints or failure 
to appear in court.  The NPF (2019) has 
found that with early identification, police 
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management can help to reduce misconduct 
or under-performance issues.
Key Findings and Assessment
Within the Garda Síochána, there is currently 
no counter-corruption strategy focused on 
reducing risk through intervention and 
support programmes.  The department 
principally responsible for helping with 
workforce welfare is the Employee 
Assistance Service (EAS).  The EAS consists 
of a superintendent, a sergeant and a higher 
executive officer in Dublin and 14 welfare 
officers distributed nationally.  Two of 
the welfare officers are garda staff and the 
remainder are sworn members.  The welfare 
officers are loosely aligned to garda divisions 
but there is some variation to allow for easier 
access and reduced travel.  The service is 
supported by a peer-to-peer support network 
and is well regarded by members of the 
workforce who met with the Inspectorate 
during this inspection.
During interviews with staff in the EAS, the 
Inspectorate was informed that members of 
the garda workforce who self-refer because 
of alcohol addiction can be facilitated with 
a support programme.  This is a 28-day 
residential programme followed by two 
years of aftercare supports funded by private 
medical insurance.  A senior line manager is 
informed of the individual’s involvement in 
the programme.
There is a low instance of self-referral for 
illegal substance misuse and the EAS believes 
that the garda workforce know that most of 
the welfare officers are garda members and 
as such may well feel compelled to report 
this as a crime.  While there is no supported 
programme for the use of illegal substances, 
there are programmes for individuals who 
are addicted to prescription drugs.
During this inspection, the issues of 
unmanageable debts and gambling 
addictions were regularly raised as 
significant welfare concerns.  The EAS can 
refer a member of the garda workforce to 
Gambling Anonymous, which has a support 
programme, or the Garda Benevolent 
Society, which has a financial adviser who 
can help with debt management.  Despite 
available support for debt management, the 
Inspectorate was informed that members of 
the workforce often delay seeking assistance 
until they are on the brink of losing assets to 
creditors.
The EAS is planning wellness information 
days in each garda district.  Apart from 
providing general health advice, the wellness 
days will involve briefing and training 
sessions to raise awareness of the warning 
signs of vulnerability to corruption, the 
support that is available, and other wellbeing 
options such as nutrition and health advice.
The EAS fulfils a valuable support function 
and its future activities and wellness 
programmes for all staff should be viewed 
as an essential element in an overall 
counter-corruption strategy and should 
be informed by strategic understanding of 
ongoing corruption risks.  The proposed 
district wellness information days should 
be extended to all departments in the Garda 
Síochána.
The Garda Síochána provides additional 
support through the Inspire Counselling 
Service, which provides a 24/7 service with 
access to trained counsellors.  Each member 
of the workforce can also receive up to eight 
personal sessions with a counsellor, with 
additional sessions authorised by the Chief 
Medical Officer.
Working in areas such as in the investigation 
of sexual offences or child abuse can 
significantly impact on the welfare of 
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individual staff members.  Some police 
services have seen an increased frequency of 
sexually motivated misconduct among staff 
who are involved in investigating sexual 
crime and this represents an additional risk 
factor for appointment to such positions. 
The Garda Síochána is in the process of 
developing a policy to address the impact 
on those who are dealing with these types 
of offences.  The proposed policy is solely 
focused on members of the Garda National 
Protective Services Unit and the Garda 
National Cyber Crime Bureau, and does 
not include those working in Divisional 
Protective Services Units.  This policy will 
make it mandatory for garda members and 
staff newly appointed to such units to be 
psychologically assessed for their suitability 
for such work.  It would also provide for 
follow-up assessments in each quarter of 
the first year.  All other staff will receive two 
mandatory annual assessments and have 
access to 12 voluntary counselling sessions. 
When staff leave these units there will be 
an exit interview and three subsequent 
counselling sessions.  If implemented, this 
will be an important welfare and support 
programme and could help to identify 
important organisational learning.
The organisation’s ability to identify and 
support those members of the workforce 
who may be vulnerable to the corrupting 
influence of external actors would be 
enhanced by the conducting of comparative 
analysis of data on sickness, complaints 
or internal disciplinary issues with other 
information and intelligence.
Recommendation
In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 




A police service’s ability to learn from its 
own mistakes and the experiences of others 
is an extremely important aspect of how it 
continues to promote public confidence and 
trust.  Continuous improvement requires 
a strong commitment to learning.  In the 
absence of new learning, a police service 
and individuals within it simply repeat old 
established patterns.
Understanding how the threats posed by 
criminal corruptors change and evolve 
also provides an important opportunity for 
organisational learning.  There is a well-
established link between organised crime 
and corruption.  Due to their role, the 
police are directly exposed to serious and 
organised crime and as a result are often 
targets for those seeking to influence or 
corrupt members of the police workforce. 
This threat adapts to the ‘business models’ of 
serious and organised crime groups, which 
evolve to take account of new markets for 
criminal commodities and vulnerabilities in 
law enforcement agencies.
The 2017 EU Serious and Organised Crime 
Threat Assessment pointed out that drug 
markets were the largest criminal markets in 
the EU with more than one-third of criminal 
groups actively involved in the production, 
The Garda Síochána should develop, 
publish and implement a structured early 
intervention and support programme 
with the objective of identifying and 
supporting members of the workforce 
who may be vulnerable to corruption.
Recommendation 32
Support and Intervention
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trafficking or distribution of illicit drugs. 
The organised crime groups involved in 
this market rely heavily on corruption, 
particularly in relation to border controls, to 
facilitate their activities.
A recent UK National Strategic Assessment 
by the National Crime Agency (2020) also 
pointed to the problem of corruption at the 
UK border, with information being a highly 
valuable commodity for organised crime 
groups.  The assessment also highlighted 
how corruption is increasingly facilitated 
through online services.  In particular, it is 
managed through the use of cryptocurrencies 
and alternative banking platforms, which 
allow crime groups to conceal the transfer of 
funds.  The use of such techniques makes it 
more difficult to detect financial flows and to 
identify corruption.  
These examples illustrate the ever-changing 
threat of corruption from serious and 
organised crime groups and the critical 
importance of capturing organisational 
learning to help law enforcement agencies 
adapt to emerging methods and targets of 
these groups.  
In policing, it is important to value 
knowledge in order to absorb it and put it 
to effective use.  It is also critical to create 
an environment where new ideas can be 
expressed freely.  Capturing learning should 
be refocused as a bottom-up process, but 
in particular police managers and leaders 
must be open to new ideas and perspectives. 
Finally, learning needs to become business as 
usual and not seen as a special task.
International and Comparable 
Practice
The use of risk or threat assessments to 
identify learning opportunities has emerged 
as a significant issue during the fifth round 
of evaluations by GRECO, particularly the 
strand focused on law enforcement.  
In Estonia, the GRECO evaluation team 
recognised as a particular strength how the 
authorities combined their risk and threat 
assessment with targeted awareness-raising 
and training activities.  This was highlighted 
as a particularly good example of proactive 
internal communication policies (2018a). 
In Sweden, the evaluators noted that the 
threat and risk assessment had identified 
the danger of organisational blindness 
within law enforcement, in terms of a lack of 
awareness of the various forms of corruption, 
as a potential risk (2019).
Regular strategic corruption threat or risk 
assessments provide valuable opportunities 
for state institutions to learn from cross-
agency experiences, to raise awareness 
and to focus attention on emerging and 
significant risks.  In their 2015 Integrity 
Matters report, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate 
of Constabulary & Fire and Rescue Services 
noted the importance of police organisations 
learning the lessons of investigations into 
police complaints and misconduct.  The 
report highlighted that the majority of 
police services collated the lessons they had 
learned, either from their own experience in 
dealing with corruption or the experience 
of other police services or criminal justice 
agencies, and regularly circulated those 
lessons to staff.  
The joint UN Office of Drug Control and 
International Olympic Council report 
Reporting Mechanisms in Sport highlighted 
how looking for patterns in old or closed 
cases can be an important learning tool for 
organisations.  This also extended to cases 
where investigators failed to establish 
wrongdoing.  In particular, such an approach 
can prevent wrongdoing by alerting persons 
in authority to the need for change in an 
organisation’s policies or rules.  It can also 
help to improve reporting mechanisms and 
raise awareness about different types of 
wrongdoing.
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The Independent Office for Police Conduct 
(IOPC) in England and Wales issues statutory 
guidance to every police service in relation 
to the operation of the police complaints 
system.  The most recent 2020 guidance 
places a strong emphasis on how reflecting 
on the evidence from complaints and other 
incidents can be used to drive improvements 
in policing.  Specifically they state:
A service that values learning: 
 > Embraces a culture of continuous 
improvement and reflection, actively 
looking for opportunities to develop 
and improve practice before a 
weakness, failing or gap is identified;
 > Encourages innovation, and is open to 
exploring new and different ways of 
working;
 > Learns from experience, retains a 
corporate memory of what worked and 
what did not, is open to learning from 
others and shares their experience with 
others; and
 > Identifies and shares best practice, 
actively seeks feedback from service 
users and staff at all levels to help 
improve practice, and tells people how 
their input was used.
To complement their guidance, the IOPC 
has published a comprehensive learning 
strategy to improve policing by identifying 
and sharing learning from their work.  The 
IOPC views the police complaints system as 
essential to support a culture of learning and 
continuous improvement in policing.  Since 
2007, the IOPC has regularly published its 
Learning the Lessons magazine in partnership 
with several policing-related agencies and 
organisations, including the UK College of 
Policing, HMICFRS, Home Office, National 
Police Chiefs Council, Police Federation and 
Police Superintendents Association.  Each 
edition includes a series of short anonymised 
case studies from IOPC investigations 
designed to support learning for policy 
makers, police managers and police officers 
and staff.  These frequently touch on themes 
relevant to counter corruption, including 
abuse of position, professional boundaries, 
conflict of interest and neglect of duty.  The 
IOPC also publishes a detailed report to 
accompany each case study which examines 
the circumstances and issues in greater 
depth.  As such, lessons learned can be 
widely disseminated among policy makers 
and within a police service to increase 
understanding of the corruption risk and 
associated policies to prevent it.
Key Findings and Assessment
As highlighted in Chapter 1, the Garda 
Síochána has not conducted a Strategic 
Assessment of corruption.  
This inspection has also found very little 
evidence that the Garda Síochána has 
effective practices, processes and procedures 
in place to capture learning in order to 
prevent and detect cases of corruption.  It 
is also the case that lessons learned from 
dealing with corruption cases or from the 
experience of others is not distilled and 
communicated to the wider garda workforce.
The Garda Síochána Ombudsman 
Commission has published 14 annual reports 
since it was first established in 2007.  While 
these reports contain detailed information 
about Garda complaints they also detail 
anonymised case studies from GSOC 
investigations.  These provide a valuable 
resource for raising awareness among 
garda supervisors and the workforce about 
integrity related issues.  
The Garda Síochána Act 2005 also permits 
GSOC to make systemic recommendations to 
the Garda Commissioner concerning Garda 
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policy, practices and procedures.  GSOC’s 
2019 Annual Report highlighted that: 
“GSOC investigators sometimes encounter 
practices or issues during the course of 
their investigations which GSOC believes 
need to be brought to the attention of 
Garda management.  The practices or 
issues outlined here relate to systemic 
or management issues rather than to the 
behaviour of individuals.  The Ombudsman 
Commission believes that highlighting 
systemic or management issues when they 
arise, and making recommendations to 
avoid the recurrence of similar incidents, 
is an important element of oversight.”
In the context of counter corruption a 
particularly relevant investigation related 
to the planning, management and record-
keeping of Garda Operations.  In that 
case, GSOC recommended that the Garda 
Síochána issue a standardised search log 
and instruction requiring garda members to 
document every search in a comprehensive 
and consistent way.  As discussed previously 
in this report there is still an inherent 
vulnerability in current garda practice 
regarding the lack of a contemporaneous 
record of property seized during a search.  A 
willingness to be open to learning from this 
type of investigation could have reduced this 
vulnerability.
During the course of this inspection, the 
Inspectorate identified that there was no 
formal or structured process for capturing 
learning opportunities from outside the 
Garda Síochána.  Such a process would 
provide a valuable opportunity to improve 
service delivery and reduce vulnerabilities 
within the organisation.  This contrasts starkly 
with the situation in other jurisdictions 
where the value of learning from the police 
complaints bodies is recognised as being 
essential to improving policing and where 
agencies collaborate in mutual learning.  
The value for the Garda Síochána of learning 
lessons from local or national corruption or 
wrongdoing cases cannot be overestimated. 
For example, conducting formal debriefs 
following investigations of misconduct 
or complaints would help to identify the 
factors which leave the Garda Síochána 
and individuals vulnerable to influence or 
corruption.
In identifying learning, the Garda 
Síochána should formally debrief its 
own investigations, take into account the 
outcomes of GSOC investigations and 
consider findings by other regulatory bodies 
such as the Office of the Data Protection 
Commissioner.
Recommendation
In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendation.
The Garda Síochána should conduct 
formal reviews of cases of corruption 
and serious wrongdoing to understand 
those factors that can lead to a corruption 
risk and develop appropriate strategies 
to prevent a recurrence.
Recommendation 33
Capturing Organisational Learning




Communicating organisational learning 
across a police service benefits counter-
corruption efforts and enhances resilience by 
allowing policy, procedures and supervision 
to be strengthened where heightened 
corruption activity affects a particular area or 
function.  The commitment to learning from 
past mistakes emphasises the value a police 
service places on serving the needs of the 
public.  Communicating learning provides a 
vital platform for clearly and unambiguously 
informing the workforce of what behaviours 
create a risk of corruption and emphasising 
that they will not be tolerated.  This can 
eliminate misunderstanding or naivety, raise 
awareness of the consequences of unethical 
behaviours and encourage internal reports 
of wrongdoing within the police workforce.
International and Comparable 
Practice
Police services in Scotland, South Yorkshire, 
Northern Ireland and Merseyside 
use multiple mechanisms to ensure 
organisational learning is cascaded.   This 
includes the delivery of workshops led 
by ACUs focused on identified counter-
corruption risks and the use of anonymised 
real-life cases studies to highlight corruption 
risks.  These are presented to new members 
of the workforce and to participants in 
courses for promotion or for specialist roles. 
The workshops raise awareness of important 
issues among supervisors, inexperienced 
workers or those in specialist roles that may 
be more vulnerable to corruption.
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 
in Scotland (HMICS) in its Counter Corruption 
Unit Assurance Review (2016) described 
the aim of the Police Scotland integrity 
programme as being to: 
“… work in partnership with Divisions/
Departments and staff to identify and 
mitigate known and emerging risks that 
can lead to the compromise of individual 
and organisational integrity.”
The programme focuses on preventing 
opportunities for corruption by helping the 
workforce to understand their individual 
responsibilities in respect of:
 > Notifiable associations;
 > Data protection;
 > Online presence;
 > Abuse of power/predatory sexual 
behaviour;
 > Gifts, gratuities, hospitality and 
sponsorship; and
 > Secondary employment or business 
interests.
The HMICS review concluded that those 
who participated in the programme had a 
better awareness of the potential areas of 
vulnerability that exist for individuals and 
the organisation as a whole.
Beyond the classroom environment, 
Police Scotland uses e-learning to deliver 
corruption-prevention courses and 
Merseyside Police uses 60-second video 
presentations or structured presentations 
such as the 7@7 initiative, which delivers 
important messages to staff when they are 
briefed for duty at 7am and 7pm.  
Due to the sensitive nature of some 
information that arises from ongoing 
disciplinary or criminal investigations, 
the Head of the Professional Standards 
Department in South Yorkshire holds regular 
meetings with nominated service champions, 
from every department.  Champions receive 
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a briefing regarding the current trends 
and risks relating to corruption.  These can 
range from organisational-level issues such 
as ICT security to local concerns such as a 
high incidence of use of force in a specific 
team.  Champions can use this information 
to monitor local activity and ensure that 
internal control systems are resilient.
Effective communication of the outcomes of 
positive substance misuse tests, discipline 
investigations and criminal cases can create 
a valuable opportunity for any police 
service to learn from past mistakes.  The 
visible consequences of failures to adhere 
to the expected professional standards can 
reinforce the ethical commitment of the police 
service to the workforce and the public.  It is 
common practice for UK police services to 
publish discipline findings internally, and 
in the case of gross misconduct, on their 
external web sites.  Figure 8.1 provides an 















Courtesy   
 
 
An allegation was made that a member 
of staff had produced a badge/card and 
instructed a driver to pull over, before 
informing the driver that they were an off-
duty police officer and gave them a 
warning for dangerous driving 
An independent Chief Inspector 
found the case to be proven and the 
outcome was a Written Warning. 
Public Complaint 
February 










An officer was found to have entered the 
property store on a number of occasions 
and removed items from the destruction 
bin, stating that he had intended to use 
the items for training purposes, although 
no recent training had occurred.  In 
addition, after the officer was suspended 
he returned to the police station, despite 
knowing that his suspension expressly 
forbid this.  
The panel, chaired by a legally 
qualified chair, decided that both 
aspects of the conduct were proven, 
that there was no policing purpose 
to remove the items on three 
occasions and that this amounted to 
gross misconduct.  The officer was 
















Integrity   
A member of staff was accused of 
removing Xbox games from an address, 
following which they took them to their 
own home address.  The items did not 
belong to the staff member and they 
were taken to their home address 
without a legitimate policing purpose 
and with the intention of keeping them.   
The staff member failed to record the 
recovery of the Xbox Games and failed 




The member of staff resigned the day 
before the misconduct hearing.    
A Misconduct Panel found the 
matters were proven and amounted 
to Gross Misconduct and that the 
staff member would have been 
dismissed if still serving.   
 
The staff member has been placed 
on the Barred List with the College 
of Police. 
Internal Conduct 
   
Figure 8.1 Extract from South Yorkshire Police Published Misconduct Outcomes 2020
Source: Information from the South Yorkshire Police website
This highly visible record of gross 
misconduct outcomes means that everyone 
in the relevant police service has a clear 
understanding of the organisation’s 
commitment to ethical behaviour and the 
likely serious consequences of failure to 
adhere to these standards.
Key Findings and Assessment
This inspection found that there is currently 
no structured process within the Garda 
Síochána for communicating organisational 
learning linked to counter-corruption cases 
or serious wrongdoing.  This creates a risk 
that individual members will continue to 
repeat mistakes and the Garda Síochána 
will react too slowly to emerging threats. 
Specifically the Inspectorate found:
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 > No department  had speci f ic 
responsibility for analysing completed 
discipline and criminal investigations 
or other important data such as the 
fraud register with a view to preventing 
further occurrences.  This means that 
important learning is unavailable 
to investigators, policy leads and 
supervisors;
 > Within the Garda College ethical 
dilemmas and the Code of Ethics form 
part of training for new recruits and 
reserves.  A separate lesson entitled 
“Where it all went wrong” focuses 
on lessons learned from high-profile 
tribunals of enquiry involving the 
Garda Síochána.  However, it is not 
supplemented with inputs by either 
Garda Internal Affairs or GSOC, 
which would allow the training to be 
enhanced with real-life case studies.  A 
number of garda staff who met with the 
Inspectorate reported that on joining 
they had no induction training prior 
to commencing work in divisions or 
departments.  In addition, there are no 
corruption training or briefing materials 
that specifically address identified 
organisational vulnerabilities, improve 
the awareness of supervisors, or 
support the resilience of those in posts 
at higher risk of corruption;
 > During focus groups and interviews, 
the Inspectorate found that there was 
limited knowledge of disciplinary 
outcomes beyond the immediate area 
where staff were based; and
 > Currently, the findings of discipline 
panels are not openly disseminated 
within the organisation to highlight the 
consequences of unethical behaviour to 
the garda workforce.
The need to improve internal communication 
of organisational learning has been identified 
as a key priority in the implementation plan 
for the Garda Síochána ACU.  This includes 
the development of a comprehensive 
communication strategy aimed at preventing 
corruption through training, briefing and 
online learning.  There are also plans to 
develop materials for online learning and 
establish Regional Integrity Champions.
To tackle corruption effectively, the Garda 
Síochána needs to learn from past mistakes 
and to communicate this learning widely. 
To be effective, information must be clear, 
accessible and sufficiently detailed, so that 
the workforce can understand the issues 
concerned and avoid repeating previous 
mistakes.
The Garda Síochána’s proposals reflect 
international practice as benchmarked by the 
Inspectorate; however, full implementation 
is required if the benefits are to be fully 
realised.
Identified Good Practice
The Garda Síochána has an e-learning 
platform known as the Learning 
Management System.  This system was 
recently used successfully to provide 
organisation-wide training to address 
weaknesses in the management of 
cases involving juveniles and is 
being developed into an interactive 
learning tool that supports blended 
learning and behavioural change 
in the organisation.  Such systems 
provide valuable opportunities for 
sharing learning quickly and effectively 
across an organisation.  During focus 
groups for this inspection, the training 
for managing juvenile cases was 
commended as valuable, and as helping 
to deliver significant organisational 
change.  
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Recommendation
In light of these findings, assessments 
and review of international practice, 
the Inspectorate makes the following 
recommendation.
The Garda Síochána should implement 
a counter-corruption communications 
strategy, which should include:
• Ensuring lessons learned and 
suitable real-life case studies form 
the basis of future training and 
briefing packages.
• Disseminating organisational 
learning drawn from international 
trends and internally focused 
investigations including those 
conducted by the Garda Síochána 
Ombudsman Commission and 
other regulatory bodies.








ACU   Anti-Corruption Unit
APP   Authorised Professional Practice
APSG   Abuse of Power for Sexual Gain
COI	 	 	 Conflict/s	of	Interest
COSO 	 Committee	of	Sponsoring	Organisations




EIPO	 	 	 Ethics	in	Public	Office	Acts
FCPN 	 	 Fixed	Charge	Penalty	Notice
GNBCI	 	 Garda	National	Bureau	of	Criminal	Investigation
GNPSB	 	 Garda	National	Protective	Services	Bureau




IAS	 	 	 Information	Assurance	System
ICB	 	 	 Irish	Credit	Bureau
ICT	 	 	 Information	and	Communication	Technology
IOI	 	 	 Incident	of	Interest
IOPC	 	 	 Independent	Office	for	Police	Conduct
IPCC	 	 	 Independent	Police	Complaints	Commission
ISMS	 	 	 Information	Security	Management	System
MRP 	 	 Modernisation	and	Renewal	Programme	
NAMA	 	 National	Asset	Management	Agency	
NCA 	 	 National	Crime	Agency
NCT	 	 	 National	Car	Test
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NGO 	 	 Non-Governmental	Organisation
NPCC 	 	 National	Police	Chiefs’	Council
OSCE 	 	 Organisation	for	Security	and	Co-operation	in	Europe
PACE   Police and Criminal Evidence Act
PAF   Performance and Accountability Framework
PEMS 	 	 Property	and	Evidence	Management	System
PSNI	 	 	 Police	Service	of	Northern	Ireland	
SIPO 	 	 Standards	in	Public	Office
UN	 	 	 United	Nations





its appreciation to the Garda Commissioner, 
garda	management	 and	 staff	who	 shared	
their	time,	knowledge,	expertise	and	ideas	
during	 this	 inspection.	 The	 Inspectorate	
appreciates the practical assistance provided 
and	facilities	offered	during	all	 inspection	
visits.
The	 Inspectorate	would	also	 like	 to	 thank	
the Garda Representative Association, 
the	 Association	 of	 Garda	 Sergeants	 and	
Inspectors	 and	 the	Association	 of	 Garda	
Superintendent’s	for	their	engagement	with	
the	 Inspectorate	 at	national	 level	 through	
meetings	 and	 submissions	 and	 through	
meetings	at	the	locations	visited.	
In	 addition,	 the	 Inspectorate	 is	 grateful	
for	 the	 input	of	 the	 following	key	official	
stakeholders who contributed to this 
inspection.	
 > Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption 
Structures Review Group
 > COSC
 > Courts Service
 > Criminal	Assets	Bureau
 > Data Protection Commission
 > Department of Justice and Equality
 > Department of Public Expenditure and 
Reform
 > Director of Public Prosecutions
 > Garda	 S íochána	 Ombudsman	
Commission







 > Private Security Authority
 > Standards	in	Public	Office	Commission
 > Tusla
The	 Inspectorate	 also	 consulted	 and	met	
with	voluntary	groups,	non-governmental	




 > Dublin Simon Community
 > Focus	Ireland
 > Group	 of	 States	Against	 Corruption	
(GRECO)
 > Irish	Council	for	Civil	Liberties	(ICCL)
 > Irish	Criminal	 Justice	 and	Disability	
Network
 > Irish	 Society	 for	 the	 Prevention	 of	
Cruelty	to	Children	(ISPCC)
 > Organisation	 for	 Economic	 Co-
operation	and	Development	(OECD)
 > Organization	 for	 Security	 and	 Co-
operation	in	Europe	(OSCE)
 > Pavee Point

















 > Her	 Majesty’s	 Inspectorate	 of	
Constabulary and Fire and Rescue 
Services	(England	and	Wales)
 > Independent	Office	for	Police	Conduct











The	 inspection	 involved	 an	 in-depth	
examination of every aspect of the Garda 
Síochána efforts to counter the risk of 
corruption	 within	 the	 organisation.	 The	
inspection had a number of key phases, 
including:	 planning,	 desktop	 literature	
review, field work, information requests, 
international visits, material review and 
report	writing.	Some	of	the	key	steps	in	the	
methodology	included	the	following:
Planning and Literature Review 
Phase
 > The	 inspection	 team	 identified	 key	
garda	functional	areas	and	personnel	
to assist the inspection, and scheduled 
interviews.	 The	 team	 also	 identified	
other relevant stakeholders and invited 
them to meet or to make written 
submissions.	The	inspection	team	made	
a number of requests to the Garda 
Liaison	 Officer	 for	 documents	 and	
information	relevant	to	the	inspection.
 > The	 inspection	 team	 carried	 out	
a	 thorough	 review	 of	 corruption-
related	 literature,	 including	 research	
and policy papers, reports similar 
to this one undertaken by other 
inspectorate	bodies,	policing	standards	
and professional practices set by 
international	security	and	human	rights	
or	 other	 international	 organisations,	
and other relevant publicly available 
information.
Field Work Phase
 > Extensive	 interviews	with	key	garda	
personnel were conducted at the 
strategic	 level	 as	well	 as	 reviews	 of	
related	information	and	policies.	Those	
interviewed	included	staff	from:	senior	
management,	 human	 resources	 and	
people	 development,	 legal	 services,	
training,	data	protection,	finance	and	
procurement, special operations and 
national units, professional standards, 
crime and security, internal affairs, 
internal	audit,	vetting,	audit	and	risk	
committee	 and	 employee	 assistance.	
Extensive	 engagement	 also	 took	
place with the Garda Síochána Anti-
Corruption	Unit	implementation	team.
 > Field interviews were conducted 
in	 garda	 divisions	 and	 with	 garda	
member	 focus	groups	 to	confirm	the	
information and explanations received 
during	 the	 strategic	 phase	 of	 the	
inspection.	Field	visits	took	place	in	the	
following	locations:	Cavan/Monaghan	
Division, Clare Division, DMR East 
Division, Waterford Division, Garda 
College	Templemore	and	Fixed	Charge	
Penalty	Office	in	Thurles.
 > Interviews	 were	 conducted	 and	





advocacy	 and	 support	 groups	 and	
services,	 and	 garda	 representative	
organisations	and	trade	unions.
International Visit Phase
 > In	 September	 and	 October	 2019	 the	
inspection team visited Merseyside 
Police	 and	 South	 Yorkshire	 Police	
to explore international practices in 




 > In	addition	to	the	 international	visits	
the inspection team had valuable 
discussions	 with	 the	 National	
Crime	Agency	 and	 the	 Independent	
Office	 of	 Police	 Conduct	 in	 the	UK,	
the	 German	 Ministry	 of	 Interior,	
the	 Federal	 Criminal	 Police	 Office	
(Bundeskriminalamt)	in	Germany,	and	
the	New	Zealand	Police.	Similarly,	the	
inspection team communicated with 
several	international	bodies:	the	OECD,	
the	 OSCE,	 the	 UN	 and	 the	 Council	
of Europe to explore international 
practices	in	relation	to	countering	the	
threat of internal corruption from an 
international	perspective.
Review and Reporting Phase
Following	the	active	phases	of	the	inspection	
outlined above, the inspection team reviewed 




Part I | Chapter 1
Recommendation 1
Strategic Threat and Risk 
Assessment
The	 Department	 of	 Justice	 should	 develop	 a	 strategic	
understanding	of	the	risk	of	internal	corruption	across	the	
criminal	justice	sector	with	the	objective	of	developing	an	
overarching	 strategy	 and	multi-agency	 approach	 to	 the	
management	of	the	corruption	threats.
Recommendation 2
Strategy and Governance in 
the Garda Síochána
The	 Garda	 Síochána	 should	 develop	 and	 implement	 a	
governance	 process	 for	 identifying	 and	 mitigating	 the	
threats, risks and potential harms associated with internal 
corruption.	This	process	must	include:










an	 overarching	 policy	 and	 guidelines	 on	 professional	
boundaries	for	the	garda	workforce.
Recommendation 4






where a position of power can be abused for emotional 
or	 sexual	purposes	 and	provide	guidance	 for	 the	garda	












Covert Human Intelligence 
Sources
The	 Garda	 Síochána	 should	 revise	 its	 Covert	 Human	
Intelligence	 Sources	Management	Policy	 to	prohibit	 the	
acceptance	of	 gifts	 or	hospitality	 from	a	Covert	Human	
Intelligence	Source.		This	should	reinforce	the	obligations	
in	other	related	garda	policies	dealing	with	professional	






























• Gifts, hospitality and sponsorship received should be 
triangulated	against	other	sources,	such	as	procurement	
contracts	and	Standards	in	Public	Office	declarations.







intervals	 including	 when	 no	 gifts,	 hospitality	 or	
sponsorship	have	been	recorded	for	the	period.
• Gifts,	hospitality	and	sponsorship	offered	to	or	received	
by ranks from superintendent and assistant principal 





• Gifts, hospitality and sponsorship should not be accepted 
from	organisations	that	could	be	subject	to	a	non-public	
duty	 charge,	 those	 with	 a	 commercial	 relationship	
with the Garda Síochána, or those subject to statutory 
oversight	by	the	Garda	Síochána.
Recommendation 10






to declare all personal commercial interests and 
































not on an annual basis at the very minimum at critical career 
points such as on promotion or selection for specialist or 
designated	positions.








• Vetting	 should	 include	pre-employment	 and	 regular	
in-service	 reviews.	 For	 example,	 appointments	 to	
designated	or	vulnerable	posts	or	promotion	 should	
attract	re-vetting	and	staff	in	designated	or	vulnerable	
















• The	Anti-Corruption	Unit	 should	 be	 responsible	 for	
assessing	all	information	relating	to	an	individual	where	
a	risk	has	been	 identified	during	vetting,	and	should	
provide a recommendation to the Garda Commissioner 
on	the	appropriate	action	to	take.
Recommendation 15
Property and Evidence 
Management
The	Garda	Síochána	should	ensure	that	all	property	stores	



































use	 of	 garda	 information	 and	 communications	
technology	systems	following	identified	or	suspected	




• The	Anti-Corruption	Unit	 should	 be	 responsible	 for	
challenging,	 through	 divisional	 supervisory	 and	
governance	structures,	the	use	of	garda	ICT	systems	on	
both a random basis and where the access has raised 
concerns	of	inappropriate	use.





• Introducing	 suitable	 guidelines	 and	 procedures	 to	
improve	record-keeping.		In	particular,	there	must	be	
requirements	 to	explain	 in	detail	a	garda	decision	 to	
discontinue a case and to record explanations for a case 
being	struck	out	in	the	District	Court.
• Reviewing	discontinued	cases	should	form	part	of	the	
divisional Performance and Accountability Framework 
review process to identify patterns or performance 
concerns.
• Ensuring	discontinued	cases	that	arise	from	the	non-
attendance	 of	 a	 garda	 member	 are	 reviewed	 by	 a	
supervisor.
Recommendation 20






Fixed Charge Penalty 
System
The	 Garda	 Síochána	 must	 ensure	 that	 the	 process	 for	
cancelling	a	Fixed	Charge	Penalty	Notice	on	the	basis	of	the	
statutory exemption consider all of the relevant conditions, 
including	 those	 set	out	 in	 regulation	and	policy,	and	be	
properly	documented.		Such	an	approach	should	ensure	that:
• The	 exceptional	 circumstances	 test	 is	 applied	more	
rigorously	 in	 the	 decision-making	 process.	 	 The	
necessity  to travel in excess of the speed limit, and the 






















• All	 non-public	 duty	 policing	 plans	 should	 be	
approved	at	a	regional	level	by	the	Regional	Assistant	
Commissioner.





















understanding	 of	 corruption	 threats	 within	 the	 Garda	
Síochána.		Specific	functions	should	include:























statutory	 framework,	 in	 line	with	 the	State’s	obligations	
under	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	relating	
to	effective	 independent	 investigation,	 to	ensure	 that	all	






Part IV | Chapter 7
Recommendation 28
Identifying the Abuse of 
Power for Sexual Gain
The	Garda	Síochána	should	ensure	that	the	Anti-Corruption	























The	Garda	 Síochána	 should	 assign	 responsibility	 to	 the	
Anti-Corruption	Unit	for	monitoring	all	counter-corruption	


















The	Garda	 Síochána	 should	 conduct	 formal	 reviews	 of	
cases	of	corruption	and	serious	wrongdoing	to	understand	







• Ensuring	 lessons	 learned	and	suitable	 real-life	case	
studies	form	the	basis	of	future	training	and	briefing	
packages.
• Disseminating	 organisational	 learning	 drawn	
from international trends and internally focused 
investigations	 including	 those	 conducted	 by	 the	
Garda	Síochána	Ombudsman	Commission	and	other	
regulatory	bodies.
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